Application of the Redox-Transmetalation Procedure to Access Divalent Lanthanide and Alkaline-Earth NHC Complexes**

Divalent lanthanide and alkaline-earth complexes supported by N-heterocyclic carbene (NHC) ligands have been accessed by redox-transmetalation between air-stable NHC-AgI complexes and the corresponding metals. By using the small ligand 1,3-dimethylimidazol-2-ylidene (IMe), two series of isostructural complexes were obtained: the tetra-NHC complexes [LnI₂(IMe)₄] (Ln=Eu and Sm) and the bis-NHC complexes [MI₂(IMe)₂(THF)₂] (M=Yb, Ca and Sr). In the former, distortions in the NHC coordination were found to originate from intermolecular repulsions in the solid state. Application of the redox-transmetalation strategy with the bulkier 1,3-dimesitylimidazol-2-ylidene (IMes) ligand yielded [SrI₂(IMes)(THF)₃], while using a similar procedure with Ca metal led to [CaI₂(THF)₄] and uncoordinated IMes. DFT calculations were performed to rationalise the selective formation of the bis-NHC adduct in [SrI₂(IMe)₂(THF)₂] and the tetra-NHC adduct in [SmI₂(IMe)₄]. Since the results in the gas phase point towards preferential formation of the tetra-NHC complexes for both metal centres, the differences between both arrangements are a result of solid-state effects such as slightly different packing forces.     

过渡金属-配体σ键键能在碳-氢键活化中的应用

过渡金属催化的碳-氢(C-H)键活化因其优异的原子经济性及步骤简便性在过去几十年间蓬勃发展,已成为当前构建复杂化合物最常用的策略之一.对该过程中活性中间体的热力学研究有助于加深人们对反应机理的理解,指导新催化剂、新反应的理性设计.然而,近年来该领域的发展颇为缓慢,相应的报道十分零散,缺少系统的归纳和总结.本综述简要梳理...     

油水两液相一维非等温渗流的传递分析

在求解油水两液相非等温渗流的温度场、压力场基础上,以驱动功、驱动功率、驱动阻力、驱动速率为特征参数,对该过程进行(火用)传递分析。数值模拟的结果表明:含水通过降低油的相对渗透率、从而增大驱动阻力、减小驱动功率, 最终导致原油产量降低。     

网格状有向图上的部分合作对策

本文通过在有向图上每个状态结点处定义合作函数,运用Berge C的关于图匕对策中策略的概念,在网格状有向图上考察部分合作动态对策.局中人在对策进程中将采取部分合作而不是完全合作,部分合作的主要特征是每个局中人的行为是合作行动与单独行动的组合.本文合作函数的设定允许局中人加入某个联盟之后再脱离该联盟,同时给出了有向图上部分合作对策的值、最优路径的算法及示例.     

The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

COSEARCH: A Parallel Cooperative Metaheuristic

In order to design a well-balanced metaheuristic for robustness, we propose the COSEARCH approach which manages the cooperation of complementary heuristic methods via an adaptive memory which contains a history of the search already done. In this paper, we present the idiosyncrasies of the COSEARCH approach and its application for solving large scale instances of the quadratic assignment problem (QAP). We propose an original design of the adaptive memory in order to focus on high quality regions of the search and avoid attractive but deceptive areas. For the QAP, we have hybridized three heuristic agents of complementary behaviours: a Tabu Search is used as the main search algorithm, a Genetic Algorithm is in charge of the diversification and a Kick Operator is applied to intensify the search. The evaluations have been executed on large scale network of workstations via a parallel environment which supports fault tolerance and adaptive dynamic scheduling of tasks.     

Simulation study on cooperation behaviors and crowd dynamics in pedestrian evacuation

Pedestrian evacuation is actually a process of behavioral evolution. Interaction behaviors between pedestrians affect not only the evolution of their cooperation strategy, but also their evacuation paths-scheduling and dynamics features. The existence of interaction behaviors and cooperation evolution is therefore critical for pedestrian evacuation. To address this issue, an extended cellular automaton(CA) evacuation model considering the effects of interaction behaviors and cooperation evolution is proposed here. The influence mechanism of the environment factor and interaction behaviors between neighbors on the decision-making of one pedestrian to path scheduling is focused. Average payoffs interacting with neighbors are used to represent the competitive ability of one pedestrian, aiming to solve the conflicts when more than one pedestrian competes for the same position based on a new method. Influences of interaction behaviors, the panic degree and the conflict cost on the evacuation dynamics and cooperation evolution of pedestrians are discussed. Simulation results of the room evacuation show that the interaction behaviors between pedestrians to a certain extent are beneficial to the evacuation efficiency and the formation of cooperation behaviors as well. The increase of conflict cost prolongs the evacuation time. Panic emotions of pedestrians are bad for cooperation behaviors of the crowd and have complex effects on evacuation time. A new self-organization effect is also presented.     

产能约束下的闭环供应链制造商合作策略研究

构建了一个由制造商、回收商和零售商组成的闭环供应链模型,运用Stackelberg博弈对产能约束下制造商的合作策略进行了研究。研究发现：制造商始终有与回收商或零售商合作的经济动机,且当产能较小时,更倾向于与零售商合作;反之,则更倾向与回收商进行合作。此外,相对于无合作模式,不同合作策略对于回收率、供应链整体利润、新产品与再制品总体环境影响程度以及消费者剩余的影响会随着制造商产能大小的变化发生改变,而不同合作策略对于总体环境影响程度的影响与制造商的再制造水平也存在关联。     

基于重复博弈的地方政府精准扶贫合作机制研究

精准扶贫是习近平总书记为彻底解决贫困问题而提出一项战略要求。精准扶贫是一项复杂性较高、涉及范畴较广的系统工作,其工作的展开需要由地方政府共同协作完成。地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫有着巨大的影响,基于博弈论的基本思想方法,针对地方政府精准扶贫合作机制进行研究。首先,针对精准扶贫过程中完全信息静态博弈的情况,构建地方政府合作与非合作的无限次重复博弈模型,并分析双方政府均采取冷酷战略时,彼此合作的临界贴现因子;然后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫成效的问题,探讨了有限重复博弈模型的临界贴现因子与地方政府合作周期的关系。分析表明：在精准扶贫过程中,双方政府合作周期越长,临界贴现因子越小,精准扶贫合作的稳定性越强。最后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期和合作机制等提出对策和建议。