Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making

In this paper, incorporating a social psychological aspect of decision making, called attitudes, into analysis of games in normal form, the author proposes a new equilibrium concept, called relational dominant strategy equilibrium (RDSE). The author also analyzes relationships between RDSE and dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), and shows the following fact: RDSE coincides with DSE under a condition on attitudes of players. The story of “The Gift of the Magi” by Henry is analyzed and given a convincing interpretation using the proposed equilibrium concept.     

A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers

This paper analyzes a model with two firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards ‘congestion’ (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the ‘congestion levels’. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing (Pmp) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet.     

Depreciation games

The main aim of this paper is to show how Game Theory can be used in the day-to-day running of a company. No precedent, as far as we know, in the literature of the application of Cooperative Game Theory in order to obtain new depreciation methods for a fixed asset which is owned by a company. To this end, we will first illustrate the usual depreciation methods employed in accountancy. Then, with the objective of finding new depreciation methods, we will establish the relationship between Game Theory and Accountancy. On the basis of this relationship we introduce some new depreciation methods. Finally, a family of solutions is defined which improves the properties of traditional and previously introduced methods. Financial support from the Generalitat Valenciana through project GV05/077 is gratefully acknowledged by J. Aparicio. Financial support from the Generalitat Valenciana through project GRUPOS04/79 and from the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia through project HI2002/0032 are gratefully acknowledged by J. Sánchez-Soriano.     

不确定意义下的路径选择研究

本文利用不确定性对策理论，考虑了出行者的主观理性判断和信息对出行路径选择的影响，研究了出行者在不确定意义下的路径选择行为，说明了信息在路径选择过程中的重要性。     

An equitable solution for multicriteria bargaining games

In this paper we study bargaining models where the agents consider several criteria to evaluate the results of the negotiation process. We propose a new solution concept for multicriteria bargaining games based on the distance to a utopian minimum level vector. This solution is a particular case of the class of the generalized leximin solutions and can be characterized as the solution of a finite sequence of minimax programming problems.     

Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges

With the advent of open standards and Internet technologies, the number of sellers who can participate in online exchanges is greatly increased. We model the competition between identical sellers vying for the same business, and find that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in prices. The results help us understand the dynamics between a seller’s capacity and his motivation to participate in an auction.     

Quantitative agent-based firm dynamics simulation with parameters estimated by financial and transaction data analysis

Firm dynamics on a transaction network is considered from the standpoint of econophysics, agent-based simulations, and game theory. In this model, interacting firms rationally invest in a production facility to maximize net present value. We estimate parameters used in the model through empirical analysis of financial and transaction data. We propose two different methods (analytical method and regression method) to obtain an interaction matrix of firms. On a subset of a real transaction network, we simulate firm's revenue, cost, and fixed asset, which is the accumulated investment for the production facility. The simulation reproduces the quantitative behavior of past revenues and costs within a standard error when we use the interaction matrix estimated by the regression method, in which only transaction pairs are taken into account. Furthermore, the simulation qualitatively reproduces past data of fixed assets.     

Neural networks and bounded rationality

Traditionally the emphasis in neural network research has been on improving their performance as a means of pattern recognition. Here we take an alternative approach and explore the remarkable similarity between the under-performance of neural networks trained to behave optimally in economic situations and observed human performance in the laboratory under similar circumstances. In particular, we show that neural networks are consistent with observed laboratory play in two very important senses. Firstly, they select a rule for behavior which appears very similar to that used by laboratory subjects. Secondly, using this rule they perform optimally only approximately 60% of the time.     

A differential game with two pursuers and one evader

This paper is concerned with a coplanar pursuit-evasion problem in which a faster evaderE with constant speedw>1 must pass between two pursuersP ₁,P ₂ having unit speed, the payoff being the distance of closest approach to either one of the pursuers. The control variables are the directions of the velocities ofP ₁,P ₂, andE. The path equations are integrated, and a closed-form solution is obtained in terms of elliptic functions of the first and second kind. A closed-loop solution is given graphically in several diagrams, for different values ofw.     

An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria

Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given.Received January 2003JEL Classification: C72, C73.1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90D05, 90D10, 90D20This work was supported in part by N.S.F. Grant #SES 8922610.