A potential approach for ordinal games

We introduce the class of ordinal games with a potential, which are characterized by the absence of weak improvement cycles, the same condition used by Voorneveld and Norde (1997) for ordinal potential games.     

Borel stay-in-a-set games

Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A ₁,A ₂,,A _n , and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a ₁,a ₂,,a _n ) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G _i , then there is an -equilibrium for every >0. AMS (1991) subject classification: 60G40, 91A60, 60E15, 46A55.     

Robust Equilibria in Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

Equilibria in dynamic games are formulated often under the assumption that the players have full knowledge of the dynamics to which they are subject. Here, we formulate equilibria in which players are looking for robustness and take model uncertainty explicitly into account in their decisions. Specifically, we consider feedback Nash equilibria in indefinite linear-quadratic differential games on an infinite time horizon. Model uncertainty is represented by a malevolent input which is subject to a cost penalty or to a direct bound. We derive conditions for the existence of robust equilibria in terms of solutions of sets of algebraic Riccati equations.     

A zero sum differential game in a Hilbert space

We study a zero sum differential game of fixed duration in a separable Hilbert space. We prove a minimax principle and establish the equivalence between the dynamic programming principle and the existence of a saddle point equilibrium. We also prove sufficient conditions for optimality.     

Cooperative game analysis of retail space-exchange problems

We analyze retail space-exchange problems where two or more retailers exchange their excess retail spaces to improve the utilization of their space resource. We first investigate the two-retailer space exchange problem. In order to entice both retailers with different bargaining powers to exchange their spaces, we use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate the total profit surplus between the two retailers. Next, we consider the space-exchange problem involving three or more retailers, and construct a cooperative game in characteristic function form. We show that the game is essential and superadditive, and also prove that the core is non-empty. Moreover, in order to find a unique allocation scheme that ensures the stability of the grand coalition, we propose a new approach to compute a weighted Shapley value that satisfies the core conditions and also reflects retailers’ bargaining powers. Our analysis indicates that the space exchange by more retailers can result in a higher system-wide profit surplus and thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme.     

On the existence of a minimum integer representation for?weighted voting systems

A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Boolean function) is weighted (linearly separable). A second related problem consists in studying whether a weighted game has a minimum integer realization. In this paper we simultaneously analyze both problems by using linear programming. For less than 9 voters, we find that there are 154 weighted games without minimum integer realization, but all of them have minimum normalized realization. Isbell in 1958 was the first to find a weighted game without a minimum normalized realization, he needed to consider 12 voters to construct a game with such a property. The main result of this work proves the existence of weighted games with this property with less than 12 voters. This research was partially supported by Grant MTM 2006-06064 of “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional” and SGRC 2005-00651 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and by the Spanish “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología” programmes ALINEX (TIN2005-05446 and TIN2006-11345).     

Non-factorizable joint probabilities and evolutionarily stable strategies in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game

The well-known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD.     

A Differential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-Based Growth Models

This paper compares the outcomes of strategic and nonstrategic research and development (R&D). Firms undertake cost-reducing R&D in an environment where benefits accrue from their rivals' R&D via a common pool of knowledge. We demonstrate that multiple suboptimal equilibria exist; under these conditions, growth models which do not consider strategic interactions will overestimate or underestimate the growth rate.     

On a New Class of Systems of Generalized Quasi-Variational Inequalities

We introduce new types of systems of generalized quasi-variational inequalities and we prove the existence of the solutions by using results of pair equilibrium existence for free abstract economies. We consider the fuzzy models and we also introduce the random free abstract economy and the random equilibrium pair. The existence of the solutions for the systems of quasi-variational inequalities comes as consequences of the existence of equilibrium pairs for the considered free abstract economies.