Profinite Groups with Polynomial Subgroup Growth

We characterise the profinite groups with polynomial subgroupgrowth. We deduce that the property PSG is extension-closedin the category of all groups, and subgroup-closed in the categoryof finitely generated profinite groups.     

Permutation groups,simple groups,and sieve methods

We show that the number of integersn≤x which occur as indices of subgroups of nonabelian finite simple groups, excluding that ofA _n−1 inA _n , is ∼hx/logx, for some given constanth. This might be regarded as a noncommutative analogue of the Prime Number Theorem (which counts indicesn≤x of subgroups of abelian simple groups). We conclude that for most positive integersn, the only quasiprimitive permutation groups of degreen areS _n andA _n in their natural action. This extends a similar result for primitive permutation groups obtained by Cameron, Neumann and Teague in 1982. Our proof combines group-theoretic and number-theoretic methods. In particular, we use the classification of finite simple groups, and we also apply sieve methods to estimate the size of some interesting sets of primes. Research partially supported by the Australian Research Council for C.E.P. and by the Bi-National Science Foundation United States-Israel Grant 2000-053 for A.S.     

Generation and random generation: From simple groups to maximal subgroups

Let G   be a finite group and let d(G)$d(G)$ be the minimal number of generators for G  . It is well known that d(G)=2$d(G)=2$ for all (non-abelian) finite simple groups. We prove that d(H)?4$d(H)?4$ for any maximal subgroup H of a finite simple group, and that this bound is best possible.     

Automorphisms of finite groups of bounded rank

LetG be a finite group admitting an automorphismα withm fixed points. Suppose every subgroup ofG isr-generated. It is shown that (1)G has a characteristic soluble subgroupH whose index is bounded in terms ofm andr, and (2) if the orders ofα andG are coprime, then the derived length ofH is also bounded in terms ofm andr. To Professor John Thompson, in honor of his outstanding achievements     

A new characterization of frobenius complements

LetH, G be finite groups such thatH acts onG and each non-trivial element ofH fixes at mostf elements ofG. It is shown that, ifG is sufficiently large, thenH has the structure of a Frobenius complement. This result depends on the classification of finite simple groups. We conclude that, ifG is a finite group andA ⊆G is any non-cyclic abelian subgroup, then the order ofG is bounded above in terms of the maximal order of a centralizerC _G(a) for 1≠a ∈A.     

Applications of dimension subgroups to the power structure ofp-groups

Dimension subgroups in characteristicp are employed in the study of the power structure of finitep-groups. We show, e.g., that ifG is ap-group of classc (p odd) andk=⌜log _p ((c+1)/(p−1))⌝, then, for alli, any product ofp ^i+k th powers inG is ap ⁱ th power. This sharpens a previous result of A. Mann. Examples are constructed in order to show that our constantk is quite often the best possible, and in any case cannot be reduced by more than 1. Partially supported by MPI funds. This author is a member of GNSAGA-CNR. Partially supported by a Rothschild Fellowship.     

Base sizes for simple groups and a conjecture of Cameron

Let G be a permutation group on a finite set . A base for Gis a subset B with pointwise stabilizer in G that is trivial;we write b(G) for the smallest size of a base for G. In thispaper we prove that b(G) 6 if G is an almost simple group ofexceptional Lie type and is a primitive faithful G-set. Animportant consequence of this result, when combined with otherrecent work, is that b(G) 7 for any almost simple group G ina non-standard action, proving a conjecture of Cameron. Theproof is probabilistic and uses bounds on fixed point ratios.     

Voting for voters: the unanimity case

We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal unanimity voting procedure. We examine several protocols, which depend on whether admission or expulsion are permissible, and on the order with which they are implemented. Conditions which ensure the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium profiles for some voting protocols, and counter examples for the existence of such profiles in other protocols are presented. Finally, we prove that, if the agents insist on perfect equilibrium strategy profiles in a one-stage play, the original founders would prefer a protocol in which expulsion precedes admission to protocols in which either admission precedes expulsion, or the two are treated simultaneously. The paper concludes with an overview and a discussion on the results and suggestions for further research. Received: December 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The authors thank Salvador Barberà for his critical reading and his many suggestions. The authors are also grateful to the anonymous referee for many very useful suggestions. Support by a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada grant and by the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is gratefully acknowledged.