Objectively discerning Autler-Townes splitting from electromagnetically induced transparency

Autler-Townes splitting (ATS) and electromagnetically induced transparency (EIT) both yield transparency in an absorption profile, but only EIT yields strong transparency for a weak pump field due to Fano interference. Empirically discriminating EIT from ATS is important but so far has been subjective. We introduce an objective method, based on Akaike's information criterion, to test ATS vs EIT from experimental data for three-level atomic systems and determine which pertains. We apply our method to a recently reported induced-transparency experiment in superconducting-circuit quantum electrodynamics.     

Suppression of flavor symmetry breaking in B decay sum rules

While flavor symmetries are useful for studying hadronic B   decays, symmetry relations for amplitudes and decay rates are usually violated by first order symmetry breaking corrections. We point out two cases in which first order symmetry breaking is suppressed by a small ratio of amplitudes: (1) An isospin sum rule for four B→Kπ$B\to K\pi$ decays, where isospin breaking is shown to be negligible. (2) An SU(3)$\mathrm{SU}(3)$ sum rule for pairs of B→Kπ$B\to K\pi$ and B→Kη₈$B\to K{\eta }_8$, generalized to pairs of B→Kπ$B\to K\pi$, B→Kη$B\to K\eta$ and B→Kη^′$B\to K{\eta }^{\prime }$.     

Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles

Trembling-hand arguments, introduced by Selten, where players make errors in implementing a strategy, are a successful and intuitively plausible approach to eliminating some equilibria. Typically, these errors are independent of the strategy the player aims to implement. In many contexts, however, when a player aims at one strategy, some errors are more likely than if a different strategy is the target. We introduce the notion of strategy-dependent trembles where each strategy intended by a player implies a different probability vector of errors over other strategies. This seemingly minor but plausible change makes a major difference. The focus becomes a player's own errors rather than the errors of others. A weakly dominated strategy is not necessarily eliminated if less costly errors arise when aiming at it than at the dominating strategy. Almost every Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is a strategy-dependent trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We thank the associate editor, two referees, James Friedman, and audiences at the Public Choice Society Meetings and Southeastern Economic Theory Meetings for comments and the Public Utility Research Center and the College of Business Administration at the University of Florida for financial support.     

A three-dimensional steady-state tumor system

The growth of tumors can be modeled as a free boundary problem involving partial differential equations. We consider one such model and compute steady-state solutions for this model. These solutions include radially symmetric solutions where the free boundary is a sphere and nonradially symmetric solutions. Linear and nonlinear stability for these solutions are determined numerically.     

Rebuttal of Kowalenko’s Paper As Concerns the Irrationality of Euler’s Constant γ

We rebut Kowalenko??s claims in this journal that he proved the irrationality of Euler??s constant ??, and that his rational series for ?? is new.