The minority game with incomplete strategies

This paper proposes a new model of Incomplete Minority Game (IMG), which features a default hierarchy of rules. This model introduces random bits into players’ individual strategies and is capable of applying the exception rules in the absence of the default one. Analysis of the numerical experiment results indicates that, in comparison with the standard Minority Game (SMG) model, this IMG model expands the maximum ensemble of uncorrelated strategies (MEUS) and excels in the effective strategy set and dynamic evolution of individual strategies, which enhance the overall performance by reaching an approximate ideal status in a shorter time with less memory steps and more stable combination of strategies. This paper also discusses the practical implication of the new IMG model.     

关于拓扑对策中的I~2(K)I(K)问题

证明了如果空间类κ为D-空间类或闭遗传不可约空间类,则I(κ)(∈)κ.这一结果对于κ为D空间类和闭遗传不可约空间类,肯定地回答了I(κ)是否包含I2(κ)问题.     

Robust Optimal Stopping-Time Control for Nonlinear Systems

Abstract. We formulate a robust optimal stopping-time problem for a state-space system and give the connection between various notions of lower value function for the associated games (and storage function for the associated dissipative system) with solutions of the appropriate variational inequality (VI) (the analogue of the Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman—Isaacs equation for this setting). We show that the stopping-time rule can be obtained by solving the VI in the viscosity sense and a positive definite supersolution of the VI can be used for stability analysis.     

Sequencing games with repeated players

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations. In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player’s cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequencing situations the cost functions are linear with respect to the minimum completion times. For both classes, following explicit procedures to go from the initial processing order to an optimal order for the coalition of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined. It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the associated RP sequencing games. Moreover, it is seen that min-RP sequencing games are convex. We thank two referees for their valuable suggestions for improvement. Financial support for P. Calleja has been given by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER under grant SEJ2005-02443/ECON, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through a BE grant from AGAUR and grant 2005SGR00984.     

On the Sociobiology of Hawks and Doves. A phase diagram for integration and segregation

Competing groups in a population will be integrated or segregated depending on their contest strategies. In this work a population of a fixed proportion of hawks and doves is supposed to be able to employ two different contest strategies, one more competitive than the other one. Energies are derived for populations employing these strategies and these energies depend on the availability of the resource for which hawks and doves compete. The energy for the less competitive strategy is lower than the other one when the resource is abundant. In that case hawks and doves can be in cohabitation in all proportions. If, however, the resource is scarce, the energy of the more competitive strategy is lower than the other one. In that case complete segregation of hawks and doves into colonies will result. The situation is akin to the phase pressure diagram of a binary solution with eutectic point, miscibility gap in the liquid phase and complete miscibility in the vapour phase. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games

We establish NP-completeness of two problems on core stable coalitions in hedonic games. In the first problem every player has only two acceptable coalitions in his preference list, and in the second problem the preference structures arise from the distances in an underlying metric space.     

中外零售商中国市场互动关系的演化博弈分析——以大商与沃尔玛为例

在经济全球化大背景下,中外零售企业长期共存、共同发展的局面将会是中国零售市场的现实状况.对中外零售商的互动博弈进行深入剖析,将有助于更好地把握中外零售商的竞争态势,制定促进本土零售商持续发展的合理战略.基于演化博弈论构建模型,并以大商集团和沃尔玛为例,尝试性地对中外零售商之间的互动关系进行了分析,从而得出结论:中外零售商之间存在着较为复杂的互动关系,双方是合作还是竞争取决于市场环境、合作成本、合作收益以及各自的发展战略等多方面因素.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.