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121.
P. Q. Khanh 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1995,87(2):359-378
We prove the Kuhn-Tucker sufficient optimality condition, the Wolfe duality, and a modified Mond-Weir duality for vector optimization problems involving various types of invex-convexlike functions. The class of such functins contains many known generalized convex functions. As applications, we demonstrate that, under invex-convexlikeness assumptions, the Pontryagin maximum principle is a sufficient optimality condition for cooperative differential games. The Wolfe duality is established for these games.The author is indebted to the referees and Professor W. Stadler for valuable remarks and comments, which have been used to revise considerably the paper. 相似文献
122.
HUANGZHENGAO 《高校应用数学学报(英文版)》1995,10(4):467-470
This paper concerns with the core of nonatomic gaxaes of foma f(μ), where μ is a nonatomic nonnegative measure and f is a continuous convex function on the domaln of μ. The main result of this paper is that the core of the game is not compact under the norm topology unless the game itself is a measure. This shows the largeness of the core in a sense other than that defined by Sharky for finite cases. 相似文献
123.
The problem of maximizing the performance in a fiber distributed data interface (FDDI) computer network is formulated as a cooperative n-player game. Solutions of this game can be obtained by solving special optimization problems. Using the models and formulas developed by Tangemann (Ref. 1) and Klehmet (Ref. 2) for the mean waiting times, the resulting optimization problems are presented and numerical results are given. 相似文献
124.
Anton Stefanescu 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(3):391-412
Uniform competitive solutions are stable configurations of proposals predicting coalition formation and effective payoffs.
Such “solutions” exist for almost all properly defined cooperative games and, therefore, can be proposed as substitute of
the core. The new existence results obtained in the present paper concern also the case when the coalitional function of a
game has empty values. All concepts and results are implemented in the competitive analysis of the exchange economies.
Received: July 1997/Final version: February 2000 相似文献
125.
The selectope for cooperative games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the
Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic
point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted
Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.
Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999 相似文献
126.
我们将在Ramik定义的模糊最大序关系基础上研究模糊环境中的二人零和对策。在非对称模糊数基础上,引入模糊环境中的几种Nash均衡策略,讨论各种均衡策略存在的充要条件。并引入含参变量确定性矩阵对策及其均衡策略的概念,讨论含参变量确定性矩阵对策的Nash均衡策略和模糊值矩阵对策的均衡策略的关系。 相似文献
127.
Cooperative (co-op) advertising has been widely used in practice and employed as a strategy to improve the performance of a distribution channel. It is known from the existing models that co-op advertising could not achieve the channel coordination (i.e., maximize the total channel profit). In this paper, we consider a distribution channel consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and investigate the effect of the retailer’s fairness concerns. Applying the equilibrium analysis, we obtain the following results: (1) Channel coordination can be achieved if the retailer has fairness concerns and model parameters satisfy certain conditions. (2) Although both channel members become better off with co-op advertising if neither channel member has fairness concerns, we find situations where co-op advertising brings detrimental effects to the retailer if the retailer has fairness concerns. (3) The retailer’s fairness concerns may increase or decrease the equilibrium participation rate, the equilibrium advertising effort, and the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer and the whole channel. (4) We identify the conditions under which the effectiveness of co-op advertising can be improved or reduced by the retailer’s fairness concerns. As long as co-op advertising can bring extra profit to the manufacturer, the retailer’s fairness concerns could improve the effectiveness of the co-op advertising. (5) There exists a Pareto improvement for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer when a retailer without fairness concerns becomes fair-minded. 相似文献
128.
Mean field theory has raised a lot of interest in the recent years (see in particular the results of Lasry-Lions in 2006 and 2007, of Gueant-Lasry-Lions in 2011, of Huang-Caines-Malham in 2007 and many others). There are a lot of applications. In general, the applications concern approximating an infinite number of players with common behavior by a representative agent. This agent has to solve a control problem perturbed by a field equation, representing in some way the behavior of the average infinite number of agents. This approach does not lead easily to the problems of Nash equilibrium for a finite number of players, perturbed by field equations, unless one considers averaging within different groups, which has not been done in the literature, and seems quite challenging. In this paper, the authors approach similar problems with a different motivation which makes sense for control and also for differential games. Thus the systems of nonlinear partial differential equations with mean field terms, which have not been addressed in the literature so far, are considered here. 相似文献
129.
AbstractThe allocation problem of rewards or costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The involvement of uncertainty in cooperative games is motivated by the real world where noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information and further vagueness in preference structures and decision-making play an important role. The theory of cooperative ellipsoidal games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. In this paper, some solution concepts using ellipsoids, namely the ellipsoidal imputation set, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are the relations between the ellipsoidal core, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets of such a game. 相似文献
130.
A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Boolean function) is weighted
(linearly separable). A second related problem consists in studying whether a weighted game has a minimum integer realization.
In this paper we simultaneously analyze both problems by using linear programming.
For less than 9 voters, we find that there are 154 weighted games without minimum integer realization, but all of them have minimum normalized realization. Isbell in 1958 was the first to find a weighted game without a minimum normalized
realization, he needed to consider 12 voters to construct a game with such a property. The main result of this work proves
the existence of weighted games with this property with less than 12 voters.
This research was partially supported by Grant MTM 2006-06064 of “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y el Fondo Europeo de
Desarrollo Regional” and SGRC 2005-00651 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and by the Spanish “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología”
programmes ALINEX (TIN2005-05446 and TIN2006-11345). 相似文献