Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions

Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii).     

Equilibrium dialysis of metal-serum albumin (Ⅱ)——Allosteric effect in Ni(Ⅱ)-serum albumin systems

Detailed studies were carried out on equilibrium dialysis of the binding of Ni2++ ion to human scrum albumin (HSA) and bovine serum albumin (BSA).The successive stability constants were obtained by the Icfisi squares fitting.The eight binding sites found for both Ni(Ⅱ)-HSA and Ni(Ⅱ)-BSA systems can be divided into two different sets; and for both systems,there exist two identical prior binding sites where the bound Ni2+ ions can he con sidered as allosteric effectors,which induce the allosteric effect in accordance with the model proposed by Moeod et al As indicated by allosteric parameters,the ability of R-state to bind Ni2+ ions is ca 100 times as much as that of T state,and the conformation of HSA is markedly tenser than that of BSA.     

On price competition in location-price models with spatially separated markets

In this paper we study price competition for two types of location-price models in which facility locations are set up and price decisions have to be made in order to maximise profit. We discuss the existence and determination of equilibrium prices in a general location space when facilities have different production costs. It is assumed that each price is bounded from below and demand for a single homogeneous product is price-inelastic. When facilities set mill prices, a price equilibrium rarely exists and necessary conditions for existence are obtained. In particular, when the location space is a tree network, we give a characterisation of the locations for which a unique equilibrium exists for two competitors. With spatial price discrimination, though equilibrium prices might not exist, it is shown that ε-equilibrium prices always exist for any locations of the facilities. A characterisation of ε-equilibrium is also given. Then the location-price problem is reduced to a location problem. A comparison of results with the two types of price determination is also presented. This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain under the research project BEC2002-01026, in part financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).     

一类稀疏效应下捕食-被捕食者系统极限环的存在性和唯一性

本文研究捕食者种群具有线性密度制约的一类稀疏效应下捕食－被捕食者系统ｘ＝ｘ（ａｘ－ｃｘ^３－ｂｙ），ｙ＝ｙ（－α＋βｘ－γｙ）．（＊）得到：（１）当Ａ_１＜Ａ_１，Ａ₂＜Ａ₂，Ａ₃＞Ａ₃时，系统（＊）在第一象限内存在极限环；（２）当Ａ₂＜Ａ₂，Ａ₃＞Ａ₃时，系统（＊）在第一     

一类含分布时滞革新传播模型的稳定性

本文建立了一类含分布时滞的革新传播模型，研究了分布时滞对传播过程的影响，讨论了正平衡点的存在性和唯一性以及正平衡点的渐近稳定性(全局和局部)，当分布时滞的核函数取形式ae^-at时，证明了正平衡点是绝对渐近稳定的。     

Thermodynamics of sorption of KNO3 by a crown-containing polymer

The equilibrium of sorption of KNO₃ from aqueous solutions by a granular polymer containing immobilized dibenzo-18-crown-6 was studied. The thermodynamic characteristics for sorption of an electrolyte by a crown-containing polymer were determined. It was shown that the adsorption sites are energetically equivalent in the range of compositions studied. Translated fromIzvestiya Akademii Nauk. Seriya Khimicheskaya. No. 7, pp. 1350–1352, July, 1998.     

Informational uniqueness of closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of nonstandard dynamic games

This paper discusses an extension of the currently available theory of noncooperative dynamic games to game models whose state equations are of order higher than one. In a discrete-time framework, it first elucidates the reasons why the theory developed for first-order systems is not applicable to higher-order systems, and then presents a general procedure to obtain an informationally unique Nash equilibrium solution in the presence of random disturbances. A numerical example solved in the paper illustrates the general approach.Dedicated to G. LeitmannResearch that led to this paper was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research under Contract No N00014-82-K-0469 and in part by the U.S. Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-84-0054.     

非线性互补约束优化问题的可行性条件

本文研究了非线性互补约束优化问题的可行性条件，其中约束条件除互补问题外还包括第一水平(设计)变量和第二水平(状态)变量同时出现的其它非线性约束，它是线性互补约束优化问题的可行性条件的推广。     

Pre-equilibrium emission effect in (n,p) reaction cross-sections at 14.8 MeV

The influence of pre-equilibrium emission on (n, p) reaction cross-sections at 14.8 MeV has been studied. Cross-sections for (n, p) reactions have been measured by the activation technique at 14.8 .1; 0.5 MeV neutron energy. The experimental cross-section values have been compared with the calculated values at 14.8 MeV with and without considering the pre-equilibrium emission. Equilibrium calculations have been performed according to the statistical model of Hauser and Feshbach while the hybrid model has been used to include the pre-equilibrium contribution. Pre-equilibrium emission has been considered only in the first emission step. The comparison of experimental and calculated values clearly indicates the presence of pre-equilibrium emission.     

On generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problems

In this paper, we will introduce the generalized operator equilibrium problem and generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problem which generalize the operator equilibrium problem due to Kazmi and Raouf [K.R. Kazmi, A. Raouf, A class of operator equilibrium problems, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 308 (2005) 554-564] into multi-valued and quasi-equilibrium problems. Using a Fan-Browder type fixed point theorem in [S. Park, Foundations of the KKM theory via coincidences of composites of upper semicontinuous maps, J. Korean Math. Soc. 31 (1994) 493-519] and an existence theorem of equilibrium for 1-person game in [X.-P. Ding, W.K. Kim, K.-K. Tan, Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with L^∗-majorized preferences, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 164 (1992) 508-517] as basic tools, we prove new existence theorems on generalized operator equilibrium problem and generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problem which includes operator equilibrium problems.