Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games

The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.     

Speculations on Nonlinear Speculative Bubbles

This paper reviews a variety of issues related to speculative bubbles, especially those involving nonlinear dynamics. Models of irrational bubbles, rational bubbles, and bubbles arising from heterogeneous agents with varying degrees of knowledge or rationality are examined. The latter are shown to be prone to nonlinear dynamics with catastrophic discontinuities, chaos, and other forms of complex phenomena. Empirical evidence regarding the existence of bubbles in various markets is reviewed, eventually examining strong evidence in closed-end country mutual funds markets.     

Adaptive approaches to stochastic programming

Economists have found a need to model agents who behave in ways that are not consistent with the traditional notions of rational behavior under uncertainty but that are oriented in some looser manner toward achieving good outcomes. Adaptation over time in a myopic manner, rather that forward-looking optimization, has been proposed as one such model of behavior that displays bounded rationality. This paper investigates the relationship between adaptation as a model of behavior and as an algorithmic approach that has been used in computing solutions to optimization problems. It describes a specific adaptive model of behavior in discrete choice problems, one that is closely related to adaptive algorithms for optimization, and shows that this model can be fruitfully applied in studying several economic issues.     

A Second Descent Problem for Quadratic Forms

Let F be a field of characteristic different from 2. We discuss a new descent problem for quadratic forms, complementing the one studied by Kahn and Laghribi. More precisely, we conjecture that for any quadratic form q over F and any Im(W(F) W(F(q))), there exists a quadratic form W(F) such that dim 2 dim and _F(q), where F(q) is the function field of the projective quadric defined by q = 0. We prove this conjecture for dim 3 and any q, and get partial results for dim {4, 5,6}. We also give other related results.     

Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game

This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an 8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks. In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance with the game equilibrium prediction. Received May 1994/Final version August 1996     

Neural networks and bounded rationality

Traditionally the emphasis in neural network research has been on improving their performance as a means of pattern recognition. Here we take an alternative approach and explore the remarkable similarity between the under-performance of neural networks trained to behave optimally in economic situations and observed human performance in the laboratory under similar circumstances. In particular, we show that neural networks are consistent with observed laboratory play in two very important senses. Firstly, they select a rule for behavior which appears very similar to that used by laboratory subjects. Secondly, using this rule they perform optimally only approximately 60% of the time.     

A stability theorem for symmetrically rational counterplanning

In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for a competitor to attribute to his opponents the same level of rationality that he himself employs. In the context of a general, linear-quadratic, nonzero-sum, two-person game, it is shown that a counterplanning procedure consistent with this principle of symmetrical rationality always converges to the unique Nash equilibrium for the game.The work of R. Kalaba and L. Tesfatsion was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. ENG-77-28432 and by the National Institutes of Health under Grant No. GM-23732-03.     

On desires and practical reasons

This paper challenges a common assumption about the relation between desires and practical reasons—namely, that if øing is an optimal way (or even just a way) for a person, P, to satisfy one of her desires, then P has a (normative) reason to ø. It challenges that assumption not by denying that desires are a source of practical reasons, but by showing that in some situations, rare though not impossible, P can lack a reason to ø despite having a desire that she could satisfy optimally by øing.     

有限注意力下一类满意启发式决策的建模与理性分析

在决策者有限注意力下,现实生活中决策人的选择行为往往表现出一类“满意启发式”特征。基于个体决策者偏好的不完备性,借助方案集系列、考虑集等相关概念探讨了满意启发式决策规则的建模;论证了方案集系列可观与部分可观条件下一类满意决策函数的存在性,以及基于相关理性条件的理性特征,并结合顾客购买行为案例的仿真实验对所建立的满意决策模型进行了验证。仿真结果表明决策者在时间紧逼和信息不完整的情形下可以通过排除部分方案的方式保证以最大概率选到满意方案。研究结果可为现实生活中决策人在时间紧迫、信息缺失等情形下的选择提供一定的理论参考与指导,也可作为一类满意决策研究的理论基础。