Complex dynamics in equilibrium asset pricing models with boundedly rational,heterogeneous agents

We study a simple model based upon the Lucas framework where heterogeneous agents behave rationally in a fully intertemporal setting but do not know other investors' personal preferences, wealth or investment portfolios. As a consequence, agents initially do not know the equilibrium asset pricing function and must make guesses, which they update via adaptive learning with constant gain. We demonstrate that even in this simple environment the economy can, depending on parameters, exhibit either stable convergence to equilibrium, or chaotic dynamical behavior of asset prices and trading volume without converging to the rational expectations equilibrium of the Lucas model. This contradicts the assertion that the Lucas model is stable in the face of modest deviations from the strong assumptions required to compute the equilibrium. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 19: 38–55, 2014     

On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation

To safeguard analytical tractability and the concavity of objective functions, the vast majority of models belonging to oligopoly theory relies on the restrictive assumption of linear demand functions. Here we lay out the analytical solution of a differential Cournot game with hyperbolic inverse demand, where firms accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. The subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized via the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations solved in closed form both on infinite and on finite horizon setups. To illustrate the applicability of our model and its implications, we analyze the feasibility of horizontal mergers in both static and dynamic settings, and find appropriate conditions for their profitability under both circumstances. Static profitability of a merger implies dynamic profitability of the same merger. It appears that such a demand structure makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the standard linear inverse demand.     

含参广义集值强向量平衡问题的稳定性

本文借助集合极限的性质和弱f-性假设证明了含参广义集值强向量平衡问题解集映射的下半连续性,其方法不同于最近文献(Zhao,2016和Meng,2018).此外,建立了含参广义集值强向量平衡问题解集连通性的充分条件,并举例验证了所得结果的正确性.本文得结果推广和改进了已有文献(Gong,2008,Xu,2009,Chen,2010,Xu,2013和Zhao,2013)中相应结果.     

工业催化:选择性提升策略

工业催化直接或间接贡献了世界GDP的20%-30%,推动了产业变革和社会进步.对于工业催化,开发高活性、高选择性和高稳定性的多相催化剂至关重要,而选择性是最主要的挑战.因为实现催化选择性的精确控制是绿色化学的重要概念之一,更是工业催化可持续发展的重要驱动力;而且,选择性不仅决定了催化过程的原子经济性,也影响到后续分离过程的能耗.针对多数工业催化反应存在'活性越高、选择性越低'的相互制约与矛盾问题,本文以若干能源化工催化反应为例,试图总结催化选择性提升的一般策略,以期为有关工业应用的催化新过程提供科学参考.多相催化一般经历与反应物有关的步骤(反应物的外扩散、内扩散和化学吸附)、与反应有关的步骤(活化和表面反应)、以及与产物相关的步骤(产物脱附、内扩散和外扩散).本文依此归纳并举例说明提高选择性的一般策略.在汽油催化吸附脱硫中,主要利用了催化剂中零价镍-氧化锌耦合活性中心的选择吸附策略,使零价镍优先吸附含硫化合物,从而实现选择性脱硫而不饱和烯烃.在甲苯和甲醇侧链烷基化反应中,主要利用了特定空间分布的酸碱吸附位,实现吸附甲苯和稳定甲醛中间体的协同匹配.在乙苯脱乙基型二甲苯异构化反应中,主要利用了双床层对催化剂功能的分离策略,在不同的择形催化剂床层中分别进行乙苯脱乙基反应和二甲苯异构化反应,从而提高对二甲苯的产量.在苯选择加氢制环己烯反应中,主要利用强化产品脱附的策略,促进环己烯产品从亲水改性的催化剂表面脱附,实现环己烯选择性的提升.这些炼油与化工研究案例中同时存在多个连串-平行反应,主要是利用吸附中心、反应中心在时间或空间上的耦合、解耦或限域策略,调控不同途径的扩散能垒、反应能垒,实现了催化剂选择性的提升.多相催化多是复杂过程,基于提高选择性的初步认识,还要结合具体复杂催化过程,系统研究单策略以及多策略组合作用下的选择催化过程,实现在合理时间尺度、空间尺度上设计高选择性的催化剂,而这本质上是一种介尺度催化.     

生产率差异与企业对外直接投资进入模式选择

基于企业异质性视角,借鉴演化博弈理论探究企业通过OFDI“走出去”时的跨国并购方和标的方在全要素生产率上的差异对企业OFDI进入策略选择的影响机制。利用Hotelling模型构造资本密集型企业与劳动密集型企业OFDI进入策略选择博弈模型,讨论两类企业OFDI进入方式决策在并购双方生产率差异变化之下的变迁机理。研究发现:当并购方和被并购方生产率差异较小时,市场达到两类企业都倾向于跨国并购策略的演化稳定状态;当并购双方生产率差异较大时,企业的生产要素密集度及其结构对其OFDI进入模式决策具有重要的作用,知识或技术密集度较高的资本密集型企业与综合实力强势的部分劳动密集型企业采取跨国并购战略,而另一部分劳动密集型企业选择绿地新建方式进入国际市场。即企业OFDI进入策略选择因其所属的行业生产要素密集度及其结构不同而具有差异性。研究结论在一定程度上弥补了现有研究的不足,为以后的研究工作提供一定的理论参考。     

On generalized Nash equilibrium problems with linear coupling constraints and mixed-integer variables

ABSTRACT

We define and discuss different enumerative methods to compute solutions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems with linear coupling constraints and mixed-integer variables. We propose both branch-and-bound methods based on merit functions for the mixed-integer game, and branch-and-prune methods that exploit the concept of dominance to make effective cuts. We show that under mild assumptions the equilibrium set of the game is finite and we define an enumerative method to compute the whole of it. We show that our branch-and-prune method can be suitably modified in order to make a general equilibrium selection over the solution set of the mixed-integer game. We define an application in economics that can be modelled as a Nash game with linear coupling constraints and mixed-integer variables, and we adapt the branch-and-prune method to efficiently solve it.     

Unravelling Structural Mysteries of Simple Organozinc Alkoxides

Simple RZnOR’ alkoxides are among the first known organozinc compounds, and widespread interest in their multifaced chemistry has been driven by their fundamental significance and potential applications including various catalytic reactions. Nevertheless, their chemistry in solution and in the solid state remains both relatively poorly understood and a subject of constant debate. Herein, the synthesis and structural characterization of long-sought structural forms, a roof-like trimer [(tBuZn)₃(μ-OC(H)Ph₂)₂(μ₃-OC(H)Ph₂)] and a ladder-type tetramer [(PhZn)₄(μ-OC(H)Ph₂)₂(μ₃-OC(H)Ph₂)₂], incorporating diphenylmethanolate as a model alkoxide ligand, are reported. Both novel aggregates are robust in the solid state and resistant towards mechanical force. By using ¹H NMR and diffusion-order spectroscopy, it is demonstrated that new RZnOR’ alkoxides are kinetically labile in solution and readily undergo ligand scrambling, such as in the case of Schlenk equilibrium. The elucidated key structural issues, which have remained undiscovered for decades, significantly advance the chemistry of RZnOR’ alkoxides and should support the rational design of zinc alkoxide-based applications.     

On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one.     

The structure factor for liquid lead

Abstract

The structure factor for liquid lead at the temperatures 613 K, 643 K, 863 K and 1163 K are measured by neutron diffraction. Extensive comparisons to earlier measurements are made as well as comparisons to different hard-core models.