随机需求下两条供应链的货架展示量竞争与链内协调研究

针对两条分别由单生产商单零售商组成的替代产品供应链,假定两种产品的随机总需求依赖于总货架展示量、而每种产品的市场份额与其货架展示量成正比,利用均衡分析方法研究两条供应链在货架展示量与订货量方面的竞争均衡,分别建立了对应两条供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链一条为集中式供应链的EPEC、MPEC和Nash均衡模型。随后分析了供应链竞争下的链内协调合同设计问题,给出了同时协调零售商的货架展示量和订货决策的回购加线性补贴合同和收益共享加线性补贴合同。最后的算例表明,协调是供应链竞争下的占优策略,但两条供应链均协调时的利润反而低于均不协调时的利润,即存在囚徒困境现象。     

考虑大数据营销和风险规避的绿色供应链决策与协调

通过建立考虑大数据营销及零售商风险规避的博弈模型,对绿色供应链定价、产品绿色度及利润进行比较分析。研究发现：无论集中决策、双方风险中性分散决策还是仅零售商风险规避分散决策,考虑大数据营销时的供应链整体期望利润和产品绿色度较高,且大数据营销效率因子对产品绿色度的增加有正向作用;双方风险中性分散决策下,一定条件下,两部定价契约能够有效协调供应链整体利润,实现帕累托改进;仅零售商风险规避分散决策下,零售商的风险规避行为会降低其对大数据营销的投入,一定条件下,两部定价契约也能够实现供应链整体期望利润的帕累托改进。     

Optimal investment strategies for participating contracts

Participating contracts are popular insurance policies, in which the payoff to a policyholder is linked to the performance of a portfolio managed by the insurer. We consider the portfolio selection problem of an insurer that offers participating contracts and has an S-shaped utility function. Applying the martingale approach, closed-form solutions are obtained. The resulting optimal strategies are compared with portfolio insurance hedging strategies (CPPI and OBPI). We also study numerical solutions of the portfolio selection problem with constraints on the portfolio weights.     

基于随机响应时间及准时交货激励的供应链博弈-协同模型与算法

在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈-协同模型.基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,分析了Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件.最后提出了该模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法.     

公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链 协调研究

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显．然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调．最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析．     

Three-level warranty service contract among manufacturer,agent and customer: A game-theoretical approach

A warranty is a service contract between a manufacturer and a customer which plays a vital role in many businesses and legal transactions. In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants; a manufacturer, an agent, and a customer. In order to obtain a better result, the interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and semi-cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost or repair cost for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the models presented in this paper.     

基于提前期压缩的两阶段供应链的契约协调

研究了基于提前期压缩的信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下的供应链协调问题,重点解决了在信息不对称时采用线性转移支付策略解决供应链的不协调问题.当压缩提前期时,制造商的成本增加,成本的增加值信息对销售商有对称和不对称两种情况.在信息对称时采用收益共享契约可以实现供应链的协调;在信息不对称,采用收益共享契约时,为了激励制造商,销售商不得不对制造商生产成本的不确定性付出成本,导致利润下降,而制造商由于拥有私有信息而使得利润增加,所以整个供应链并没有达到集中决策时的水平,只得到了帕累托改善的次优结果.创新点在于采用线性转移支付策略实现了供应链的协调,达到了帕累托最优,解决了收益共享契约不能实现供应链协调的问题.最后通过算例进行了说明.     

软件服务供应链合同设计与协调策略

考虑了整合式软件服务供应链和分散式软件服务供应链两种模式,以整合供应链为基准对分散供应链下的软件开发合同设计与协调问题进行了研究。在分散供应链下,分析了固定价格合同、销量激励合同和成本分担合同三种合同对供应链收益的影响,探索了这些合同的激励机制,考察了这些合同的适用环境。研究表明:三种合同中,成本分担合同对软件开发商的激励最高,达到了整合供应链下的协调水平;固定价格合同适用于软件用户对质量不太注重而对价格比较敏感、以及开发成本较高的情形,销量激励合同适用于软件用户对质量比较注重而对价格不太敏感、以及开发成本较低的情形,成本分担合同适用于平台运营商易于监测软件开发商开发成本的情形。     

Optimal corrective maintenance contract planning for aging multi‐state system

This paper considers an aging multi‐state system, where the system failure rate varies with time. After any failure, maintenance is performed by an external repair team. Repair rate and cost of each repair are determined by a corresponding corrective maintenance contract with a repair team. The service market can provide different kinds of maintenance contracts to the system owner, which also can be changed after each specified time period. The owner of the system would like to determine a series of repair contracts during the system life cycle in order to minimize the total expected cost while satisfying the system availability. Operating cost, repair cost and penalty cost for system failures should be taken into account. The paper proposes a method for determining such optimal series of maintenance contracts. The method is based on the piecewise constant approximation for an increasing failure rate function in order to assess lower and upper bounds of the total expected cost and system availability by using Markov models. The genetic algorithm is used as the optimization technique. Numerical example is presented to illustrate the approach. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

数量折扣契约下基于成本分担的供应链突发事件协调应对

突发事件会增加供应链成本,如何进行成本分担是决定供应链能否协调应对突发事件的重要因素.用参数分别描述市场需求剧增时增加的生产成本和市场需求剧减时发生的多余产品处理成本,在数量折扣契约基础上,研究突发事件发生后制造商的最优批发价格和零售商的最优订货量,分析其影响因素比较突发事件发生前后包括市场剧增与市场剧减两种情况下的差异,并给出了数值算例.结果表明,成本分担系数和市场需求分布及其变化都会影响最优批发价格和最优订货量,只要根据市场需求变化相应调整契约参数并合理分担由突发事件增加的成本,通过数量折扣契约供应链就能够协调应对突发事件.