Bargaining over the division of a shrinking pie: An axiomatic approach

The Bargaining Problem paradigm is extended to time-consuming conflict situations. Such a situation can be represented by a chain of bargaining domains, each representing the conflict at a different point in time. The solution function selects a point in the union of all these domains. We characterize a solution function which satisfies several requirements and explore its properties. One of the results is that an extension of the Adding requirement (Thomson-Myerson 1980) is enough, under some conditions, to yield a solution point, so there is no need to extend the stronger requirements of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Nash 1950) or Monotonicity (Kalai-Smorodinsky 1975).     

Investigating and ordering Quadrilaterals and their analogies in space—problem fields with various aspects

Problem fields with one or two generating problems and possibilities of varying existing problems give a good chance for self-activities of students and can be used for reaching different general aims. In this paper some topics concerning quadrilaterals will be presented. I hope they will animate teachers for more problem orientation in mathematics education. First we will reflect about different types of convex and non-convex quadrilaterals and possibilities of ordering them. Then we focus on middle-quadrilaterals and types of quadrilaterals with special middle-quadrilaterals as well as their logical ordering. Finally we investigate the analogies in space to the parallelogram and its sub-types and order them in the “house of parallelepipeds”.     

Einfluß der Dilatation einer ebenen Phasengrenzfläche auf den Stoffdurchgang

The common methods for calculating the mass transfer across liquid-liquid interfaces in technical applications take into account the mass transfer resistances within the bulk phases. The transfer resistance of the interface and a possible coupling between the momentum and the mass transport is not taken into account. In the present paper a survey is given of theoretical approaches which can describe this coupling and the additional mass transfer resistance. A theory is proposed by Hampe which can be used to explain the coupling between momentum and mass transport employing thermodynamics of irreversible processes. On the basis of this work, the influence of the dilatation of a flat interface on the mass transfer is deduced. It is also concluded from this theory that the diffusion coefficients within the bulk phases are coupled near the thermodynamic equilibrium.     

Strength of cylinder joint adhesively bonded by coupling

Summary A method of joining two metal cylindrical shafts with adhesive coupling is proposed. Two cylindrical shafts with the same diameter are connected by bonding through a cylindrical coupling with epoxy resin. The strength of the shaft joint under tensile loading and torsional loading is investigated analytically and experimentally. The stress and strain distributions of the shaft joint is analyzed by the finite element method. The analyzed strain distributions in the joint are compared with experimental values. The joint strength is predicted by applying the strength laws of shafts, coupling, adhesive layer and adhesive interface between shaft and adhesive coupling. The effects of the coupling dimension on the joint strength are examined. It is shown that the adhesive shaft joint can transfer the load by which the cylindrical shafts are plastically deformed.This paper was refined by the author, K. Ikegami, during statying at Technische Universität München under the support of Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdients. The author is grateful to Professor Lippmann of Technische Universität München who is the host professor of the support.     

The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints

Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts.