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21.
22.
Flip?KlijnEmail author Dries?Vermeulen Herbert?Hamers Tamás?Solymosi Stef?Tijs Joan Pere?Villar 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2003,58(2):191-208
Neighbor games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbor games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (Curiel et al. (1994)). We first present some elementary features of neighbor games. After that we provide a polynomially bounded algorithm of order p
3 for calculating the leximax solution (cf. Arin and Iñarra (1997)) of neighbor games, where p is the number of players.
This authors work has been supported by CentER and the Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University and by the Foundation for the Hungarian Higher Education and Research (AMFK). 相似文献
23.
L. Mallozi S. Tijs M. Voorneveld 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2000,107(2):287-296
Hierarchical potential games with infinite strategy sets are considered. For these games, pessimistic Stackelberg equilibria are characterized as minimum points of the potential function; properties are studied and illustrated with examples. 相似文献
24.
Stefano Moretti Stef Tijs Rodica Branzei Henk Norde 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2009,69(1):181-202
The class of Construct and Charge (CC-) rules for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is considered. CC-rules are defined starting from the notion of charge systems, which specify particular allocation protocols rooted on the Kruskal algorithm for computing an mcst. These protocols can
be easily implemented in practical network situations (for instance, in supply transportation networks), are flexible to changes
in the network situation and meet the requirement of continuous monitoring by the agents involved. Special charge systems,
that we call conservative, lead to a subclass of CC-rules that coincides with the class of obligation rules for mcst situations.
The authors thank two anonymous referees both for detailed remarks and for interesting general comments on a previous version
of the paper.
Stef Tijs and Rodica Branzei are indebted to Daniel Granot for useful discussions on the topics treated in this paper and
his hospitality during our research visit at British Columbia University at Vancouver in July–August 2003. 相似文献
25.
In this paper the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria in mixed strategies is central. Sufficient conditions are given under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian games. Further one possible approach is suggested to the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria for the class of multicriteria Bayesian games. 相似文献
26.
This paper studies two classes of two-person zero-sum games in which the strategies of both players are of a special type.
Each strategy can be split into two parts, a taking and a guessing part. In these games two types of asymmetry between the players can occur. In the first place, the number of objects available
for taking does not need to be the same for both players. In the second place, the players can be guessing sequentially instead
of simultaneously; the result is asymmetric information. The paper studies the value and equilibria of these games, for all
possible numbers of objects available to the players, for the case with simultaneous guessing as well as for the variant with
sequential guessing.
相似文献
27.
Results of Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley and results of Shapley and Snow, concerning solutions of matrix games, are extended to the class of discounted stochastic games. Prior to these extensions, relations between the game parameters, value, and optimal stationary strategy spaces are established. Then, the inverse problem of constructing stochastic games, given the solution, is considered. 相似文献
28.
Dr. S. H. Tijs 《International Journal of Game Theory》1976,5(4):209-210
In this note an example is given of two superadditive games which are isomorphic and notS-equivalent. 相似文献
29.
Judith?TimmerEmail author Peter?Borm Stef?Tijs 《International Journal of Game Theory》2004,32(4):595-613
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided.2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 91A12.The authors thank two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments.This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.Received: October 2000 相似文献
30.
A. van den Nouweland S. Tijs J. Potters J. Zarzuelo 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1995,41(3):289-311
A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels. Cooperative games form a subclass of the class of multi-choice games.This paper extends some solution concepts for cooperative games to multi-choice games. In particular, the notions of core, dominance core and Weber set are extended. Relations between cores and dominance cores and between cores and Weber sets are extensively studied. A class of flow games is introduced and relations with non-negative games with non-empty cores are investigated. 相似文献