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排序方式: 共有451条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
A review of the optimal stopping problem with more than a single decision maker (DM) is presented in this paper. We classify
the existing literature according to the arrival of the offers, the utility of the DMs, the length of the sequence of offers,
the nature of the game and the number of offers to be selected. We enumerate various definitions for this problem and describe
some dynamic approaches.
Fouad Ben Abdelaziz is on leave from the Institut Superieur de Gestion, University of Tunis, Tunisia e-mail: foued.benabdelaz@isg.run.tn. 相似文献
2.
We study game formulas the truth of which is determined by a semantical game of uncountable length. The main theme is the study of principles stating reflection of these formulas in various admissible sets. This investigation leads to two weak forms of strict-II11 reflection (or ∑1-compactness). We show that admissible sets such as H(ω2) and Lω2 which fail to have strict-II11 reflection, may or may not, depending on set-theoretic hypotheses satisfy one or both of these weaker forms. Mathematics Subject Classification : 03C70, 03C75. 相似文献
3.
We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes ‘loss’). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. 相似文献
4.
We examine the problem of building or fortifying a network to defend against enemy attacks in various scenarios. In particular,
we examine the case in which an enemy can destroy any portion of any arc that a designer constructs on the network, subject
to some interdiction budget. This problem takes the form of a three-level, two-player game, in which the designer acts first
to construct a network and transmit an initial set of flows through the network. The enemy acts next to destroy a set of constructed
arcs in the designer’s network, and the designer acts last to transmit a final set of flows in the network. Most studies of
this nature assume that the enemy will act optimally; however, in real-world scenarios one cannot necessarily assume rationality
on the part of the enemy. Hence, we prescribe optimal network design algorithms for three different profiles of enemy action:
an enemy destroying arcs based on capacities, based on initial flows, or acting optimally to minimize our maximum profits
obtained from transmitting flows. 相似文献
5.
A stochastic version of Isaacs's (Ref. 1) game of two cars is dealt with here. In this version, the pursuer, owing to thrust and drag forces, has a variable speed, whereas the evader's speed is constant. Also, the pursuer can maneuver as long as his speed is bounded by some lower and upper limits. The probability of interception, corresponding to optimal (saddle-point) feedback strategies, is computed and serves as a reference for evaluating the performance of four different versions of the proportional navigation pursuit law as well as two other strategies. 相似文献
6.
Chi Kin Chau Kwang Mong Sim 《Operations Research Letters》2003,31(5):327-334
By showing that there is an upper bound for the price of anarchyρ(Γ) for a non-atomic congestion game Γ with only separable cost maps and fixed demands, Roughgarden and Tardos show that the cost of forgoing centralized control is mild. This letter shows that there is an upper bound for ρ(Γ) in Γ for fixed demands with symmetric cost maps. It also shows that there is a weaker bound for ρ(Γ) in Γ with elastic demands. 相似文献
7.
Fernández F. R. Monroy L. Puerto J. 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1998,99(2):403-421
In this paper, we deal with multicriteria matrix games. Different solution concepts have been proposed to cope with these games. Recently, the concept of Pareto-optimal security strategy which assures the property of security in the individual criteria against an opponent's deviation in strategy has been introduced. However, the idea of security behind this concept is based on expected values, so that this security might be violated by mixed strategies when replications are not allowed. To avoid this inconvenience, we propose in this paper a new concept of solution for these games: the G-goal security strategy, which includes as part of the solution the probability of obtaining prespecified values in the payoff functions. Thus, attitude toward risk together with payoff values are considered jointly in the solution analysis. 相似文献
8.
Matthew D. Bailey Steven M. Shechter Andrew J. Schaefer 《Operations Research Letters》2006,34(3):307-315
We consider a general adversarial stochastic optimization model. Our model involves the design of a system that an adversary may subsequently attempt to destroy or degrade. We introduce SPAR, which utilizes mixed-integer programming for the design decision and a Markov decision process (MDP) for the modeling of our adversarial phase. 相似文献
9.
《Operations Research Letters》2022,50(4):407-414
In this study, the existing game theoretical framework is extended to strategic queuing in search of solutions for a two-population game in observable double-ended queuing systems with zero matching times. We show that multiple Nash equilibria and one unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exist in this game. 相似文献
10.
Competitive location problems can be characterized by the fact that the decisions made by others will affect our own payoffs. In this paper, we address a discrete competitive location game in which two decision-makers have to decide simultaneously where to locate their services without knowing the decisions of one another. This problem arises in a franchising environment in which the decision-makers are the franchisees and the franchiser defines the potential sites for locating services and the rules of the game. At most one service can be located at each site, and one of the franchisees has preferential rights over the other. This means that if both franchisees are interested in opening the service in the same site, only the one that has preferential rights will open it. We consider that both franchisees have budget constraints, but the franchisee without preferential rights is allowed to show interest in more sites than the ones she can afford. We are interested in studying the influence of the existence of preferential rights and overbidding on the outcomes for both franchisees and franchiser. A model is presented and an algorithmic approach is developed for the calculation of Nash equilibria. Several computational experiments are defined and their results are analysed, showing that preferential rights give its holder a relative advantage over the other competitor. The possibility of overbidding seems to be advantageous for the franchiser, as well as the inclusion of some level of asymmetry between the two decision-makers. 相似文献