Optimal credit period and lot size for deteriorating items with expiration dates under two-level trade credit financing

In a supplier-retailer-buyer supply chain, the supplier frequently offers the retailer a trade credit of S periods, and the retailer in turn provides a trade credit of R periods to her/his buyer to stimulate sales and reduce inventory. From the seller’s perspective, granting trade credit increases sales and revenue but also increases opportunity cost (i.e., the capital opportunity loss during credit period) and default risk (i.e., the percentage that the buyer will not be able to pay off her/his debt obligations). Hence, how to determine credit period is increasingly recognized as an important strategy to increase seller’s profitability. Also, many products such as fruits, vegetables, high-tech products, pharmaceuticals, and volatile liquids not only deteriorate continuously due to evaporation, obsolescence and spoilage but also have their expiration dates. However, only a few researchers take the expiration date of a deteriorating item into consideration. This paper proposes an economic order quantity model for the retailer where: (a) the supplier provides an up-stream trade credit and the retailer also offers a down-stream trade credit, (b) the retailer’s down-stream trade credit to the buyer not only increases sales and revenue but also opportunity cost and default risk, and (c) deteriorating items not only deteriorate continuously but also have their expiration dates. We then show that the retailer’s optimal credit period and cycle time not only exist but also are unique. Furthermore, we discuss several special cases including for non-deteriorating items. Finally, we run some numerical examples to illustrate the problem and provide managerial insights.     

First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion.     

Managing raw material in supply chains

In this paper, we explore how firms can manage their raw material sourcing better by developing appropriate sourcing relationships with their raw material suppliers. We detail three empirical case studies of firms explaining their different raw material sourcing strategies: (a) firms can adopt a hands-off approach to raw material management, (b) firms can supply raw material directly to their suppliers, and this may be beneficial for some agents in the supply chain, and (c) firms can bring their component suppliers together, and the resulting cooperation between suppliers can be beneficial for supply chain. We then analytically model the three raw material scenarios encountered in our empirical work, examine the resulting profits along the supply chain, and extend the results to a competitive buyer scenario. Overall, our results show that active management of raw material sourcing can add value to supply chains.     

Make-or-buy service capacity decision in a supply chain providing after-sales service

We consider a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer supplies a product to the retailer, while the retailer sells the product bundled with after-sales service to consumers in a fully competitive market. The sales volume is affected by the retailer’s service-level commitment. The retailer can build service capacity in-house at a deterministic price before service demand is realized, or buy the service from an outsourcing market at an uncertain price after service demand realization. We find that the outsourcing market encourages the retailer to make a higher level of service commitment, while prompting the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price, resulting in more demand realization. We analyze how the expected cost of the service in the outsourcing market and the retailer’s risk attitude affect the decisions of both parties. We derive the conditions under which the retailer is willing to build service capacity in-house and under which it will buy the service from the outsourcing market. Moreover, we find that the manufacturer’s sharing with the retailer the cost to build service capacity improves the profits of both parties.     

Sensitivity analysis of markup equilibria in complementary markets

We study the competitive structure of a market in which firms compete to provide various products within a bundle. Firms adopt price functions proportional to their per-unit costs by selecting markups. We consider two measures reflecting, respectively, the intensity of direct competition and the impact of complementarity on each producer’s markup. We characterize the sensitivity of these terms to various changes in the market structure and relate this to changes in producer profits and the social efficiency of the market.     

An integrated revenue sharing and quantity discounts contract for coordinating a supply chain dealing with short life-cycle products

This paper develops a combined contract model for coordinating a two stage supply chain where the demand at the retailer’s end is price sensitive and stock dependent. It has been shown that proposed coordination mechanism achieves perfect coordination and win–win situation for both the members of the supply chain. Further, an extensive sensitivity analysis is performed to examine the impact of various parameters on supply chain performance. It has been found that stock dependency factor has positive impact on order quantity and subsequently on supply chain performance. The paper has also made a comparative statics analysis to see the impact of certain parameters on the pricing and replenishment policies of the retailer.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition

This paper investigates a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a revenue-sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the season, and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract. Adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods, the study finds that the provision of revenue-sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price-only contract. However, the benefits earned under the revenue-sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price-sensitivity factors. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price, order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers. Lastly, it investigates how the competition (between retailers) factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

Analyzing the effect of the inventory policy on order and inventory variability with linear control theory

In this paper we apply linear control theory to study the effect of various inventory policies on order and inventory variability, which are key drivers of supply chain performance. In particular, we study a two-echelon supply chain with a stationary demand pattern under the influence of three inventory policies: an inventory-on-hand policy that bases orders on the visible inventory at an installation, an installation-stock policy that bases orders on the inventory position (on-hand plus on-order inventory) at an installation, and an echelon-stock policy that bases orders on the inventory position at that installation and all downstream installations. We prove analytically that the inventory-on-hand policy is unstable in practical settings, confirming analytically what has been observed in experimental settings and in practice. We also prove that the installation-stock and echelon-stock policies are stable and analyze their effect on order and inventory fluctuation. Specifically, we show the general superiority of the echelon-stock in our setting and demonstrate analytically the effect of forecasting parameters on order and inventory fluctuations, confirming the results in other research.