多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化

在双方市场中定义的博弈概念，可以使市场同方参与者的收益同时达到最大．这种最优化存在的理论依据是选择匹配的稳定性．用博弈论的分析与证明方法研宄多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化．在替代偏好和LAD（Law of Aggregate Demend）偏好下，证明由企业作选择的选择函数一定是个稳定匹配，由工人做选择的选择函数也是一个稳定匹配．     

Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis

In this paper, we use a biform-game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives. In the first stage of the game, firms decide non-cooperatively on investments. In the second stage, the surplus is shared according to the Shapley value. We find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which, however, depend on their position in the supply chain. Cross-subsidies for investment costs can mitigate, but not eliminate the underinvestment problem. Vertical integration between at least some firms.yields efficient investments, but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms. We show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology. Various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust.     

On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation

To safeguard analytical tractability and the concavity of objective functions, the vast majority of models belonging to oligopoly theory relies on the restrictive assumption of linear demand functions. Here we lay out the analytical solution of a differential Cournot game with hyperbolic inverse demand, where firms accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. The subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized via the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations solved in closed form both on infinite and on finite horizon setups. To illustrate the applicability of our model and its implications, we analyze the feasibility of horizontal mergers in both static and dynamic settings, and find appropriate conditions for their profitability under both circumstances. Static profitability of a merger implies dynamic profitability of the same merger. It appears that such a demand structure makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the standard linear inverse demand.     

基于演化博弈的公共交通、共享汽车与私家车的博弈分析

出行者的选择行为分析是交通系统中的一项重要内容,随着城市的发展,交通出行方式大体分为三大类:公共交通出行、辅助公共交通出行和私人交通出行。本文在以往的研究基础上,采用演化博弈的方法研究公共交通、共享汽车以及私家车三者之间的博弈关系,模拟出行者的选择行为,分析博弈均衡点稳定性及参数条件。通过模型仿真实验,演化结果中各项比例大小取决于各项收益、补贴、损失以及额外收益,要增加公共交通的配套设施,增收拥堵费以及增加对共享汽车的补贴及配套服务。     

A dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit adjustments

We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution.     

On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one.