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71.
Henning Bruhn 《Discrete Mathematics》2008,308(16):3694-3698
Owari is an old African game that consists of cyclically ordered pits that are filled with pebbles. In a sowing move all the pebbles are taken out of one pit and distributed one by one in subsequent pits. Repeated sowing will give rise to recurrent states of the owari. Bouchet studied such periodical states in an idealised setup, where there are infinitely many pits. We characterise periodical states in owaris with finitely many pits. Our result implies Bouchet's result. 相似文献
72.
M. A. Mosquera I. García-Jurado M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro 《Annals of Operations Research》2008,158(1):183-188
In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483–491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies
this property.
The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, FEDER and Xunta de Galicia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02 and PGIDIT06PXIC207038PN. 相似文献
73.
G. E. Fruchter 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2008,138(1):27-44
The dual role of price, as a product attribute signaling quality and as a measure of sacrifice, serving as a benchmark for
comparing the utility gains from superior product quality, is now well established in the marketing and economic literature.
However, knowledge about their long-run impact and the influence of competition on these effects still remains very sparse.
In the current paper, with reference to a dynamic and competitive framework, an analytical model is proposed to help determining
optimal decision rules for price incorporating both roles. The main results are as follows: (i) The optimal pricing policy
is determined as a Nash equilibrium strategy. (ii) The resulting equilibrium price is higher than an equilibrium that disregards
the carryover price effects. (iii) For a symmetric competition, we provide normative rules on how firms should set prices
as a function of the perceived quality; particularly, how the price should be set initially, when there is little product
familiarity and the perceived quality is low, and how this price should vary as the perceived quality increases. (iv) At steady
state, we find that the level of equilibrium margin, in percentage terms, decreases with the elasticity of demand with respect
to the brand price, but this decrease is moderated by the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand perceived quality,
the cross elasticity of demand with respect to the competitor’s perceived quality and the effect of the competitor’s current
price on the firm’s perceived quality deterioration.
The author thanks Konstantin Kogan for helpful discussions and comments. 相似文献
74.
76.
Single–valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm–Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the τ value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. The Shapley value is in the core only if the game is a square glove market, and in this case also coincides with the two aforementioned solutions.Institutional support from research grants BEC 2002-00642, FEDER and SGR2001-0029 is gratefully acknowledged 相似文献
77.
The purpose of this paper is to study efficient measures to combat terror. To choose efficient actions against terror organizations,
the response of terrorists has to be taken into consideration. Thus, an appropriate framework to study the intertemporal strategic
interactions of Western governments and terror organizations is dynamic game theory.
Using the open-loop Nash solution concept, it turns out that the system may exhibit long-run persistent oscillations. However,
transitory behavior is nonunique. 相似文献
78.
Eric Sundberg 《Discrete Mathematics》2008,308(15):3308-3314
A positional game is essentially a generalization of tic-tac-toe played on a hypergraph (V,F). A pivotal result in the study of positional games is the Erd?s-Selfridge theorem, which gives simple criteria for the existence of a Breaker's winning strategy on a hypergraph F. It has been shown that the Erd?s-Selfridge theorem can be tight and that numerous extremal systems exist for that theorem. We focus on a generalization of the Erd?s-Selfridge theorem proven by Beck for biased (p:q) games, which we call the (p:q)-Erd?s-Selfridge theorem. We show that for pn-uniform hypergraphs there is a unique extremal system for the (p:q)-Erd?s-Selfridge theorem (q?2) when Maker must win in exactly n turns (i.e., as quickly as possible). 相似文献
79.
Takuya Masuzawa 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(2):185-201
In this paper, we discuss the computational complexity of the strategic cores of a class of n-person games defined by Masuzawa (Int J Game Theory 32:479–483, 2003), which includes economic situations with monotone externality.
We propose an algorithm for finding an α-core strategy of any game in this class which, counting the evaluation of a payoff
for a strategy profile as one step, terminates after O(n
3· M) operations, where M is the maximum size of a strategy set of any of the n players. The idea underlying this method is based on the property of reduced games.
This paper is based on a part of the doctoral dissertation of the author. The author thanks Mikio Nakayama, Masashi Umezawa,
William Thomson, an associate editor, and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments, suggestions, and advice. Thanks
are also due to Yukihiko Funaki for a comment that led the author to this subject. The author is responsible for errors and
inadvertencies. 相似文献
80.
Emilio Calvo 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(4):533-563
We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell
(Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: the random marginal and
the random removal values. Their main characteristic is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The
random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen in Int J Game Theory 18:389–407, 1989) for
hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley in In: Contributions to the theory of Games II. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953). The random removal value coincides with the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik
in Int J Game Theory 23:43–48, 1994) in TU-games. In large games we show that, in the special class of market games, the random
marginal value coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley in In: La Décision. Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1969), and that
the random removal value coincides with the equal split value.
相似文献