Letter: Extremal Reissner-Nordström Black Hole in Thermal Equilibrium: The Back-Reaction-Change of Entropy

Using the thermodynamical approach and the method of York, the back-reaction of extremal R-N black hole in thermal equilibrium is studied. It is found that both approaches give identical results.     

Quantitative Analysis of Spectral Effects due to the Z/E Conformational Equilibria in Derivatives of the Amides and Hydrazides of Dicarboxylic Acids

The contributions from anisotropic magnetic screening and electronic effects to the relative chemical shifts of the NH protons in the amides and N,N-dimethylhydrazides of succinic and glutaric acids were calculated. It was shown that the splitting of the signals of the NH protons is largely determined by the redistribution of electron density in the molecule during the conformational transition.     

参数向量均衡问题

提出一类参数向量均衡问题，讨论解映射的连续性。作为应用，得到一类参数向量优化问题和参数向量变分不等式的解的连续性。     

Curing theory of A_f-A_g type free radical polymerization (I)──Distribution function and its invariant property

ＴｈｅｔｈｅｏｒｙｏｆｎｏｎｌｉｎｅａｒｐｏｌｙｍｅｒｉｚａｔｉｏｎｗａｓｉｎｉｔｉａｔｅｄｂｙＦｌｏｒｙ[1]ａｎｄＳｔｏｃｋｍａｙｅｒ[2].Ｆｏｒｓｉｍｐｌｉｆｙｉｎｇｔｈｅｅｖａｌｕａｔｉｏｎｏｆａｖｅｒａｇｅｐｏｌｙｍｅｒｑｕａｎｔｉｔｉｅｓ,ｍａｎｙｏｔｈｅｒｓｔａｔｉｓｔｉｃａｌｍｅｔｈｏｄｓｓｕｃｈａｓｔｈｅｐｒｏｂａｂｉｌｉｔｙｏｆｇｅｎｅｒａｔｉｎｇｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎｍｅｔｈｏｄ[3],ｔｈｅｌａｗｏｆｔｏｔａｌｐｒｏｂａｂｉｌｉｔｙｍｅｔｈｏｄ[4,5]ａｎｄｔｈｅｏｔｈｅｒｍｅｔｈｏｄｓ[6…     

一甲胺-三甲胺-水三元系的汽液平衡

用泵式沸点仪测定了常压下一甲胺-三甲胺一水三元系在不同液相组成时的沸点，并用间接法TPx推算了一甲胺-水、三甲胺-水的汽相平衡组成y。用最小二乘法求出了此二元体系的液相活度系数模型参数，在一甲胺-水、三甲胺-水两个二元系基础上计算三元系，并回归出一甲胺-三甲胺二元系的Wilson参数。用Wilson模型对所测的数据进行关联，建立该系统汽液平衡的热力学模型并计算平衡时的汽相组成。     

NEW CRITERIA OF EXPONENTIAL STABILITY FOR BAM NEURAL NETWORKS WITH DELAYS

In this Letter,a novel Lyapunov functional is constructed to investigate the exponential stability of the BAM neural networks.New sufficient conditions of the uniqueness and global exponential stability for the equilibrium of BAM neural networks with delays are obtained.The results improve those existing ones.     

Analysis of a two-stage telecommunication supply chain with technology dependent demand

We analyze a two-stage telecommunication supply chain consisting of one operator and one vendor under a multiple period setting. The operator faces a stochastic market demand which depends on technology investment level. The decision variables for the operator are the initial technology investment level and the capacity of the network for each period. The capacity that the operator installs in one period also remains available in subsequent periods. The operator can increase or decrease the available capacity at each period. For this model, an algorithm to find the centralized optimal solution is proposed. A profit sharing contract where firms share both the revenue and operating costs generated throughout the periods along with initial technology investment is suggested. Also a coordinating quantity discount contract where the discount on the price depends on the total installed capacity is designed. The case where the vendor decides on the technology investment level and the operator decides on the capacity of the network is also analyzed and it is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium.     

Systems of Simultaneous Generalized Vector Quasiequilibrium Problems and their Applications

In this paper, we introduce systems of simultaneous generalized vector equilibrium problems and prove the existence of their solutions. As application of our results, we derive the existence theorems for solutions of systems of vector saddle–point problems. Consequently, we prove the existence of a solution of systems of generalized minimax inequalities. Further application of our results is also given to establish the existence of a solution of a Debreu-type equilibrium problem for vector-valued functions. The first author thanks the Department of Mathematical Sciences, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for providing excellent research facilities. The second and third authors were supported by the National Science Council of the Republic of China. The authors are grateful to the referees for valuable suggestions and comments.     

Direct Method Comparing Efficient and Nonefficient Payoffs in Differential Games

In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.     

Randomized stopping games and Markov market games

We study nonzero-sum stopping games with randomized stopping strategies. The existence of Nash equilibrium and ɛ-equilibrium strategies are discussed under various assumptions on players random payoffs and utility functions dependent on the observed discrete time Markov process. Then we will present a model of a market game in which randomized stopping times are involved. The model is a mixture of a stochastic game and stopping game. Research supported by grant PBZ-KBN-016/P03/99.