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21.
本文给出了基于个人超出值的无限模糊联盟合作博弈最小二乘预核仁的求解模型,得到该模型的显式解析解,并研究该解的若干重要性质。证明了:本文给出的无限模糊联盟合作博弈的最小二乘预核仁与基于个人超出值的相等解(The equalizer solution),基于个人超出值的字典序解三者相等。进一步证明了:基于Owen线性多维扩展的无限模糊联盟合作博弈的最小二乘预核仁与基于个人超出值的经典合作博弈最小二乘预核仁相等。最后,通过数值实例说明本文提出的无限模糊联盟合作博弈求解模型的实用性与有效性。 相似文献
22.
研究多重目标随机结盟对策问题,引用区间模糊教有关理论,同时考虑局中人参与程度模糊化和支付函数模糊化的情形以及局中人对不同目标的偏好程度,给出多目标随机结盟对策的区间模糊ZS-值的定义及定理.区间模糊ZS-值能更好解决企业合作中存在的不精确数据时的利益分配问题,最后通过一个实例说明其可行性. 相似文献
23.
24.
Tamás Solymosi 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):1-11
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set ℳi
1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced
games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set ℳi
1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person
case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides
with the bargaining set ℳi
1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Received: August 2001/Revised version: April 2002 相似文献
25.
PEDRO PINTASSILGO 《Natural Resource Modeling》2003,16(2):175-197
ABSTRACT. The current paper extends the coalition approach of the management of high seas fisheries to the presence of externalities. The coalition approach is set within the framework of a two‐stage game in which the payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure and are determined through a partition function. The relationship between the presence of externalities and the stability of the coalition structures is explored. The equilibrium coalition structures of the game are also examined. The application of the game to the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna shows a typical picture of the high seas fisheries: the simultaneous presence of strong externalities in the coalition structures and the absence of stability of the grand coalition. A fundamental conclusion of this paper is that, generally, in order to guarantee the stability of the cooperative agreements it is not sufficient to implement a fair sharing rule for the distribution of the returns from cooperation. Stability requires a legal regime preventing the players that engage in noncooperative behavior from having access to the resource. 相似文献
26.
27.
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency. 相似文献
28.
Gérard Hamiache 《International Journal of Game Theory》2001,29(4):517-532
This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are
defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in
an aggressive manner towards players who are not members of the same unions and in a friendly manner towards players that
do belong to their unions. The consistency axiom necessitates the definition of only one associated game which is not a reduced
game.
Received: February 1999/Revised version: January 2000 相似文献
29.
YULIA PAVLOVA 《Natural Resource Modeling》2010,23(4):540-564
Abstract In this paper, we search for multistage realization of international environmental agreements. To analyze countries' incentives and the results of their interactions, we mathematically represent players' strategic preferences and apply a game‐theoretic approach to make predictions about their outcomes. The initial decision on emissions reduction is determined by the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. We generalize Barrett's static “emission” model to a dynamic framework and answer the question “how rapid should the emission reduction be?” It appears that sharper abatement is desirable in the early term, which is similar to the conclusion of the Stern review. Numerical example demonstrates that abatement dynamics of the coalition and the free‐rider differ when discounting of the future payoffs increases. We show that without incentives from external organizations or governments, such pollution reduction path can actually lead to a decline in the agreement's membership size. 相似文献
30.
Simple games are yes/no cooperative games which arise in many practical applications. Recently, we have used reduced ordered binary decision diagrams and quasi-reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (abbreviated as Robdds and Qobdds, respectively) for the representation of simple games and for the computation of some power indices. In the present paper, we continue this work. We show how further important computational problems on simple games can be solved using Qobdds, viz. the identification of some key players, the computation of the desirability relation on individuals, the test whether a simple game is proper and strong, respectively, and the computation of Qobdd-representations for the sets of all minimal winning coalitions, all shift-minimal winning coalitions and all blocking coalitions, respectively. Applications of these solutions include the computation of recent power indices based on shift-minimal winning coalitions and the test for linear separability of a directed simple game. 相似文献