Selfish routing in public services

It is well observed that individual behaviour can have an effect on the efficiency of queueing systems. The impact of this behaviour on the economic efficiency of public services is considered in this paper where we present results concerning the congestion related implications of decisions made by individuals when choosing between facilities. The work presented has important managerial implications at a public policy level when considering the effect of allowing individuals to choose between providers. We show that in general the introduction of choice in an already inefficient system will not have a negative effect. Introducing choice in a system that copes with demand will have a negative effect.     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces

We define a general game which forms a basis for modelling situations of static search and concealment over regions with spatial structure. The game involves two players, the searching player and the concealing player, and is played over a metric space. Each player simultaneously chooses to deploy at a point in the space; the searching player receiving a payoff of 1 if his opponent lies within a predetermined radius r of his position, the concealing player receiving a payoff of 1 otherwise. The concepts of dominance and equivalence of strategies are examined in the context of this game, before focusing on the more specific case of the game played over a graph. Methods are presented to simplify the analysis of such games, both by means of the iterated elimination of dominated strategies and through consideration of automorphisms of the graph. Lower and upper bounds on the value of the game are presented and optimal mixed strategies are calculated for games played over a particular family of graphs.     

Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach

We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.     

Kaleidoscope of life: A 24-neighbourhood outer-totalistic cellular automaton

One of the challenges of cellular automaton research is finding models with a low complexity and at the same time a rich dynamics. A measure of low complexity is the number of states in the model and the number of transition rules to switch between those states. In this paper, we propose a 2-dimensional 2-state cellular automaton that-though governed by a single simple transition rule-has a sufficiently rich dynamics to be computationally universal. According to the transition rule, a cell’s state is determined by the sum of the states of the cells at orthogonal or diagonal distances one or two from the cell (distance-2 Moore neighbourhood), but not by the previous state of the cell itself. Notwithstanding its simplicity, this model is able to generate a great variety of patterns, including several types of stable configurations, oscillators and patterns that move over cellular space (gliders). We prove the computational universality of the model by constructing a universal set of logic gates (NOT and AND) from these patterns. A key element in this proof is the shifting of phases and positions of signals such that they meet the input requirements of the logic gates. Similarities of the model with classical spin systems are also discussed.     

Induced lines in Hales-Jewett cubes

A line in d[n] is a set {x(1),…,x(n)} of n elements of d[n] such that for each 1?i?d, the sequence is either strictly increasing from 1 to n, or strictly decreasing from n to 1, or constant. How many lines can a set S⊆d[n] of a given size contain?One of our aims in this paper is to give a counterexample to the Ratio Conjecture of Patashnik, which states that the greatest average degree is attained when S=d[n]. Our other main aim is to prove the result (which would have been strongly suggested by the Ratio Conjecture) that the number of lines contained in S is at most |S|^2−ε for some ε>0.We also prove similar results for combinatorial, or Hales-Jewett, lines, i.e. lines such that only strictly increasing or constant sequences are allowed.     

正则条件全竞赛空间与混合策略竞赛空间上的两个极值定理

在正则的全竞赛空间与混合策略竞赛空间推广并证明了两个新的最优决策存在定理．     

Inspection games in arms control

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that the potential illegal action is carried out strategically; thus a non-cooperative game with two players, inspector and inspectee, is defined. Three phases of development in the application of such models to arms control and disarmament may be identified. In the first of these, roughly from 1961 through 1968, studies that focused on inspecting a nuclear test ban treaty emphasized game theory, with less consideration given to statistical aspects associated with data acquisition and measurement uncertainty. The second phase, from 1968 to about 1985, involves work stimulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Here, the verification principle of material accountancy came to the fore, along with the need to include the formalism of statistical decision theory within the inspection models. The third phase, 1985 to the present, has been dominated by challenges posed by such far-reaching verification agreements as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as perceived failures of the NPT system in Iraq and North Korea. In this connection, the interface between the political and technical aspects of verification is being examined from the game-theoretic viewpoint.     

Equilibrium analysis in batch-arrival queues with complementary services

This paper studies a batch-arrival queue with two complementary services. The two services are complementary and any customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no works contributed to the batch-arrival queues on analysis of the equilibrium behaviors in queueing systems by now. The properties of batch-arrival queues, which is more practical and universal in reality, induce different Nash equilibria under competition or monopoly compared with the single-arrival queues. We observe the joint effect of batch joining rate and cost structure on the behavior of customers and graphically interpret the equilibrium solutions under competition. Moreover, we discuss the model under three types of price structures and give comparisons from customer and server points.     

Opportunistic timing and manipulation in Australian Federal Elections

In many parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision made by governments in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. Governments can also introduce policy or economic actions to enhance their popular standing and thus their chance of being re-elected. On the other hand, an oppositions’ natural objective is to gain power, and they will also apply controls through their own policies to reduce the governments’ chance of being re-elected. In this paper we employ a dynamic programming approach to determine the optimal timing for governments and oppositions to best utilize their limited resources. At each decision branch, the optimal control is interpreted as a Nash–Cournot equilibrium of a zero-sum political game which, in certain states, admits mixed strategy solutions. We perform a case study on the Australian Federal Election for House of Representatives.