Cooperative emission study in ytterbium doped NdVO4

The infrared and visible cooperative emissions of ytterbium ions are studied in Yb-doped NdVO₄ single crystals. The absorption of optical phonons allows the emissions at room temperature when a Nd:YAG laser is used. Low temperature emissions are observed due to the Nd³⁺→Yb³⁺ energy transfer following an argon ion laser excitation of the Nd³⁺ ions. Analysis of the cooperative emission at low doping concentration (1%) indicates that it is generated by distant pair forming Yb³⁺ ions while at high doping concentration (≥ 5%) close ions magnetically coupled and superexchange mechanisms prevail in the emitting process.     

Reputation-based network selection mechanism using game theory

Current and future wireless environments are based on the coexistence of multiple networks supported by various access technologies deployed by different operators. As wireless network deployments increase, their usage is also experiencing a significant growth. In this heterogeneous multi-technology multi-application multi-terminal multi-user environment users will be able to freely connect to any of the available access technologies. Network selection mechanisms will be required in order to keep mobile users “always best connected” anywhere and anytime. In such a heterogeneous environment, game theory techniques can be adopted in order to understand and model competitive or cooperative scenarios between rational decision makers. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for combining reputation-based systems, game theory and network selection mechanism. We define a network reputation factor which reflects the network’s previous behaviour in assuring service guarantees to the user. Using the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we model the user–network interaction as a cooperative game and we show that by defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives against defecting on service guarantees, repeated interaction sustains cooperation.     

Emergent cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games

We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives every day, and there is a reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only on the past history of the number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents, acting independently, and trying to maximize their individual expected payoff, still achieve a very efficient overall utilization of resources, and the average deviation of the number of happy agents per day from the maximum possible can be made O(N^?), for any ?>0. We also show that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents with heterogenous view radii

In this paper, we study cooperative behavior among mobile agents; the agents have heterogenous view radii and they play the prisoner’s dilemma game with those being within their vision fields. It is found that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted when the heterogeneity of view radii is considered, and the degree distribution of the system is investigated to explain this interesting phenomenon. Moreover, we report that the cooperative behavior is best favored by low density, moderate view radius, and small moving speed. Our findings may be helpful in understanding cooperative behavior in natural and social systems consisting of mobile agents.     

基于再保险和投资的随机微分博弈

本文研究了具有再保险和投资的随机微分博弈.应用线性-二次控制的理论,在指数效用和幂效用下,求得了最优再保险策略、最优投资策略、最优市场策略和值函数的显示解,推广了文[8]的结果.通过本文的研究,当市场出现最坏的情况时,可以指导保险公司选择恰当的再保险和投资策略使自身所获得的财富最大化.     

On the cooperation of recycling operations

This paper addresses two important issues that may affect the operations efficiency in the recycling industry. First, the industry contains many small-scale and inefficient recycling firms, especially in developing countries. Second, the output from recycling a waste product often yields multiple recycled products that cannot all be sold efficiently by a single firm. To address these two issues, this paper examines how different firms can cooperate in their recycling and pricing decisions using cooperative game theory. Recycling operations under both joint and individual productions with different cost structures are considered. Decisions include the quantity of waste product to recycle and the price at which to sell each recycled product on each firm’s market. These decisions can be made jointly by multiple cooperating firms to maximize total profit. We design allocation schemes for maximized total profit to encourage cooperation among all firms. Managerial insights are provided from both environmental and economic perspectives.     

Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review

This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel.     

On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).     

The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs

We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are interested in the uniqueness property defined by Milchtaich (2005) as the uniqueness of equilibrium flows for all assignments of strictly increasing cost functions. He settled the case with two-terminal networks. As a corollary of his result, it is possible to prove that some other networks have the uniqueness property as well by adding common fictitious origin and destination. In the present work, we find a necessary condition for networks with several origin–destination pairs to have the uniqueness property in terms of excluded minors or subgraphs. As a key result, we characterize completely bidirectional rings for which the uniqueness property holds: it holds precisely for nine networks and those obtained from them by elementary operations. For other bidirectional rings, we exhibit affine cost functions yielding to two distinct equilibrium flows. Related results are also proven. For instance, we characterize networks having the uniqueness property for any choice of origin–destination pairs.