Two-target game model of an air combat with fire-and-forget all-aspect missiles

An air combat duel between similar aggressive fighter aircraft, both equipped with the same type of guided missiles, is formulated as a two-target differential game using the dynamic model of the game of two identical cars. Each of the identical target sets represents the effective firing envelope of an all-aspect fire-and-forget air-to-air missile. The firing range limits depend on the target aspect angle and are approximated by analytical functions. The maximum range, computed by taking into account the optimal missile avoidance maneuver of the target, determines the no-escape firing envelope. The solution consists of the decomposition of the game space into four regions: the respective winning zones of the two opponents, the draw zone, and the region where the game terminates by a mutual kill. The solution provides a new insight for future air combat analysis.This paper is based on the first author's D.Sc. Thesis. The research was supported by NASA Cooperative Agreement NCCW-4.     

Allocation processes in cooperative games

This paper deals with a temporal aspect of cooperative games. A solution of the game is reached through an allocation process. At each stage of the allocation process of a cooperative game a budget of fixed size is distributed among the players. In the first part of this paper we study a type of process that, at any stage, endows the budget to a player whose contribution to the total welfare, according to some measurements, is maximal. It is shown that the empirical distribution of the budget induced by each process of the family converges to a least square value of the game, one such value being the Shapley value. Other allocation processes presented here converge to the core or to the least core. Received: January 2001/Revised: July 2002 I am grateful to the Associate Editor and to the two anonymous referees of International Journal of Game Theory. This research was partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant no. 178/99     

The principal-agent problem with adaptive players

In this study we show predictions made by the standard principal-agent theory may not hold when knowlege assumptions are relaxed. Conventional principal-agent models assume players are completely rational: they know their own and other player's utilities and probabilities of all states of nature. In reality, players must make decisions without such knowledge.We define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is modeled with a statistical learning model. Our results show that even this simple game combined with standard learning assumptions results in complex behavior. Expectations of both the principal and the agents are crucial in determining the system outcomes. Expectations and lack of prior knowledge make it possible for the principal to converge on suboptimal behavior or not converge on a consistent behavior at all. The same attributes in the agents make it possible for the principal to drive expectations down and thus get higher effort for lower reward.This study contributes a more robust understanding of the principal-agent model and its application to incentive design.     

基于概率区间的信念均衡

本文用概率区间描述对策中的策略不确定性,放弃共同知识假设,考虑了基于概率区间的不确定性对策模型的信念均衡问题,提出了一种新的信念均衡概念,并证明了其存在性及合理性.     

线性规划问题的一种转换解法

本文根据矩阵对策与对偶规划问题的等价性，以及矩阵对策的凌越原则，对线性规划问题提出了一种转换解法。     

基于合作博弈的预付条件下应急物资库存策略

应急物资储备是应急管理的主要工作之一.以往政府自己组织物资储备,不仅耗费大量人力、物力,且由于应急物资具有有效期等缘故,报废损失较大.本文考虑政府与供应商合作进行应急物资的实物储备,讨论在政府提前支付部分货款、供应商储备应急物资的库存策略,并从合作博弈的角度,确立了联盟的合作期限与政府提前支付货款比例,实现了在减少政府支出的前提下,动态存储定量应急物资,大幅度延长有效期的目标.最后使用算例验证了该策略的有效性.     

基于合作博弈纳什议价的几种网络定价结构模型比较

本文基于目前的网络资费模式,提炼出三种网络定价结构模型,研究本地网络服务提供商(ISP)及用户之间的利润分配.首先,利用一个简化的网络业务质量(Qos)保证模型构造目标函数,说明合作博弈得到的解比非合作博弈情形下更优,合作博弈时得到纳什议价解与双方的相对议价权力有关.然后,从社会结构理论角度,说明议价权力取决于网络结构类型以及局中人在结构中所处的位置.相对议价权力大,获益较多;相对议价权力小,获益较少.最后,通过实例分析得到三种网络定价结构模型下的纳什议价解.结果表明,本地网络服务提供商的合并、收购、互联有利于提高其相对议价权力,从而获益增加.     

The complexity of node blocking for dags

We consider the following modification of annihilation games called node blocking. Given a directed graph, each vertex can be occupied by at most one token. There are two types of tokens, each player can move only tokens of his type. The players alternate their moves and the current player i selects one token of type i and moves the token along a directed edge to an unoccupied vertex. If a player cannot make a move then he loses. We consider the problem of determining the complexity of the game: given an arbitrary configuration of tokens in a planar directed acyclic graph (dag), does the current player have a winning strategy? We prove that the problem is PSPACE-complete.     

Winning strategies in club games and their applications

We present results concerning winning strategies and tactics in club games on ??λ. We show that there is generally no winning tactic for the player trying to get inside the club. The bound‐countable game turns out to be rather fruitful and adds to some previous results about the construction of elementary substructures and their localization in certain intervals. We show that Player II has a winning strategy in the bound‐countable game, thus establishing a new ZFC result. The applications given are new proofs for two cardinal diamonds and the impossibility of collapsing cardinals to ?₂ under certain conditions (© 2011 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

水电施工企业创新行为市场演化博弈分析

针对水电施工企业如何选择创新战略,政府如何引导企业进行创新,运用演化博弈理论分析了创新行为与市场结构的演化规律.研究表明,市场中企业采取自主创新或模仿创新的行为战略最终演化稳定均衡,即市场中总有一定比例的企业进行自主创新,其余的企业采取模仿创新,并且企业自主创新投资的概率与企业的规模成正比,与创新风险成正比,与创新成本成反比.由此我们得出,若企业个体规模小、自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小,则可采取模仿创新战略,反之,采取自主创新战略;对于政府若想维护市场稳定,提高行业技术水平和国际竞争力,对自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小的可采取补贴、减税等优惠政策,以鼓励企业采取自主创新.