On a dynamic fractional game

Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game system.     

Analysis of a Duopoly Supply Chain and its Application in Electricity Spot Markets

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market. Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.     

最小费用k度限制树对策

本在Glover—Klingman算法及最小费用支撑树对策的基础上，讨论了最小费用k度限制树对策问题．利用威胁、旁支付理论制订了两种规则，并利用优超、策略等价理论分别给出了在这两种规则下最小费用k度限制树对策核心中的解，从而证明了在这两种规则下其核心非空．     

Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems

This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

A Relationship Among Gentzen's Proof-Reduction,Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game and Buchholz's Hydra Game

We first note that Gentzen's proof-reduction for his consistency proof of PA can be directly interpreted as moves of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game, which implies a direct independence proof of the game (Section 1 and Appendix). Buchholz's Hydra Game for labeled hydras is known to be much stronger than PA. However, we show that the one-dimensional version of Buchholz's Game can be exactly identified to Kirby-Paris' Game (which is two-dimensional but without labels), by a simple and natural interpretation (Section 2). Jervell proposed another type of a combinatorial game, by abstracting Gentzen's proof-reductions and showed that his game is independent of PA. We show (Section 3) that this Jervell's game is actually much stronger than PA, by showing that the critical ordinal of Jervell's game is φ_ω (0) (while that of PA or of Kirby-Paris' Game is φ₁ (0) = ?₀) in the Veblen hierarchy of ordinals.     

Perfect information two-person zero-sum markov games with imprecise transition probabilities

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an equilibrium value for the games formulated with the model in terms of a partial order and then establish the existence of an equilibrium policy pair that achieves the equilibrium value. We further analyze finite-approximation error bounds obtained from a value iteration-type algorithm and discuss some applications of the model.     

k-边覆盖对策及其核心

本文针对从图的k-边覆盖问题引出的合作对策模型，利用线性规划对偶理论得到了其核心非空的一个充分条件和构造核心分配的多项式时间算法，并将这一结果推广到了一般的k-集合覆盖对策模型中．     

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN UTILIZING A COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE

Noncooperative games are used to demonstrate that, while free riding is always an option, the “tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable. When the decision to cooperate or free ride is considered in a dynamic setting, there is no intermediate case where some cooperate and others free ride. The game is only stabilized in either full cooperation or full defection. The important factor in obtaining a cooperative outcome is the critical number of players that decide to cooperate. The concept of commitment is used to demonstrate the necessary and sufficient conditions for full cooperation. Although the analysis is based on a shared water resource, it can be extended to other natural resources with common costs and private benefits, especially in the cases where there are no international authorities or treaties that internalize the externalities involved in privatizing the resource.     

A theoretical approximation scheme for Stackelberg problems

We consider the Stackelberg problem corresponding to a two-player game in which one of the two players has the leadership in playing the game. We present a general approach for approximating the considered hierarchical programming problem by a sequence of two-level optimization problems. From a practical point of view, we also give some results for asymptotically Stackelberg approximating sequences and for problems with perturbed constraints.This paper is based upon results first presented at Journées Fermat: Mathematics for Optimization, Toulouse, France, May 1985.