Li-rich layered oxides: Structure,capacity and voltage fading mechanisms and solving strategies

Lithium rich layered oxides (LLOs) are attractive cathode materials for Li-ion batteries owing to their high capacity (>250 mA h g^–1) and suitable voltage (∼3.6 V). However, they suffer from serious voltage and capacity fading, which is focused in this review. First, an overview of crystal structure, band structure and electrochemical performances of LLOs is provided. After that, current understanding on oxygen loss, capacity fading and voltage fading is summarized. Finally, five strategies to mitigate capacity and voltage fading are reviewed. It is believed that these understandings can help solve the fading problems of LLOs.     

Solving Matrix Games with I-fuzzy Payoffs: Pareto-optimal Security Strategies Approach

A recent research work of Clemente et al. [12] on Pareto-optimal security strategies (POSS) in matrix games with fuzzy payoffs is extended to I-fuzzy scenario. Besides, the membership and the non-membership functions of the I-fuzzy values for both players are obtained by employing the technique of multiobjective optimization. The presented approach provides an efficient solution to a class of I-fuzzy matrix games with piecewise linear membership and non-membership functions. This class also includes I-fuzzy matrix games with triangular and trapezoidal I-fuzzy numbers as special cases. Further, POSS approach also provides an approximate solution to I-fuzzy matrix games with payoffs as general I-fuzzy numbers.     

A New Condition and Approach for Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Average Payoffs

Abstract

This article deals with discrete-time two-person zero-sum stochastic games with Borel state and action spaces. The optimality criterion to be studied is the long-run expected average payoff criterion, and the (immediate) payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds. We first replace the optimality equation widely used in the previous literature with two so-called optimality inequalities, and give a new set of conditions for the existence of solutions to the optimality inequalities. Then, from the optimality inequalities we ensure the existence of a pair of average optimal stationary strategies. Our new condition is slightly weaker than those in the previous literature, and as a byproduct some interesting results such as the convergence of a value iteration scheme to the value of the discounted payoff game is obtained. Finally, we first apply the main results in this article to generalized inventory systems, and then further provide an example of controlled population processes for which all of our conditions are satisfied, while some of conditions in some of previous literature fail to hold.     

An integrated production and preventive maintenance planning model

We are given a set of items that must be produced in lots on a capacitated production system throughout a specified finite planning horizon. We assume that the production system is subject to random failures, and that any maintenance action carried out on the system, in a period, reduces the system’s available production capacity during that period. The objective is to find an integrated lot-sizing and preventive maintenance strategy of the system that satisfies the demand for all items over the entire horizon without backlogging, and which minimizes the expected sum of production and maintenance costs. We show how this problem can be formulated and solved as a multi-item capacitated lot-sizing problem on a system that is periodically renewed and minimally repaired at failure. We also provide an illustrative example that shows the steps to obtain an optimal integrated production and maintenance strategy.     

Convex semi-infinite games

This paper introduces a generalization of semi-infinite games. The pure strategies for player I involve choosing one function from an infinite family of convex functions, while the set of mixed strategies for player II is a closed convex setC inR ⁿ. The minimax theorem applies under a condition which limits the directions of recession ofC. Player II always has optimal strategies. These are shown to exist for player I also if a certain infinite system verifies the property of Farkas-Minkowski. The paper also studies certain conditions that guarantee the finiteness of the value of the game and the existence of optimal pure strategies for player I.Many thanks are due to the referees for their detailed comments.     

Observability analysis and model formulation for nonlinear state estimation

A suitable design of state estimators for advanced control requires a detailed and representative mathematical model for capturing the nonlinear process behavior. The system observability, i.e. when the set of measurements provides enough information to estimate all the system states, is not a premise of the derivation of the Kalman filter. However, this propriety can improve the state estimator performance. On the basis of these design tasks, we outline a state estimation tuning strategy for different model formulations and present an algorithm to select the smallest number of measured variables to guarantee the system observability. The Williams–Otto semi-batch reactor was selected as case study, since its model formulation can be represented by two different set of states: (a) a mass basis states set and (b) a mass fraction basis states set. While the process-noise covariance matrix Q in the state estimator can be a diagonal and constant for the first model formulation, the matrix Q is not diagonal and time-varying for the second one due to their highly correlated states. Our results have shown how to convert the tuning matrices between different state definitions so that similar estimation results can be achieved.     

Analysis of an Age Structured SEIRS Epidemic Model with Varying Total Population Size and Vaccination

This article focuses on the study of an age structured SEIRS epidemic model with a vaccinationprogram when the total population size is not kept at constant.We first give the explicit expression of thereproduction number R(ψ,(?)) in the presence of vaccine ((?) is the exponent of growth of total population),andshow that the infection-free steady state is linearly stable if R(ψ,(?))<1 and unstable if R(ψ,(?))>1,then weapply the theoretical results to vaccination policies to determine the optimal age or ages at which an individualshould be vaccinated.It is shown that the optimal strategy can be either one- or two-age strategies.     

Market oscillations induced by the competition between value-based and trend-based investment strategies

We consider financial market using mathematical models which incorporate an excess demand function that depends not only upon the price but on the price derivative. The classical (value-based) motivation for purchasing the equity is augmented with a trend-based strategy of buying due to rising prices. An analysis (based on money flow and the finiteness of assets) of the supply, demand and price as a function of time leads to a system of ordinary differential equations which is mathematically complete. The numerical study of our equations exhibits overshooting, abrupt reversals and oscillations in prices. We examine our models within the context of real markets and economic laboratory experiments by comparing its predictions with a set of Porter and Smith experiments and with all US stock market “crashes” since 1929.     

Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server Markovian queue with setup times

We consider a single server Markovian queue with setup times. Whenever this system becomes empty, the server is turned off. Whenever a customer arrives to an empty system, the server begins an exponential setup time to start service again. We assume that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We examine customer behavior under various levels of information regarding the system state. Specifically, before making the decision, a customer may or may not know the state of the server and/or the number of present customers. We derive equilibrium strategies for the customers under the various levels of information and analyze the stationary behavior of the system under these strategies. We also illustrate further effects of the information level on the equilibrium behavior via numerical experiments.      

On generalized Stackelberg strategies

The concept of Stackelberg strategy for a nonzero-sum two-person game is extended to allow for a nonunique rational response of the follower. This leads to the notion of a generalized Stackelberg strategy for the leader, which guarantees him a cost value that cannot be exceeded, no matter what the rational response of the follower. Then, a generalized Stackelberg strategy pair is defined. A simple example is given. The idea of a generalized Stackelberg strategy and strategy pair is then applied to the situation of one leader and many rational followers.This paper is based on research supported by the National Science Foundation.