Ellipsoid projection method in matrix games

A problem of calculating a solution of a zero-sum matrix game is considered in the paper The problem of search of a solution is reduced to a constrained convex minimization problem for which an ellipsoid projection algorithm is used. The algorithm generates an ?-optimal solution of the game in a polynomial time     

Can international environmental cooperation be bought: Comment

Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) analytically examine the effects of the countries’ heterogeneity on the international environmental cooperation. They consider two types of countries having different abatement costs in one case and different environmental damages in another case. Furthermore it is analyzed whether a self-financed transfer system can diminish these heterogeneity effects. The paper shows for both scenarios of asymmetry and no transfers that the maximum level of cooperation consists of three countries of the same type. For the case of heterogeneity in environmental damages, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio conclude that an agreement between one type 1 and one type 2 country is also self-enforcing given that the differences in the damages are not very large. In this comment, the derivation of the last mentioned result is shown to be incorrect by proving that this coalition is not self-enforcing.     

Partnership formation based on multiple traits

A model of partnership formation based on two traits, called beauty and character, is presented. There are two classes of individual and partners must be of different classes. Individuals prefer prospective partners with a high beauty measure and of a similar character. This problem may be interpreted as e.g. a job search problem in which the classes are employer and employee, or a mate choice problem in which the classes are male and female. Beauty can be observed instantly. However, a costly date (or interview) is required to observe the character of a prospective partner. On observing the beauty of a prospective partner, an individual decides whether he/she wishes to date. During a date, the participants observe each other’s character and then decide whether to form a pair. Mutual acceptance is required both for a date to occur and pair formation. On finding a partner, an individual stops searching. Beauty has a continuous distribution on a finite interval, while character ‘forms a circle’ and has a uniform distribution. Criteria based on the concept of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are used to define a symmetric equilibrium of this game. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique. When dating costs are high, this equilibrium is a block separating equilibrium as in more classical formulations of two-sided job search problems. However, for sufficiently small dating costs the form of this equilibrium is essentially different.     

Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty

Deregulated infrastructure industries exhibit stiff competition for market share. Firms may be able to limit the effects of competition by launching new projects in stages. Using a two-stage real options model, we explore the value of such flexibility. We first demonstrate that the value of investing in a sequential manner for a monopolist is positive but decreases with uncertainty. Next, we find that a typical duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high. Intriguingly, this result is reversed for a low loss in market share. We finally show that this loss in value is reduced if a firm invests in a sequential manner and specify the conditions under which sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist firm than for a monopolist.     

On a game in manufacturing

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.     

模糊支付合作博弈的可信性准核仁

合作博弈是处理局中人之间协同行为的数学理论。有诸如核心、稳定集、沙普利值、准核仁和核仁等不同的解概念。在很多情形,除了借助专家经验和主观直觉,没有恰当的方式来确定支付函数,由此产生了具有模糊支付的合作博弈模型。准核仁是一种重要的解概念,在模糊支付合作博弈中如何恰当定义准核仁是个重要的问题。本文在可信性理论的框架下研究了这个问题,定义了两类可信性准核仁概念并证明了它们的存在性和唯一性,同时研究了可信性核心、可信性核仁与它们之间的关系。     

Analysis and identification of a social interaction model

In this paper, we present a model of social interaction systems. By comparing it with existing analytical models, and using simulations, we focus on dynamical behavior and interaction properties of this nonlinear time-varying system. The system's behavior can be predicted if we have sufficient knowledge of system parameters such as the connection matrix. Observation of system behavior can be useful to recover the unknown or insufficiently known levels of interaction strength. Furthermore, if proper sampling can be carried out, the system can be identified. This model is suitable for investigating social phenomena such as the fashion phenomenon.     

Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems

Recent results have used game theory to explore the nature of optimal investments in the security of simple series and parallel systems. However, it is clearly important in practice to extend these simple security models to more complicated system structures with both parallel and series subsystems (and, eventually, to more general networked systems). The purpose of this paper is to begin to address this challenge. While achieving fully general results is likely to be difficult, and may require heuristic approaches, we are able to find closed-form results for systems with moderately general structures, under the assumption that the cost of an attack against any given component increases linearly in the amount of defensive investment in that component. These results have interesting and sometimes counterintuitive implications for the nature of optimal investments in security.     

Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation

We present an application of relational algebra to coalition formation. This leads to specifications, which can be executed with the help of the RelView tool after a simple translation into the tool’s programming language. As an example we consider a simplification of the situation in Poland after the 2001 elections.