Diisopropyl tartrate modified (E)-γ-[(cyclohexyloxy)dimethylsilyl-allylboronate, a chiral reagent for the stereoselective synthesis of anti 1,2-diols via the formal α-hydroxyallylation of aldehydes

An enantioselective synthesis of anti 1,2-diols via the reactions of aldehydes and the tartrate ester modified γ(alkoxysilyl)allylboronate2 has been developed. This method is most effective in double asymmetric reactions with chiral aldehydes.     

Studies toward the total synthesis of angelmicin B (hibarimicin B): synthesis of a model CD-D' arylnaphthoquinone

[structure: see text] A synthesis of arylnaphthoquinone 22 corresponding to the CD-D' unit of angelmicin B via the Suzuki coupling of the D' arylboronic acid 15 with the CD bromonaphthoquinone 21 is described. The mild conditions for the Suzuki cross-coupling leading to 22 may prove to be useful for the eventual late-stage coupling of the two highly functionalized halves of angelmicin B.     

Applications of control theory to economic analysis: J.D. Pitchford and S.J. Turnovsky,Editors, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977, 364 pages,Dfl. 155.00

A.K. Sen's index, P, is the only measure of poverty in a population that adequately allows for numbers in poverty, intensity of average poverty, and income distribution among the poor, while respecting two natural axioms. Nevertheless, the derivatives of P possess at least four attributes, at best highly counter-intuitive, at worst inconsistent with diminishing-marginal-utility assumptions, underlying the axioms themselves. Due to problems in handling income distribution among the poor, no measure of aggregate poverty can be constructed. Instead, it is proposed to construct a simple measure of those in ultra-poverty - among whom income cannot be very unequal - plus a pair of measures of moderate poverty.     

Dominance solvable games and trees

We study social choice functions represented by Moulin's dominance solvable games. We first show that dominance solvability of games is independent of the order in which dominated strategies are deleted. This implies that the perfect equilibrium of a game with perfect information generally coincides with its solution according to dominance solvability. Then we show that a large class of d-solvable games yields the same social choice functions as those represented by games of perfect information. We show that for three alternatives and all n relatively prime to 6 there exists a method of social choice fractional elimination, which can be represented by a kingmaker tree. This covers some cases not previously covered by Moulin. We also find numerous examples.