Representations of simple games by social choice functions

We investigate possible constructions of choice procedures (social choice functions) for committees (simple games). The notion of a capacity of a committee is derived from our construction. We determine the capacity of strong, symmetric and weak simple games. We also provide an upper bound on the capacity of a simple game without veto players.     

Associative and Jordan Algebras Generated by Two Idempotents

The purpose of this note is to obtain precise information about associative or Jordan algebras generated by two idempotents.     

Multisoliton ejection from an amplifying potential trap

We study theoretically the dynamics of a beam launched inside an amplifying trap potential. Raising the amplification transforms the dynamics from linear tunneling at low amplification to periodic ejection of a sequence of identical solitons (when the amplification rate exceeds the tunneling rate) and, at strong amplification, to nonperiodic multisoliton ejection.     

On non-equilibria threshold strategies in ticket queues

In many real-life queueing systems, a customer may balk upon arrival at a queueing system, but other customers become aware of it only at the time the balking customer was to start service. Naturally, the balking is an outcome of the queue length, and the decision is based on a threshold. Yet the inspected queue length contains customers who balked. In this work, we consider a Markovian queue with infinite capacity and with customers that are homogeneous with respect to their cost reward functions. We show that that no threshold strategy can be a Nash equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, we show that for any threshold strategy adopted by all, the individual’s best response is a double threshold strategy. That is, join if and only if one of the following is true: (i) the inspected queue length is smaller than one threshold, or (ii) the inspected queue length is larger than a second threshold. Our model is under the assumption that the response time of the server when he finds out that a customer balked is negligible. We also discuss the validity of the result when the response time is not negligible.     

Asymptotic centers and best compact approximation of operators intoC(K)

The existence of best compact approximations for all bounded linear operators fromX intoC(K) is related to the behavior of asymptotic centers inX ^*. IfK is just one convergent sequence, the condition is that everyω ^*-convergent sequence inX ^* will have an asymptotic center. We first study this property, solving some open problems in the theory of asymptotic centers. IfK is more “complex,” the asymptotic centers should behave “continuously.” We use this observation to construct operators fromC[0,1] intoC(ω ²) and from ?₁ intoL ₁ without best compact approximation. We also construct spacesX ₁,X ₂, isomorphic to a Hilbert space, and operatorsT ₁,∶X ₁→C(ω ²),T ₂∶?₁→X ₂ without best compact approximations.     

Closed incompressible surfaces in knot complements

In this paper we show that given a knot or link in a -plat projection with and , where is the length of the plat, if the twist coefficients all satisfy then has at least nonisotopic essential meridional planar surfaces. In particular if is a knot then contains closed incompressible surfaces. In this case the closed surfaces remain incompressible after all surgeries except perhaps along a ray of surgery coefficients in .

     

Bitangents of tropical plane quartic curves

Mathematische Zeitschrift - We study smooth tropical plane quartic curves and show that they satisfy certain properties analogous to (but also different from) smooth plane quartics in algebraic...     

Customers’ abandonment strategy in an <Emphasis Type="Italic">M</Emphasis> / <Emphasis Type="Italic">G</Emphasis> / 1 queue

We consider an M / G / 1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We show the Nash equilibrium profile among customers and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision is based on the observed past (which determines from what sequence the threshold is taken) and the observed queue length (which determines the appropriate element in the chosen sequence). We construct a set of equations that has the Nash equilibrium as its solution and discuss the relationships between the properties of the service time distribution and the properties of the Nash equilibrium, such as uniqueness and finiteness.