差分—等级依赖效用模型研究

等级依赖效用模型在决策权重设置上存在理论缺陷;差分-等级依赖效用模型在有限理性假设下,考虑结果差分变化对决策权重的影响,提出基于差分的决策权重与概率权重的组合权重控制机制,可克服等级依赖效用模型的缺陷;针对差分-等级依赖效用模型的检验表明模型可很好解释拆分效应;差分-等级依赖效用模型保持了等级依赖效用模型的理论框架,可对人们的风险决策行为做出更好的解释和预测.     

基于损失厌恶的Littlewood容量控制准则

在传统的航空收益管理单航段两种票价等级的容量控制准则—Littlewood准则容量控制模型基础上考虑有限理性决策中的损失厌恶特性和参照依赖属性,以盈亏均衡点为基点,引入具有损失厌恶特征的效用函数,在Kahneman和Tversky预期理论(Prospect Theory,PT)的框架下,给出单航段两种票价等级的不同损失厌恶程度下高等级座位保护水平的计算公式.理论分析和数值算例均表明,随着损失厌恶程度的增加,在其他条件不变的前提下,高等级座位的保护水平将不断降低.     

有限理性双寡头博弈模型的复杂性分析

以Bowley博弈模型为核心,将寡头的调整速度作为企业的竞争策略,并对该模型Nash均衡点的稳定域进行分析;通过数值仿真把双寡头的策略区域分为均衡区、周期区和混沌区。研究发现双寡头博弈市场中,寡头为了获得更大的利润而不断改变自身产量策略,这是市场出现周期波动、甚至陷入混沌的根本内因.     

Rationality of quotients by linear actions of affine groups

LetG = SLn(C)Cn be the (special) affine group. In this paper we study the representation theory of G and in particular the question of rationality for V/G, where V is a generically free G-representation. We show that the answer to this question is positive (Theorem 6.1) if the dimension of V is sufficiently large and V is indecomposable. We explicitly characterize two-step extensions 0 → S → V → Q → 0, with completely reducible S and Q, whose rationality cannot be obtained by the methods presented here (The...     

模糊选择函数T-拟传递合理性充要条件的研究

T-拟传递合理性对模糊选择函数的研究至关重要.基于选择集为正规模糊选择集,对任意的t-模,利用文献中已有的结论,深入研究了模糊选择函数T-拟传递合理性的刻画问题,得到了模糊选择函数T-拟传递合理性的充要条件.     

A Maximum Entropy Model of Bounded Rational Decision-Making with Prior Beliefs and Market Feedback

Bounded rationality is an important consideration stemming from the fact that agents often have limits on their processing abilities, making the assumption of perfect rationality inapplicable to many real tasks. We propose an information-theoretic approach to the inference of agent decisions under Smithian competition. The model explicitly captures the boundedness of agents (limited in their information-processing capacity) as the cost of information acquisition for expanding their prior beliefs. The expansion is measured as the Kullblack–Leibler divergence between posterior decisions and prior beliefs. When information acquisition is free, the homo economicus agent is recovered, while in cases when information acquisition becomes costly, agents instead revert to their prior beliefs. The maximum entropy principle is used to infer least biased decisions based upon the notion of Smithian competition formalised within the Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium framework. The incorporation of prior beliefs into such a framework allowed us to systematically explore the effects of prior beliefs on decision-making in the presence of market feedback, as well as importantly adding a temporal interpretation to the framework. We verified the proposed model using Australian housing market data, showing how the incorporation of prior knowledge alters the resulting agent decisions. Specifically, it allowed for the separation of past beliefs and utility maximisation behaviour of the agent as well as the analysis into the evolution of agent beliefs.     

Elliptic subcovers of hyperelliptic curves

The main result of this paper states that if C is a hyperelliptic curve of even genus over an arbitrary field K , then there is a natural bijection between the set of equivalence classes of elliptic subcovers of and the set of elliptic subgroups of its Jacobian .     

Closure,Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

Introduction to the Special Issue

In the model, each person in a large population chooses between two options, such as adhering to or not adhering to a social norm. People observe each others’ choices at random and adjust their adherence probabilities in imitative directions. It is known from earlier work that, under strong restrictions on the imitation, the distribution of adherence probabilities will either evolve upward toward a high adherence equilibrium or downward toward a low adherence equilibrium, depending on initial conditions. The intuition is that imitation leads to uniformity. Here we show that more general forms of imitation allow a much wider variety of outcomes. There can be a sizable number of equilibria and a variety of stability patterns. In mathematical form, the model is an interactive Markov chain.