公共资产预算配置的拍卖机制设计

本文探讨在财政部门作为政府出资人的框架下,通过设计一套可行的竞标机制来提高预算项目的配置效率。结合运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论与方法建立竞标机制设计模型,在保证竞标预算单位参与投标和真实显示自己效率的条件下最大化拍卖者——政府出资人的期望效用,并通过求解此模型得到最优的竞标机制。鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了第二高得分拍卖这种最优拍卖方式。最后对公共资产配置预算的规则如何确定才能减少效率损失进行了归纳。     

A spectrum auction algorithm based on joint power control and beamforming in small cell networks

Spectrum auction is considered as a suitable approach to efficiently allocate spectrum among unlicensed users. However, in previous studies of spectrum auction, competition can hardly be reflected in the traditional spectrum allocation and the spectrum efficiency is still not high after the allocation. In this paper, we enhance the factor of competition in the auctions, in which bidders need to pay for the competition and the interference to macro cell users (MUs). We consider a communication system with one macro cell and several small cells, thus a licensed radio spectrum is shared by both MUs and small cell users (SUs). A truthful auction algorithm is proposed for spectrum allocation and the spectrum is divided into multiple channels in different time slots, so that SUs can make their choice for bidding under the guidance of history. In order to raise the communication quality, we propose a power control and beamforming algorithm in the heterogeneous network to enhance the system performance. Simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in the small cell network.     

Quantum Secure Direct Communication and Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction with EPR Pairs

I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respectivesecret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction (QSBD) protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze the security of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbance attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.     

Does an increase in the number of solvers benefit the seeker in heterogeneous contests?

In this paper, we analyze whether increasing the number of solvers benefits the seeker in heterogeneous contests. We show that if the number of solvers is large, the expected average quality (resp., expected maximum quality) of solutions is decreasing (resp., increasing). However, the results may not hold when the number of solvers is below a certain threshold. These imply that the seeker should adopt the restricted-entry policy or not based on different measure criteria and sizes of solvers.     

An auction with positive externality and possible application to overtime rules in football,soccer, and chess

We analyze auctions with positive externality, wherein the utility of each player who submitted a losing bid is strictly increasing in the price paid by the winning bidder. Such an auction was recently proposed for determining the starting team and the starting yard line in an overtime period in American football. We analyze the NFL case and also consider other football leagues, as well as tie-breaking by penalty shots in soccer, and overcoming a draw situation in chess.     

On vector formulations of auction-type problems with applications

We propose an extension of the auction model with many divisible commodities for vector price (validity) functions. It can be viewed as a new general equilibrium model for complex systems with active elements. We give its sufficient vector variational inequality formulation and new general existence results for different ordering cones. We suggest vector extensions of network and spatial equilibrium problems with capacity bounds and show that they are particular cases of the general auction model. We also give new sufficient conditions for existence of solutions for these problems.     

第一密封价格逆向拍卖机制博弈研究

在供应商对拟投标项目成本估计独立、不同分布的条件下,通过建立不公开保留价的第一价格逆向拍卖机制博弈模型,推导了供应商的最优报价策略,博弈均衡存在时采购者最优保留价满足的条件,发现供应商的报价高于他的成本估计,进一步得到了与该采购机制资源配置效率有关的结论:参与投标的人数越多供应商报价溢出成本部分越少;成本越低的供应商期望支付越大.这对于现实采购拍卖的政策建议为:设法让更多供应商参与竞标,能有效选择优势供应商、降低采购成本、增加社会福利.     

有不公开底价英式拍卖的非时齐Markov链模型

对有不公开底价的英格兰式拍卖,建立了非时齐Markov链数学模型．对此模型,求出了拍卖的成交概率、平均成交价、成交时应价次数和成交价的联合概率分布以及边缘分布．     

电子商务环境下企业采购招标模型研究

本文研究了在电子商务环境下企业采用网上招标形式时的最优采购策略,指出了在不对称信息情况下企业应如何选择竞标商及如何确定最优采购数量,对Myerson(1981)的结论进行了扩展.     

DEA based auctions

We discuss the design of a multi-dimensional procurement mechanism that combines Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanism selects an agent to provide a project characterized by multiple attributes. The optimal configuration of the multiple attributes is settled endogenously by trading off the costs to the provider with the benefits to the acquirer. This is done within a context of asymmetric information and strategic behavior as well as possibly correlated costs. The mechanism makes it individually rational and incentive compatible to participate and reveal costs, and the outcome is socially optimal (allocatively efficient).