On Totally Ordered Rings Whose Positive Cones are Finitely Generated

This paper is mainly dealt with the structure of totally ordered rings (t.o. rings) whose positive cones are finitely generated as multiplicative right ideals.AMS Subject Classification (1991): 16W80, 13J25     

Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the core of the game. These games will be called buyer-seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed-pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyer-seller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer-seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed-pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a “45^o-lattice” by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered. Received: March 2002/Revised version: January 2003 RID="*" ID="*"  Institutional support from research grants BEC 2002-00642 and SGR2001-0029 is gratefully acknowledged RID="**" ID="**"  The authors thank the referees for their comments     

Computational complexity of stable partitions with B-preferences

Consider a special stable partition problem in which the player's preferences over sets to which she could belong are identical with her preferences over the most attractive member of a set and in case of indifference the set of smaller cardinality is preferred. If the preferences of all players over other (individual) players are strict, a strongly stable and a stable partition always exists. However, if ties are present, we show that both the existence problems are NP-complete. These results are very similar to what is known for the stable roommates problem. Received: July 2000/Revised: October 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  This work was supported by the Slovak Agency for Science, contract #1/7465/20 “Combinatorial Structures and Complexity of Algorithms”.     

A sharp bound for the degree of proper monomial mappings between balls

The authors prove that a proper monomial holomorphic mapping from the two-ball to the N-ball has degree at most 2N-3, and that this result is sharp. The authors first show that certain group-invariant polynomials (related to Lucas polynomials) achieve the bound. To establish the bound the authors introduce a graph-theoretic approach that requires determining the number of sinks in a directed graph associated with the quotient polynomial. The proof also relies on a result of the first author that expresses all proper polynomial holomorphic mappings between balls in terms of tensor products.     

Precise rate in the law of iterated logarithm for <Emphasis Type="Italic">ρ</Emphasis>-mixing sequence

Let {X, X _n;n≥1} be a strictly stationary sequence of ρ-mixing random variables with mean zero and finite variance. Set . Suppose lim _n→∞ and , where d=2, if −1<b<0 and d>2(b+1), if b≥0. It is proved that, for any b>−1,

The Heighway Dragon Revisited

We prove that the Heighway dragon is a countable union of closed geometrically similar disk-like planar sets which intersect each other in a linear order: any two of them intersect at no more than one cut point and for any three disks there exist at least two with an empty intersection. Consequently, the interior of the Heighway dragon is a countable union of disjoint open disk-like planar sets. We determine all the cut points of the dragon and show that each disk-like subset between two cut points is a graph self-similar set defined by a graph-directed iterated function system consisting of four seed sets. Our results describe a fairly complete picture of the topological and geometric structure of the Heighway dragon.     

On the structure of inner ideals of nest algebras

IfA is a nest algebra andA _s=A ∩ A* , whereA* is the set of the adjoints of the operators lying inA, then the pair (A, A _s) forms a partial Jordan *-triple. Important tools when investigating the structure of a partial Jordan *-triple are its tripotents. In particular, given an orthogonal family of tripotents of the partial Jordan *-triple (A, A _s), the nest algebraA splits into a direct sum of subspaces known as the Peirce decomposition relative to that family. In this paper, the Peirce decomposition relative to an orthogonal family of minimal tripotents is used to investigate the structure of the inner ideals of (A, A _s), whereA is a nest algebra associated with an atomic nest. A property enjoyed by inner ideals of the partial Jordan *-triple (A, A _s) is presented as the main theorem. This result is then applied in the final part of the paper to provide examples of inner ideals. A characterization of the minimal tripotents as a certain class of rank one operators is also obtained as a means to deduce the principal theorem.     

Some Bipartite Ramsey Numbers

Consider a complete bipartite graph K(s, s) with p = 2s points. Let each line of the graph have either red or blue colour. The smallest number p of points such that K(s, s) always contains red K(m, n) or blue K(m, n) is called bipartite Ramsey number denoted by rb(K(m, n), K(m, n)). In this paper, we show that

Groups in which every non-abelian subgroup is permutable

A subgroupH of a groupG is said to bepermutable ifHX=XH for every subgroupX ofG. In this paper the structure of groups in which every subgroup either is abelian or permutable is investigated. This work was done while the last author was visiting the University of Napoli Federico II. He thanks the “Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni” for its financial support.     

Consistent values and the core in continuum market games with two types of players

The consistent value is an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games with non-transferable utility.? In this paper, the consistent value will be characterized for market games with a continuum of players of two types. We will show that for such games the consistent value need not belong to the core, and provide conditions under which there is equivalence between the two concepts. Received: October 1998 RID="*" ID="*"  This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Sergiu Hart, The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Mathematics, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Professor Hart for introducing me to this area of research, for his help and guidance, and, especially, for all his patience.? I would also like to thank Michael Borns for improving the style, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.