基于BP神经网络的不同灾害情境下群体亲社会行为分析:大学生捐赠意愿实验

本文探讨了在不同灾害情境下社会群体的亲社会行为的影响因素.以大学生这一特殊群体为对象,运用行为经济学实验方法,通过研究不同灾害情境下大学生的捐赠意愿,探讨了大学生群体的亲社会行为的影响因素及其影响机理.设计了包括捐赠情境量表、利他人格量表、温情效应量表、共情量表和捐赠意愿量表的实验方案.基于290份有效实验问卷样本,测试了BP神经网络模型,运用这一模型分析了在强情境和弱情境下的各个影响因素对大学生捐赠意愿的影响权重占比,由此刻画在不同情境下不同因素对大学生捐赠意愿的影响程度.分析结果表明,强情境下的主要影响因素为温情效应和情绪共情,各自占比分别为33.31%和28.82%;而弱情境下的主要影响因素为温情效应和认知共情,各自占比分别为37.98%和32.22%.表明不同灾害程度情境下各影响因素的重要性不同,但温情效应是最重要的因素.     

SUBJECTIVE RADE-OFF RATE METHOD OF MULTIOBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING

ＳＵＢＪＥＣＴＩＶＥＲＡＤＥ－ＯＦＦＲＡＴＥＭＥＴＨＯＤＯＦＭＵＬＴＩＯＢＪＥＣＴＩＶＥＤＥＣＩＳＩＯＮ－ＭＡＫＩＮＧ￥ＷａｎｇＸｉａｎｊｉａ（王先甲）（ＷｕｈａｎＵｎｉｖｅｒｓｉｔｙｏｆＨｙｄｒａｕｌｉｃａｎｄＥｌｅｃｔｒｉｃＥｎｇｉｎｅｅｒｉｎｇ...     

进化博弈决策机制设计综述

进化博弈论是一门交叉性强的综合性理论,在国内外已得到广泛研究和应用.本文系统论述了进化博弈的决策机制及其特点,指出了进化博弈研究的趋势,进化博弈论可作为中国科技工作者学习、研究和应用的有力工具.     

基于AHP和动量BP神经网络的工程项目承包商选择模型

运用BP神经网络技术,采用动量BP算法,构建了基于动量BP神经网络的工程项目承包商选择模型,并将AHP的评价结果作为学习样本,对BP神经网络模型进行训练和测试.结果表明,基于AHP和动量BP神经网络的工程项目承包商选择模型是可行的,该模型具有较高的自组织、自适应和自学习能力以及较强的容错功能,能够为一般的工程项目承包商选择活动提供有效的参考和依据.     

基于灰色关联-TOPSIS的政府公共工程绿色采购评标决策方法研究

提出了一种基于灰色关联-TOPSIS的政府公共工程绿色采购评标决策方法.首先,采用极值处理法对政府公共工程绿色采购评标指标的原始数据进行规范化处理;其次,运用TOPSIS方法计算各方案与正理想系统和负理想系统的加权距离,运用灰色关联分析法计算各方案与正理想系统和负理想系统的关联度;最后,分别计算TOPSIS相对贴近度和...     

具有模糊支付的Moran过程演化博弈动态

以往对演化博弈的研究都假设个体从博弈中获得的支付是确定的并以精确的数来表示。然而由于受环境中各种不确定因素的影响,个体博弈时所获得的支付并不是一个精确的数值,而需要用一个模糊数来表示。本文研究模糊支付下2×2的对称博弈, 利用模糊数的运算, 分析具有模糊支付的有限种群Moran过程演化动态。在弱选择下以梯形模糊数和三角模糊数表示博弈支付,计算策略的模糊扎根概率,分析自然选择有利于策略扎根及策略成为模糊演化稳定策略的条件。将经典博弈推广到模糊环境中丰富了演化博弈理论,更具有现实意义。     

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.(i) The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.(ii)Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the "C+P" states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.(iii) When the system chooses"C+P" states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the "P" strategy in the "C+P" states.     

基于神经网络与群智能的多代理人决策模型及其应用

本文提出了一种基于神经网络与群智能技术的多代理人决策模型.该决策模型以神经网络作为决策控制器,神经网络的输入层是代理人的历史行为策略,输出层决定了代理人的当前策略,神经网络的权重通过群智能优化技术进行训练.权重值的更新过程刻画了代理人行为策略的动态变化过程.仿真实验表明该决策模型具有自适应学习的能力,并能克服代理人之间的冲突取得Pareto最优.     

PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究

基于显示原理以及机制设计的思想,运用广义质量生产函数模型,针对PPP项目招标建立了关于PPP项目特许经营权期与广义质量的二维信息招标直接机制模型,在保证投标人真实显示自己综合管理能力的条件下最大化参与双方的福利。通过模型求解,得到了该招标机制的最优分配以及最低质量的设定条件,并得出在该机制下能实现社会福利最优。并鉴于机制设计的复杂性,给出了该机制的实施规则。最后通过算例,证明了该直接机制的有效性,对PPP项目招标提供了理论上的指导。     

DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT FOR SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH EXPONENTIAL DEMAND FUNCTION

The coordination problem of a supply chain comprising one supplier and one retailer under market demand disruption is studied in this article. A novel exponential demand function is adopted, and the penalty cost is introduced explicitly to capture the deviation production cost caused by the market demand disruption. The optimal strategies are obtained for different disruption scale under the centralized mode. For the decentralized mode, it is proved that the supply chain can be fully coordinated by adjusting the price discount policy appropriately when disruption occurs. Furthermore, the authors point out that similar results can be established for more general demand functions that represent different market circumstances if certain assumptions are satisfied.