Evolution of public cooperation with weighted and conditional strategies

In real systems, generous individuals who prefer to contribute can play more important roles on the public than selfish individuals. Inspired by this, a spatial public goods game with weighted and conditional strategies is proposed in this paper. In our model, a player’s contribution behavior is mainly determined by the less cautious neighbors rather than those more cautious ones. The weight effect is adjusted by a non-negative parameter α$\alpha$. Our results show that the number of strategies increases with the weight parameter α$\alpha$ for the low multiplication factor r$r$. On the contrary, for the high multiplication factor r$r$, the less cautious cooperators are more likely to appear in the system.     

Dynamic allocation of investments promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

In this paper, we introduce a dynamic allocation investment mechanism into the spatial public goods game. In the model, if a cooperator i$i$ collects more payoffs from one group centered on the player j$j$ in the last round, he will put more investments to the group in the next round. The intensity of investment is controlled by a tunable parameter α$\alpha$. Simulation results show that the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted, and a larger α$\alpha$ induces a higher cooperation level. These interesting phenomena are then extensively explained by pairwise investments, average payoffs and evolution snapshots.     

Evaluating fitness by integrating the highest payoff within the neighborhood promotes cooperation in social dilemmas

In this paper, we propose a modified fitness evaluation mechanism, which integrates the environmental factors into the focal player’s fitness calculation, to investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviors in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Here, the fitness of a player is computed by combining the individual raw payoff and the highest payoff within the neighborhood, which is regulated by a single parameter termed as trust level η$\eta$. We show, compared to the traditional version (η=0$\eta =0$), that the cooperation level can be highly enhanced for η>0$\eta >0$. Meanwhile, we illustrate the dynamical evolution of cooperators on the square lattice, and for different defection parameters b$b$ the _FC−K$F_C-K$ curves are utilized to investigate the impact of noise during the strategy updates. Likely, the role of pursuing the highest payoff within the neighborhood also favors the survival of cooperators in the spatial snowdrift game. In addition, the sensibility of knowing the external factors is often not identical for all individuals and we consider the distributed trust level in which η$\eta$ is a distributed parameter, and the results indicate that pursuing the highest payoff in the neighborhood is also inspiring as a consequence of its positive effect on cooperation. The current results are highly instructive for us to further understand the maintenance and emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory.     

Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game

Indirect reciprocity is a fascinating topic in the field of social cooperation. In this paper, we propose a novel updating strategy based on the critical reputation-aware calculation. The joint of reputation allows players to make decisions not only on current payoffs but also from a third party, which improves the status of cooperators in the prisoner's dilemma game and provides a possibility for surviving. Experiments show that the discrepancies in initial fitness caused by reputation will support cooperators in occupying a high proportion in communities. Interestingly, we find that the massive scale of reputation fluctuation helps to enhance the cooperative effect, and newly name this character as “quasi-time lag”. The simulations show that the promotion of our proposed mechanism is effective and robust on different network topologies. This work provides a new perspective for the study of the cooperative game.     

Multi-server queueing systems with cooperation of the servers

In this paper, we consider an N-server queueing model with homogeneous servers in which customers arrive according to a stationary Poisson arrival process. The service times are exponentially distributed. Two new customer’s service disciplines assuming simultaneous service of arriving customer by all currently idle servers are discussed. The steady state analysis of the queue length and sojourn time distribution is performed by means of the matrix analytic methods. Numerical examples, which illustrate advantage of introduced disciplines comparing to the classical one, are presented.     

校企合作、企业环境与知识转移绩效——以长三角医疗器械产业为例

本文在长三角地区医疗器械产业问卷调研的基础上,构建了校企合作、企业环境与知识转移绩效间关系的概念模型,并利用结构方程模型(SEM)对理论模型进行了实证研究.研究结果表明:校企合作与企业吸收能力以及企业所处的环境有着密切的关系,企业环境与知识溢出以及企业潜在和实际吸收能力具有正相关关系.最后在理论和实证分析的基础上提出了提高我国校企合作和知识转移绩效的建议.     

Selective investment promotes cooperation in public goods game

Most previous investigations on spatial Public Goods Game assume that individuals treat neighbors equivalently, which is in sharp contrast with realistic situations, where bias is ubiquitous. We construct a model to study how a selective investment mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators selectively contribute to just a fraction among their neighbors. According to the interaction result, the investment network can be adapted. On selecting investees, three patterns are considered. In the random pattern, cooperators choose their investees among the neighbors equiprobably. In the social-preference pattern, cooperators tend to invest to individuals possessing large social ties. In the wealth-preference pattern, cooperators are more likely to invest to neighbors with higher payoffs. Our result shows robustness of selective investment mechanism that boosts emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Cooperation is more or less hampered under the latter two patterns, and we prove the anti-social-preference or anti-wealth-preference pattern of selecting investees can accelerate cooperation to some extent. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis of our mechanism on double-star networks coincides with simulation results. We hope our finding could shed light on better understanding of the emergence of cooperation among adaptive populations.