Full Bayesian analysis of claims reserving uncertainty

We revisit the gamma–gamma Bayesian chain-ladder (BCL) model for claims reserving in non-life insurance. This claims reserving model is usually used in an empirical Bayesian way using plug-in estimates for the variance parameters. The advantage of this empirical Bayesian framework is that allows us for closed form solutions. The main purpose of this paper is to develop the full Bayesian case also considering prior distributions for the variance parameters and to study the resulting sensitivities.     

The valuation of life contingencies: A symmetrical triangular fuzzy approximation

This paper extends the framework for the valuation of life insurance policies and annuities by Andrés-Sánchez and González-Vila (2012, 2014) in two ways. First we allow various uncertain magnitudes to be estimated by means of fuzzy numbers. This applies not only to interest rates but also to the amounts to be paid out by the insurance company. Second, the use of symmetrical triangular fuzzy numbers allows us to obtain expressions for the pricing of life contingencies and their variability that are closely linked to standard financial and actuarial mathematics. Moreover, they are relatively straightforward to compute and understand from a standard actuarial point of view.     

Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation

Existing risk capital allocation methods, such as the Euler rule, work under the explicit assumption that portfolios are formed as linear combinations of random loss/profit variables, with the firm being able to choose the portfolio weights. This assumption is unrealistic in an insurance context, where arbitrary scaling of risks is generally not possible. Here, we model risks as being partially generated by Lévy processes, capturing the non-linear aggregation of risk. The model leads to non-homogeneous fuzzy games, for which the Euler rule is not applicable. For such games, we seek capital allocations that are in the core, that is, do not provide incentives for splitting portfolios. We show that the Euler rule of an auxiliary linearised fuzzy game (non-uniquely) satisfies the core property and, thus, provides a plausible and easily implemented capital allocation. In contrast, the Aumann–Shapley allocation does not generally belong to the core. For the non-homogeneous fuzzy games studied, Tasche’s (1999) criterion of suitability for performance measurement is adapted and it is shown that the proposed allocation method gives appropriate signals for improving the portfolio underwriting profit.     

Incorporating model uncertainty into optimal insurance contract design

In stochastic optimization models, the optimal solution heavily depends on the selected probability model for the scenarios. However, the scenario models are typically chosen on the basis of statistical estimates and are therefore subject to model error. We demonstrate here how the model uncertainty can be incorporated into the decision making process. We use a nonparametric approach for quantifying the model uncertainty and a minimax setup to find model-robust solutions. The method is illustrated by a risk management problem involving the optimal design of an insurance contract.     

Haezendonck–Goovaerts risk measure with a heavy tailed loss

Recently Haezendonck–Goovaerts (H–G) risk measure has received much attention in (re)insurance and portfolio management. Some nonparametric inferences have been proposed in the literature. When the loss variable does not have enough moments, which depends on the involved Young function, the nonparametric estimator in Ahn and Shyamalkumar (2014) has a nonnormal limit, which challenges interval estimation. Motivated by the fact that many loss variables in insurance and finance could have a heavier tail such as an infinite variance, this paper proposes a new estimator which estimates the tail by extreme value theory and the middle part nonparametrically. It turns out that the proposed new estimator always has a normal limit regardless of the tail heaviness of the loss variable. Hence an interval with asymptotically correct confidence level can be obtained easily either by the normal approximation method via estimating the asymptotic variance or by a bootstrap method. A simulation study and real data analysis confirm the effectiveness of the proposed new inference procedure for estimating the H–G risk measure.     

Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems

Motivated by applications in many economic environments, Bochet et al. (2010) generalize the classic rationing model (Sprumont 1991) as follows: there is a moneyless market, in which a non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so. For this problem they propose the egalitarian transfer solution, which equalizes the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. Furthermore, they show that the egalitarian mechanism elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links. In the variant where demanders are not strategic but demands need to be exactly met Bochet et al. (2013), they propose a similar mechanism for which truthfully reporting the peaks is a dominant strategy, but truthful reporting of links is not.The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is group strategyproof : no coalition of agents can (weakly) benefit from jointly misreporting their peaks. Furthermore, we show that the egalitarian mechanism cannot be manipulated – by misreporting links or by misreporting peaks – by any coalition of suppliers (or any coalition of demanders) in the model where both the suppliers and demanders are agents. Our proofs shed light on the structure of the two models and simplify some of the earlier proofs of strategyproofness. An implication of our results is that the well known algorithm of Megiddo (1977) to compute a lexicographically optimal flow in a network is group strategyproof with respect to the source capacities and sink capacities.     

Pareto-optimal reinsurance arrangements under general model settings

In this paper, we study Pareto optimality of reinsurance arrangements under general model settings. We give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a reinsurance contract to be Pareto-optimal and characterize all Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts under more general model assumptions. We also obtain the sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of the Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts. When the losses of an insurer and a reinsurer are both measured by the Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR) risk measures, we obtain the explicit forms of the Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts under the expected value premium principle. For the purpose of practice, we use numerical examples to show how to determine the mutually acceptable Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts among the available Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts such that both the insurer’s aim and the reinsurer’s goal can be met under the mutually acceptable Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts.