Game of two cars: Case of variable speed

A stochastic version of Isaacs's (Ref. 1) game of two cars is dealt with here. In this version, the pursuer, owing to thrust and drag forces, has a variable speed, whereas the evader's speed is constant. Also, the pursuer can maneuver as long as his speed is bounded by some lower and upper limits. The probability of interception, corresponding to optimal (saddle-point) feedback strategies, is computed and serves as a reference for evaluating the performance of four different versions of the proportional navigation pursuit law as well as two other strategies.     

The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands

By showing that there is an upper bound for the price of anarchyρ(Γ) for a non-atomic congestion game Γ with only separable cost maps and fixed demands, Roughgarden and Tardos show that the cost of forgoing centralized control is mild. This letter shows that there is an upper bound for ρ(Γ) in Γ for fixed demands with symmetric cost maps. It also shows that there is a weaker bound for ρ(Γ) in Γ with elastic demands.     

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solutions in Stochastic Differential Games

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.     

An Approach to Fuzzy Noncooperative Nash Games

Systems that involve more than one decision maker are often optimized using the theory of games. In the traditional game theory, it is assumed that each player has a well-defined quantitative utility function over a set of the player decision space. Each player attempts to maximize/minimize his/her own expected utility and each is assumed to know the extensive game in full. At present, it cannot be claimed that the first assumption has been shown to be true in a wide variety of situations involving complex problems in economics, engineering, social and political sciences due to the difficulty inherent in defining an adequate utility function for each player in these types of problems. On the other hand, in many of such complex problems, each player has a heuristic knowledge of the desires of the other players and a heuristic knowledge of the control choices that they will make in order to meet their ends.In this paper, we utilize fuzzy set theory in order to incorporate the players' heuristic knowledge of decision making into the framework of conventional game theory or ordinal game theory. We define a new approach to N-person static fuzzy noncooperative games and develop a solution concept such as Nash for these types of games. We show that this general formulation of fuzzy noncooperative games can be applied to solve multidecision-making problems where no objective function is specified. The computational procedure is illustrated via application to a multiagent optimization problem dealing with the design and operation of future military operations.     

Multicriteria Goal Games

In this paper, we deal with multicriteria matrix games. Different solution concepts have been proposed to cope with these games. Recently, the concept of Pareto-optimal security strategy which assures the property of security in the individual criteria against an opponent's deviation in strategy has been introduced. However, the idea of security behind this concept is based on expected values, so that this security might be violated by mixed strategies when replications are not allowed. To avoid this inconvenience, we propose in this paper a new concept of solution for these games: the G-goal security strategy, which includes as part of the solution the probability of obtaining prespecified values in the payoff functions. Thus, attitude toward risk together with payoff values are considered jointly in the solution analysis.     

Recursive solution of linear-quadratic Nash games for weakly interconnected systems

A recursive method is developed for the solution of coupled algebraic Riccati equations and corresponding linear Nash strategies of weakly interconnected systems. It is shown that the given algorithm converges to the exact solution with the rate of convergence ofO(²), where is a small coupling parameter. In addition, only low-order systems are involved in algebrdic computations; the amount of computations required does not grow per iteration and no analyticity assumption is imposed on the system coefficients.This work was supported by Rutgers University Research Council under Grant No. 2-02188.     

The lion and man problem revisited

A pursuerP, whose speed is bounded by 1, wants to get closer to an evaderE, whose speed is bounded by >1.P wants to reduce his distancePE fromE below the capture radius . Both players are confined to a circular arena. This problem is equivalent to a problem discussed by Flynn, who characterized and gave numerical bounds to the least upper boundd* on the values ofPE thatE can maintain. He used direct methods and did not use Isaacs' theory.We solve our problem relying on the theory of singular surfaces in differential games. We construct and investigate barriers of the game of kind, and we replace Flynn's bounds ond* by analytical (exact) values for various speeds .The support of the TW Department of THT, Enschede, Holland, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Statistical mechanics of a dynamical system based on Conway's game of Life

We study a discrete dynamical system whose evolution is governed by rules similar to those of Conway's game of Life but also include a stochastic element (parametrized by a temperature). Statistical properties that are examined are density as a function of temperature and entropy (suitably defined). A phase transition and a certain thermodynamic constant of the motion are observed.Lady Davis Visiting Scientist at the Technion 1974–75.     

Mixed strategy solutions forN-person quadratic games

Mixed strategy -equilibrium points are given forN-person games with cost functions consisting of quadratic, bilinear, and linear terms and strategy spaces consisting of closed balls in Hilbert spaces. The results are applied to linear-quadratic differential games with no information and quadratic integral constraints on the control functions.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.     

Perfect equilibria in stochastic games

We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the -discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.Support was provided by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO via the Netherlands Foundation for Mathematics SMC, Project 10-64-10.