Linear production with transport of products,resources and technology

This paper considers linear production situations with a finite number of production facilities, each with its own production technology and market prices. The economic agents control resources at the different facilities. Transport of resources, products and technology is restricted. Sufficient conditions for the corresponding TU-game to be balanced are discussed. In this we extend the results of Owen (1975), Granot (1986) and Curiel, Derks, and Tijs (1989). An example is presented in some detail.This research is sponsored by the Foundation for the Promotion of Research in Economic Sciences, which is part of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).     

Convex multi-choice games: Characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes

This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex multi-choice games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. Furthermore, level-increase monotonic allocation schemes (limas) on the class of convex multi-choice games are introduced and studied. It turns out that each element of the Weber set of such a game is extendable to a limas, and the (total) Shapley value for multi-choice games generates a limas for each convex multi-choice game.     

Cooperative interval games: a survey

The (re)distribution of collective gains and costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The theory of cooperative interval games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. This survey aims to briefly present the state-of-the-art in this young field of research, discusses how the model of cooperative interval games extends the cooperative game theory literature, and reviews its existing and potential applications in economic and operations research situations with interval data.     

A symmetrization for finite two-person games

The symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for matrix games is extended for bimatrix games. It is shown that the equilibria of a bimatrix game and its symmetrization correspond two by two. A similar result is found with respect to quasi-strong, regular and perfect equilibria.     

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

Summary The aim of this paper is to give a survey on several well-known compromise values in cooperative game theory and its applications. Special attention is paid to the τ-value for TU-games, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems, and the compromise value for NTU-games.     

On some balanced, totally balanced and submodular delivery games

This paper studies a class of delivery problems associated with the Chinese postman problem and a corresponding class of delivery games. A delivery problem in this class is determined by a connected graph, a cost function defined on its edges and a special chosen vertex in that graph which will be referred to as the post office. It is assumed that the edges in the graph are owned by different individuals and the delivery game is concerned with the allocation of the traveling costs incurred by the server, who starts at the post office and is expected to traverse all edges in the graph before returning to the post office. A graph G is called Chinese postman-submodular, or, for short, CP-submodular (CP-totally balanced, CP-balanced, respectively) if for each delivery problem in which G is the underlying graph the associated delivery game is submodular (totally balanced, balanced, respectively). For undirected graphs we prove that CP-submodular graphs and CP-totally balanced graphs are weakly cyclic graphs and conversely. An undirected graph is shown to be CP-balanced if and only if it is a weakly Euler graph. For directed graphs, CP-submodular graphs can be characterized by directed weakly cyclic graphs. Further, it is proven that any strongly connected directed graph is CP-balanced. For mixed graphs it is shown that a graph is CP-submodular if and only if it is a mixed weakly cyclic graph. Finally, we note that undirected, directed and mixed weakly cyclic graphs can be recognized in linear time. Received May 20, 1997 / Revised version received August 18, 1998?Published online June 11, 1999     

A fluorescence approach to investigate repartitioning of coalescing agents in acrylic polymer emulsions

Repartitioning of co-solvents between particles of latex emulsions was investigated by means of a fluorescence method based on the detection of the amount of co-solvent via the solvatochromic shift of the emission maximum of a fluorescent probe, copolymerized at a low concentration. Complete repartitioning of co-solvents between particles of latex materials with a low T _g (ca. 25 °C) occurred within minutes. For a hydrophilic latex with a T _g of 68 °C, equilibration was achieved within an hour. Repartitioning was faster for more hydrophobic co-solvents. For a hydrophobic latex of similar T _g , co-solvent repartitioning took place on the same time scale, but complete equilibration was not reached. Possibly, there is an additional slow component in the repartitioning, or the prolonged presence of co-solvent causes a structural change in the latex particles that affects the outcome of the experiment.     

Sequencing interval situations and related games

Uncertainty accompanies almost every situation in real world and it influences our decisions. In sequencing situations it may affect parameters used to determine an optimal order in the queue, and consequently the decision of whether (or not) to rearrange the queue by sharing the realized cost savings. This paper extends the analysis of one-machine sequencing situations and their related cooperative games to a setting with interval data, i.e. when the agents’ costs per unit of time and/or processing time in the system lie in intervals of real numbers obtained by forecasting their values. The question addressed here is: How to determine an optimal order (if the initial order in the queue is not so) and which approach should be used to motivate the agents to adopt the optimal order? This question is an important one that deserves attention both in theory and practice.