公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链 协调研究

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显．然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调．最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析．     

基于随机响应时间及准时交货激励的供应链博弈-协同模型与算法

在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈-协同模型.基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,分析了Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件.最后提出了该模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法.     

Bundling decisions in supply chains

Firms often sell products in bundles to extract consumer surplus. While most bundling decisions studied in the literature are geared to integrated firms, we examine a decentralized supply chain where the suppliers retain decision rights. Using a generic distribution of customers’ reservation price we establish equilibrium solutions for three different bundling scenarios in a supply chain, and generate interesting insights for distributions with specific forms. We find that (i) in supply chain bundling the retailer’s margin equals the margin of each independent supplier, and it equals the combined margin when the suppliers are in a coalition, (ii) when the suppliers form a coalition to bundle their products the bundling gain in the supply chain is higher and retail price is lower than when the retailer bundles the products, (iii) the supply chain has more to gain from bundling relative to an integrated firm, (iv) the first-best supply chain bundling remains viable over a larger set of parameter values than those in the case of the integrated firm, (v) supplier led bundling is preferable to separate sales over a wider range of parameter values than if the retailer led the bundling, and (vi) if the reservation prices are uniformly distributed bundling can be profitable when the variable costs are low and valuations of the products are not significantly different from one another. For normally distributed reservation prices, we show that the bundling set is larger and the bundling gain is higher than that for a uniform distribution.     

基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调

构建了由一个占主导地位的电商平台和一个处于跟随地位的制造商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了电商平台有无利他偏好时电商供应链的最优决策和契约协调问题,并通过数值算例验证了本文的主要结论.研究表明:电商平台的利他偏好行为能够促使自身服务水平提高、正向影响制造商的最优销售价格并削弱自身利润.但电商平台的让利行为能够提高制造商的利润水平、缓和供应链冲突并改善供应链整体绩效."销售佣金比例+服务成本共担"契约能够完美的协调电商供应链,使双方最优利润获得帕累托改进,从而保证电商平台有足够的激励执行利他偏好行为.另外,进一步分析发现电商平台的利他偏好正向影响制造商支付给电商平台的固定技术服务费、制造商占有的电商供应链利润份额和服务成本分担比例,负向影响自身的销售佣金比例.     

A Branch and Contract Algorithm for Problems with Concave Univariate, Bilinear and Linear Fractional Terms

A new deterministic branch and bound algorithm is presented in this paper for the global optimization of continuous problems that involve concave univariate, bilinear and linear fractional terms. The proposed algorithm, the branch and contract algorithm, relies on the use of a bounds-contraction subproblem that aims at reducing the size of the search region by eliminating portions of the domain in which the objective function takes only values above a known upper bound. The solution of contraction subproblems at selected branch and bound nodes is performed within a finite contraction operation that helps reducing the total number of nodes in the branch and bound solution tree. The use of the proposed algorithm is illustrated with several numerical examples.     

基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中,与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题,以创意的特性为基础,通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型,证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性,并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现,当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时,分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。     

项目管理中业主-承包商最优激励模型研究

为解决项目管理中承包商不努力工作的问题,运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论,建立了业主一承包商间的激励数学模型.构造了努力产出函数和努力成本函数,求出了业主的最优激励水平以及相应的承包商最优努力水平,给出了业主的最优激励合同安排.最后,通过一个简化算例求出了模型均衡解的解析式,结果表明模型的结论是符合工程项目实际的,从而本模型能够为业主的激励合同设计提供指导.     

Optimal corrective maintenance contract planning for aging multi‐state system

This paper considers an aging multi‐state system, where the system failure rate varies with time. After any failure, maintenance is performed by an external repair team. Repair rate and cost of each repair are determined by a corresponding corrective maintenance contract with a repair team. The service market can provide different kinds of maintenance contracts to the system owner, which also can be changed after each specified time period. The owner of the system would like to determine a series of repair contracts during the system life cycle in order to minimize the total expected cost while satisfying the system availability. Operating cost, repair cost and penalty cost for system failures should be taken into account. The paper proposes a method for determining such optimal series of maintenance contracts. The method is based on the piecewise constant approximation for an increasing failure rate function in order to assess lower and upper bounds of the total expected cost and system availability by using Markov models. The genetic algorithm is used as the optimization technique. Numerical example is presented to illustrate the approach. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

非对称信息和模糊需求下的闭环供应链协调决策研究

在模糊需求和非对称销售价格信息下,研究了由单一制造商和零售商组成的两级闭环供应链系统的协调问题。通过建立不确定环境下的集中决策和收益共享-费用共担契约决策模型,分别得到了不同模型下闭环供应链系统的最优策略。并进一步通过算例分析了契约下供应链各方收益随模糊需求和价格的变化情况,以及该契约对整个系统决策效率的影响。结果表明:收益共享-费用共担契约能有效实现模糊闭环供应链系统的协调,实现闭环供应链系统决策的最优化;其次,需求和零售价格的不确定性程度越高,对零售商的最优订购量、供应链成员及系统利润的影响也越大。     

二级物流服务供应链的契约协调机制研究

研究一个物流服务集成商和一个物流服务提供商所组成的二级物流服务供应链的系统协调问题。分别建立了集中控制模型、批发价格契约下的Stackelberg主从协调模型、收益共享契约下的协调模型,得到不同协调方法下的最优解所满足的条件。通过模型间的对比,证明了收益共享契约可使得该物流服务供应链达到整体最优的状态,相对于批发价格契约,实现了Pareto改进。最后,用数值试验的方式进一步验证了收益共享契约在协调物流服务供应链运作的有效性。