Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment–dominance relations

In this paper, we discuss the computational complexity of the strategic cores of a class of n-person games defined by Masuzawa (Int J Game Theory 32:479–483, 2003), which includes economic situations with monotone externality. We propose an algorithm for finding an α-core strategy of any game in this class which, counting the evaluation of a payoff for a strategy profile as one step, terminates after O(n ³· M) operations, where M is the maximum size of a strategy set of any of the n players. The idea underlying this method is based on the property of reduced games. This paper is based on a part of the doctoral dissertation of the author. The author thanks Mikio Nakayama, Masashi Umezawa, William Thomson, an associate editor, and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments, suggestions, and advice. Thanks are also due to Yukihiko Funaki for a comment that led the author to this subject. The author is responsible for errors and inadvertencies.     

Random marginal and random removal values

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: the random marginal and the random removal values. Their main characteristic is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen in Int J Game Theory 18:389–407, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley in In: Contributions to the theory of Games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953). The random removal value coincides with the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik in Int J Game Theory 23:43–48, 1994) in TU-games. In large games we show that, in the special class of market games, the random marginal value coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley in In: La Décision. Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1969), and that the random removal value coincides with the equal split value.      

博弈联盟模糊收益的分配

提出了联盟模糊收益合理分配的一种新方法.首先,在模糊收益α截集上定义了α合理分配集,分析了该分配集与模糊收益Shapley值的关系.接着,给出了模糊收益的α合理Shapley分配函数,对其性质进行了讨论.然后,构造了模糊合理Shapley分配,证明其连续性,得到了联盟模糊收益与模糊合理Shapley分配具有包含关系的结论.     

Potential,value, and coalition formation

In this paper, a simple probabilistic model of coalition formation provides a unified interpretation for several extensions of the Shapley value. Weighted Shapley values, semivalues, weak (weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself appear as variations of this model. Moreover, some notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley’s seminal characterization, as ‘balanced contributions’ and the ‘potential’ are reinterpreted from this point of view. Natural relationships of these conditions with some mentioned families of ‘values’ are shown. These reinterpretations strongly suggest that these conditions are more naturally interpreted in terms of coalition formation than in terms of the classical notion of ‘value.’      

A potential approach for ordinal games

We introduce the class of ordinal games with a potential, which are characterized by the absence of weak improvement cycles, the same condition used by Voorneveld and Norde (1997) for ordinal potential games.     

Dimension of complete simple games with minimum

Weighted majority games have the property that players are totally ordered by the desirability relation (introduced by Isbell in [J.R. Isbell, A class of majority games, Quarterly Journal of Mathematics, 7 (1956) 183–187]) because weights induce it. Games for which this relation is total are called complete simple games. Taylor and Zwicker proved in [A.D. Taylor, W.S. Zwicker, Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power, Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993) 170–181] that every simple game (or monotonic finite hypergraph) can be represented by an intersection of weighted majority games and consider the dimension of a game as the needed minimum number of them to get it. They provide the existence of non-complete simple games of every dimension and left open the problem for complete simple games.     

Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.     

The effect of impurities on the viscoelastic response of polycarbonate reinforced with short glass fibers

Observations are reported in oscillatory torsion tests at room temperature on unfilled and fiber-reinforced polycarbonates melt-blended with impurities (acronitrile–butadiene–styrene, high-impact polystyrene, low-density polyethylene, poly(ethylene terephthalate) and Nylon 6,6). Constitutive equations are derived for the viscoelastic behavior of glassy polymers. With reference to the theory of cooperative relaxation, a polymer is treated as an ensemble of meso-regions with arbitrary shapes and sizes. The time-dependent response of the ensemble is attributed to rearrangement of meso-domains. The rearrangement events occur at random times, when meso-regions are excited by thermal fluctuations. Stress–strain relations are derived by using the laws of thermodynamics. The governing equations are determined by four adjustable parameters that are found by fitting the experimental data. Fair agreement is demonstrated between the observations and the results of numerical simulation. The study focuses on the effects of the concentration of impurities and glass fibers on material parameters.     

中空纤维协同液相微萃取在4种莨菪碱分析中的应用

利用协同液相微萃取方法初步探讨氢溴酸山莨菪碱、硫酸阿托品、氢溴酸东莨菪碱和丁溴酸东莨菪碱的优势构象;阐明有机溶剂对4种莨菪碱的萃取选择性和协同萃取作用机理;探讨中空纤维与莨菪碱形成电荷转移超分子对萃取效果的影响以及4种莨菪碱结构中N原子的亲电能力;结合高效液相色谱技术测定药物制剂中4种莨菪碱的含量。4种莨菪碱的线性范围均为0.05～5mg/L(r0.99),方法RSD小于7%,消旋山莨菪碱片和颠茄片中平均回收率分别为95.0%～119.0%和93.0%～95.0%,氢溴酸山莨菪碱和丁溴酸东莨菪碱检出限为0.03mg/L,硫酸阿托品和氢溴酸东莨菪碱检测出限为0.01mg/L。     

Thermal loading induced near-infrared broadband upconversion emission of Sm-doped β-NaYbF4 nano-phosphors

A non-closed hydrothermal synthetic processing is improved to synthesize Sm³⁺ doped β-NaYbF₄ nano-phosphors at 98 °C without any high-temperature and high-pressure treatments as a final step. Novel green, red, and near-infrared broadband (799-873 nm) upconversion emissions of Sm³⁺-doped β-NaYbF₄ nano-phosphors under 980 nm excitation are observed. These UC emissions can be assigned to the Sm³⁺ transitions of ⁴G_J, ⁴F_3/2 and ⁶F_11/2→⁶H_J. The half-width of 873 nm emission band is broadened nearly two-fold through the annealing treatment for nano-phosphors. The upconversion process in Yb³⁺-Sm³⁺ system is discussed based on energy transfer mechanisms.