Sequencing interval situations and related games

Uncertainty accompanies almost every situation in real world and it influences our decisions. In sequencing situations it may affect parameters used to determine an optimal order in the queue, and consequently the decision of whether (or not) to rearrange the queue by sharing the realized cost savings. This paper extends the analysis of one-machine sequencing situations and their related cooperative games to a setting with interval data, i.e. when the agents’ costs per unit of time and/or processing time in the system lie in intervals of real numbers obtained by forecasting their values. The question addressed here is: How to determine an optimal order (if the initial order in the queue is not so) and which approach should be used to motivate the agents to adopt the optimal order? This question is an important one that deserves attention both in theory and practice.     

Geometric Brascamp–Lieb Has the Optimal Best Constant

We study the optimal best constant for the Brascamp–Lieb inequality and show that it is furnished exactly by the geometric Brascamp–Lieb inequality.     

Recent applications of chemometrics in one‐ and two‐dimensional chromatography

The proliferation of increasingly more sophisticated analytical separation systems, often incorporating increasingly more powerful detection techniques, such as high‐resolution mass spectrometry, causes an urgent need for highly efficient data‐analysis and optimization strategies. This is especially true for comprehensive two‐dimensional chromatography applied to the separation of very complex samples. In this contribution, the requirement for chemometric tools is explained and the latest developments in approaches for (pre‐)processing and analyzing data arising from one‐ and two‐dimensional chromatography systems are reviewed. The final part of this review focuses on the application of chemometrics for method development and optimization.     

A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games

In this note, we will give several examples to illustrate that two essential games which are isomorphic are not necessarily S-equivalent when the cores of both games are “small” or empty. In other words, we show that whether two isomorphic games are S-equivalent can not be justified in terms of the “size” of the core.     

Pseudozero Set of Real Multivariate Polynomials

The pseudozero set of a system P of polynomials in n variables is the subset of C ⁿ consisting of the union of the zeros of all polynomial systems Q that are near to P in a suitable sense. This concept arises naturally in Scientific Computing where data often have a limited accuracy. When the polynomials of the system are polynomials with complex coefficients, the pseudozero set has already been studied. In this paper, we focus on the case where the polynomials of the system have real coefficients and such that all the polynomials in all the perturbed polynomial systems have real coefficients as well. We provide an explicit definition to compute this pseudozero set. At last, we analyze different methods to visualize this set.      

Multi-choice clan games and their core

In this paper, we consider market situations with two corners. One corner consists of a group of powerful agents with yes-or-no choices and clan behavior. The other corner consists of non-powerful agents with multi-choices regarding the extent at which cooperation with the clan can be achieved. Multi-choice clan games arise from such market situations. The focus is on the analysis of the core of multi-choice clan games. Several characterizations of multi-choice clan games by the shape of the core are given, and the connection between the convexity of a multi-choice clan game and the stability of its core is studied.      

On the characterization of dynamic supramolecular systems: a general mathematical association model for linear supramolecular copolymers and application on a complex two-component hydrogen-bonding system

A general mathematical model for the characterization of the dynamic (kinetically labile) association of supramolecular assemblies in solution is presented. It is an extension of the equal K (EK) model by the stringent use of linear algebra to allow for the simultaneous presence of an unlimited number of different units in the resulting assemblies. It allows for the analysis of highly complex dynamic equilibrium systems in solution, including both supramolecular homo- and copolymers without the recourse to extensive approximations, in a field in which other analytical methods are difficult. The derived mathematical methodology makes it possible to analyze dynamic systems such as supramolecular copolymers regarding for instance the degree of polymerization, the distribution of a given monomer in different copolymers as well as its position in an aggregate. It is to date the only general means to characterize weak supramolecular systems. The model was fitted to NMR dilution titration data by using the program Matlab, and a detailed algorithm for the optimization of the different parameters has been developed. The methodology is applied to a case study, a hydrogen-bonded supramolecular system, salen 4+porphyrin 5. The system is formally a two-component system but in reality a three-component system. This results in a complex dynamic system in which all monomers are associated to each other by hydrogen bonding with different association constants, resulting in homo- and copolymers 4n5m as well as cyclic structures 6 and 7, in addition to free 4 and 5. The system was analyzed by extensive NMR dilution titrations at variable temperatures. All chemical shifts observed at different temperatures were used in the fitting to obtain the DeltaH degrees and DeltaS degrees values producing the best global fit. From the derived general mathematical expressions, system 4+5 could be characterized with respect to above-mentioned parameters.     

The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).