指派问题的纳什均衡解

为弥补传统指派问题解不符合个体理性的不足,提出指派问题的纳什均衡解,并证明有限指派问题有且仅有纯纳什均衡解。相比传统的指派问题解,纯纳什均衡符合Pareto最优,是个体理性视角下的最优解。在此基础上,给出一个综合考虑个体理性与集体理性的求解方法。     

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies: cooperators, efectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show
that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature (London) {\bf 425} (2003) 390], but also it will heavily
influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner's payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner's payoff. It thus indicates
the effects of rationality and loner's payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.     

The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning

We extend agency theory to incorporate bounded rationality of both principals and agents. In this study we define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is simulated with a genetic algorithm model. Our results show that players of incentive games in highly uncertain environments may take on defensive strategies. These defensive strategies lead to equilibria which are inferior to Nash equilibria. If agents are risk averse, the principal may not be able to provide enough monetary compensation to encourage them to take risks. But principals may be able to improve system performance by identifying good performers and facilitating information exchange among agents.The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.     

Complementarity and Scientific Rationality

Bohrs interpretation of quantum mechanics has been criticized as incoherent and opportunistic, and based on doubtful philosophical premises. If so Bohrs influence, in the pre-war period of 1927–1939, is the harder to explain, and the acceptance of his approach to quantum mechanics over de Broglies had no reasonable foundation. But Bohrs interpretation changed little from the time of its first appearance, and stood independent of any philosophical presuppositions. The principle of complementarity is itself best read as a conjecture of unusually wide scope, on the nature and future course of explanations in the sciences (and not only the physical sciences). If it must be judged a failure today, it is not because of any internal inconsistency.     

Some properties of choice functions based on valued binary relations

Choice functions based on t-norms of valued binary relations are introduced. Strict preference is also specified with the use of a t-norm. Properties of the choice functions are investigated and rationality conditions are studied. Some classical particular cases are presented.     

考虑随机扰动的群体决策理性演化模型

在群体决策过程中,随机噪音对个体理性和群体理性的变化具有不可忽视的影响.针对存在随机扰动条件下群体决策理性的演化行为,在假设个体和群体理性之间存在作用叠加效果的基础上,建立了刻画个体和群体理性受随机噪声影响的个体和群体理性演化动力学模型,利用随机微分方程理论,论证了模型解的存在性和唯一性,在给定群体决策的随机扰动为白噪声的假设条件下得到了模型的解析解,讨论了群体决策中两个重要参数:理性作用强度和随机干扰作用强度对于群体理性演化的影响.理论分析结果表明:群体决策理性的演化行为取决于这两个参数的相对大小,存在着三条不同的演化路径,数值算例验证了模型的合理性和有效性,并对群体理性的演化行为进行了直观说明,对于深入认识群体决策规律和提高决策质量具有积极的理论和实际意义.     

Bogomolov multipliers for some <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-groups of nilpotency class 2

The Bogomolov multiplier B ₀(G) of a finite group G is defined as the subgroup of the Schur multiplier consisting of the cohomology classes vanishing after restriction to all abelian subgroups of G. The triviality of the Bogomolov multiplier is an obstruction to Noether’s problem. We show that if G is a central product of G ₁ and G ₂, regarding K _i ≤ Z(G _i ), i = 1, 2, and θ: G ₁ → G ₂ is a group homomorphism such that its restriction \(\theta {|_{{K_1}}}:{K_1} \to {K_2}\) is an isomorphism, then the triviality of B ₀(G ₁/K ₁),B ₀(G ₁) and B ₀(G ₂) implies the triviality of B ₀(G). We give a positive answer to Noether’s problem for all 2-generator p-groups of nilpotency class 2, and for one series of 4-generator p-groups of nilpotency class 2 (with the usual requirement for the roots of unity).     

基于Ekeland变分原理的一类平衡问题解集的稳定性研究及应用

基于Ekeland变分原理建立的平衡问题,减弱了函数和定义域的凸性要求,减弱了三角不等式条件,函数只有循环反单调性,但其具有良好的性质.一方面,利用非线性分析方法,对非凸紧和非凸非紧的平衡问题研究解的唯一性,在Baire分类意义下,得到基于Ekeland变分原理建立的平衡问题的解具有通有唯一性.另一方面,利用有限理性模...     

几类考虑有限理性平衡问题解的稳定性

对Ky Fan点问题定义了理性函数,证明了大多数的KyFan点问题(在Baire分类意义上)都是结构稳定的,对$\varepsilon$-平衡也都是鲁棒的.作为应用,还给出了Nash平衡问题和变分不等式问题的稳定性结论.     

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.