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31.
On Linear Programming Duality and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Minimax Theory 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
J. B. G. Frenk P. Kas G. Kassay 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2007,132(3):423-439
In this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax results to hold using only linear programming
duality and the finite intersection property for compact sets. It turns out that these necessary and sufficient conditions
have a clear interpretation within zero-sum game theory. We apply these results to derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for strong duality for a general class of optimization problems.
The authors like to thank the comments of the anonymous referees for their remarks, which greatly improved the presentation
of this paper. 相似文献
32.
税企博弈模型的再研究 总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5
刘京娟 《数学的实践与认识》1998,(4)
本文以文[1]基础,在更一般条件下提出了税企博弈模型,得到新的骗税罚款系数公式.从理论上证明了税务机关对企业抽样检查与全面检查具有相同的经济效果.最后,给出建模应注意的几个问题. 相似文献
33.
Fernández F. R. Hinojosa M. A. Puerto J. 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2002,112(2):331-360
In this paper, we analyze core solution concepts for vector-valued cooperative games. In these games, the worth of a coalition is given by a vector rather than by a scalar. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined; the important principles of individual and collective rationality must be accommodated; moreover, the sense given to the domination relationship gives rise to two different theories. Although different, we show the areas which they share. This analysis permits us to propose a common solution concept that is analogous to the core for scalar cooperative games. 相似文献
34.
A system-theoretic approach to cooperation, interaction and allocation is presented that simplifies, unifies and extends the results on classical cooperative games and their generalizations. In particular, a general Weber theory of linear values is obtained and a new theory for local cooperation and general interaction indices is established. The model is dynamic and based on the notion of states of cooperation that change under actions of agents. Careful distinction between “local” states of cooperation and general “system” states leads to a notion of entropy for arbitrary non-negative and efficient allocations and thus to a new information-theoretic criterion for fairness of allocation mechanisms. Shapley allocations, for instance, are exhibited as arising from random walks with maximal entropy. For a large class of cooperation systems, a characterization of game symmetries in terms of λ-values is given. A concept for cores and Weber sets is proposed and it is shown that a Weber set of a game with selection structure always contains the core. 相似文献
35.
J.M. Díaz-Báñez M. Heredia B. Pelegrín P. Pérez-Lantero I. Ventura 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,214(1):91-98
In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost. 相似文献
36.
Marc Levy 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,215(2):411-421
In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the Banzhaf index. This paper firstly offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and then suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: the French group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float’s structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders. 相似文献
37.
Chunming Shi Shilei YangYu Xia Xuan Zhao 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,215(2):367-373
Inventory competition for newsvendors (NVs) has been studied extensively under the objective of expected profit maximization which is based on risk neutrality. In this paper, we study this classic problem under the objective of profit satisficing which is based on downside-risk aversion. Consistent with prior literature, we consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, each NV’s demand depends on the stocking levels of all NVs other than herself. In this scenario, we show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium where all NVs optimally order as if they were independent. In the second scenario, each NV’s demand depends on the stocking levels of all NVs including herself. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for both additive and multiplicative forms of demands. As a special case, we also study symmetrical NVs under the proportional allocation model. We show that at equilibrium, if the number of NVs exceeds a threshold, the market becomes highly competitive. 相似文献
38.
《Operations Research Letters》2021,49(4):473-476
We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy. 相似文献
39.
Lorenzo Carlucci 《Mathematical Logic Quarterly》2005,51(4):342-350
We define a direct translation from finite rooted trees to finite natural functions which shows that the Worm Principle introduced by Lev Beklemishev is equivalent to a very slight variant of the well‐known Kirby‐Paris' Hydra Game. We further show that the elements in a reduction sequence of the Worm Principle determine a bad sequence in the well‐quasi‐ordering of finite sequences of natural numbers with respect to Friedman's gapembeddability. A characterization of gap‐embeddability in terms of provability logic due to Lev Beklemishev is also presented. (© 2005 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim) 相似文献
40.
Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.Bloch is also affiliated with the University of Warwick. 相似文献