Commuting Graphs of Matrix Algebras

The commuting graph of a ring R, denoted by Γ(R), is a graph whose vertices are all noncentral elements of R, and two distinct vertices x and y are adjacent if and only if xy = yx. The commuting graph of a group G, denoted by Γ(G), is similarly defined. In this article we investigate some graph-theoretic properties of Γ(M _n (F)), where F is a field and n ≥ 2. Also we study the commuting graphs of some classical groups such as GL _n (F) and SL _n (F). We show that Γ(M _n (F)) is a connected graph if and only if every field extension of F of degree n contains a proper intermediate field. We prove that apart from finitely many fields, a similar result is true for Γ(GL _n (F)) and Γ(SL _n (F)). Also we show that for two fields F and E and integers n, m ≥ 2, if Γ(M _n (F))?Γ(M _m (E)), then n = m and |F|=|E|.     

On Strongly J-Clean Rings

An element of a ring is called strongly J-clean provided that it can be written as the sum of an idempotent and an element in its Jacobson radical that commute. A ring is strongly J-clean in case each of its elements is strongly J-clean. We investigate, in this article, strongly J-clean rings and ultimately deduce strong J-cleanness of T _n (R) for a large class of local rings R. Further, we prove that the ring of all 2 × 2 matrices over commutative local rings is not strongly J-clean. For local rings, we get criteria on strong J-cleanness of 2 × 2 matrices in terms of similarity of matrices. The strong J-cleanness of a 2 × 2 matrix over commutative local rings is completely characterized by means of a quadratic equation.     

Ideal-Symmetric and Semiprime Rings

Lambek extended the usual commutative ideal theory to ideals in noncommutative rings, calling an ideal A of a ring R symmetric if rst ∈ A implies rts ∈ A for r, s, t ∈ R. R is usually called symmetric if 0 is a symmetric ideal. This naturally gives rise to extending the study of symmetric ring property to the lattice of ideals. In the process, we introduce the concept of an ideal-symmetric ring. We first characterize the class of ideal-symmetric rings and show that this ideal-symmetric property is Morita invariant. We provide a method of constructing an ideal-symmetric ring (but not semiprime) from any given semiprime ring, noting that semiprime rings are ideal-symmetric. We investigate the structure of minimal ideal-symmetric rings completely, finding two kinds of basic forms of finite ideal-symmetric rings. It is also shown that the ideal-symmetric property can go up to right quotient rings in relation with regular elements. The polynomial ring R[x] over an ideal-symmetric ring R need not be ideal-symmetric, but it is shown that the factor ring R[x]/xⁿR[x] is ideal-symmetric over a semiprime ring R.     

Control and Nash Games with Mean Field Effect

Mean field theory has raised a lot of interest in the recent years (see in particular the results of Lasry-Lions in 2006 and 2007, of Gueant-Lasry-Lions in 2011, of Huang-Caines-Malham in 2007 and many others). There are a lot of applications. In general, the applications concern approximating an infinite number of players with common behavior by a representative agent. This agent has to solve a control problem perturbed by a field equation, representing in some way the behavior of the average infinite number of agents. This approach does not lead easily to the problems of Nash equilibrium for a finite number of players, perturbed by field equations, unless one considers averaging within different groups, which has not been done in the literature, and seems quite challenging. In this paper, the authors approach similar problems with a different motivation which makes sense for control and also for differential games. Thus the systems of nonlinear partial differential equations with mean field terms, which have not been addressed in the literature so far, are considered here.     

On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games

Abstract

The allocation problem of rewards or costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The involvement of uncertainty in cooperative games is motivated by the real world where noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information and further vagueness in preference structures and decision-making play an important role. The theory of cooperative ellipsoidal games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. In this paper, some solution concepts using ellipsoids, namely the ellipsoidal imputation set, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are the relations between the ellipsoidal core, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets of such a game.     

Schur Orthogonality Relations for the Finitary Infinite Symmetric Group

Let S f be the finitary infinite symmetric group. For a certain class of irreducible unitary representations of S f , a version of Schur orthogonality relations is proved. That is, we construct an invariant inner product on the matrix coefficient space of each representation and show that matrix coefficients for distinct representations are orthogonal with respect to these norms.     

Constrained regulation of continuous Petri nets

This paper deals with constrained regulation of continuous Petri nets under the so-called infinite servers semantics. Our aim is to design feedback gains that permit us to reach both desired stationary marking vector and desired asymptotic firing rate vector. The proposed approach takes into account constraints on the control, the marking of the Petri net, and the stability of the closed-loop system. The existence of a solution is first expressed geometrically, in terms of the inclusion of two polyhedral sets. They are reformulated algebraically as linear matrix inequalities, which provides an effective way to calculate feedback gains answering the problem. Finally, an application to an assembly production system is given.     

模糊值二人零和对策的Nash均衡策略

我们将在Ramik定义的模糊最大序关系基础上研究模糊环境中的二人零和对策。在非对称模糊数基础上,引入模糊环境中的几种Nash均衡策略,讨论各种均衡策略存在的充要条件。并引入含参变量确定性矩阵对策及其均衡策略的概念,讨论含参变量确定性矩阵对策的Nash均衡策略和模糊值矩阵对策的均衡策略的关系。     

On inverses of GCD matrices associated with multiplicative functions and a proof of the Hong-Loewy conjecture

Let C={1,2,…,m} and f be a multiplicative function such that (f∗μ)(k)>0 for every positive integer k and the Euler product converges. Let (C_f)=(f(i,j)) be the m×m matrix defined on the set C having f evaluated at the greatest common divisor (i,j) of i and j as its ij-entry. In the present paper, we first obtain the least upper bounds for the ij-entry and the absolute row sum of any row of (C_f)^-1, the inverse of (C_f), in terms of ζ_f. Specializing these bounds for the arithmetical functions f=N^ε,J_ε and σ_ε we examine the asymptotic behavior the smallest eigenvalue of each of matrices (C_N^ε),(C_Jε) and (C_σε) depending on ε when m tends to infinity. We conclude our paper with a proof of a conjecture posed by Hong and Loewy [S. Hong, R. Loewy, Asymptotic behavior of eigenvalues of greatest common divisor matrices, Glasg. Math. J. 46 (2004) 551-569].     

The diameter game

A large class of Positional Games are defined on the complete graph on n vertices. The players, Maker and Breaker, take the edges of the graph in turns, and Maker wins iff his subgraph has a given — usually monotone — property. Here we introduce the d‐diameter game, which means that Maker wins iff the diameter of his subgraph is at most d. We investigate the biased version of the game; i.e., when the players may take more than one, and not necessarily the same number of edges, in a turn. Our main result is that we proved that the 2‐diameter game has the following surprising property: Breaker wins the game in which each player chooses one edge per turn, but Maker wins as long as he is permitted to choose 2 edges in each turn whereas Breaker can choose as many as (1/9)n^1/8/(lnn)^3/8. In addition, we investigate d‐diameter games for d ≥ 3. The diameter games are strongly related to the degree games. Thus, we also provide a generalization of the fair degree game for the biased case. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 2009