Cyclic and telechelic ladder polymers derived from tetrahydroxytetramethylspirobisindane and 1,4‐dicyanotetrafluorobenzene

5,5′,6,6′‐Tetrahydroxy‐3,3,3′,3′‐tetramethylspirobisindane was polycondensed with 1,4‐dicyanotetrafluorobenzene in four different solvents at 70 °C. In dimethylformamide, N‐methylpyrrolidone, and sulfolane exclusively, cyclic polymers were detectable by matrix‐assisted laser desorption/ionization time‐of‐flight (MALDI‐TOF) mass spectrometry up to masses around 13,000 Da. In dimethyl sulfoxide, linear byproducts were also found. Higher temperatures caused degradation reactions catalyzed by potassium carbonate. Polycondensations performed with the addition of 4‐tert‐butyl catechol or 2,2′‐dihydroxy binaphthyl yielded linear telechelic oligomers. Equimolar mixtures of linear and cyclic ladder polymers were examined by MALDI‐TOF mass spectra to determine how the end groups and the cyclic structure influenced the signal‐to‐noise ratio. The results suggested a preferential detection of the linear chains. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Polym Sci Part A: Polym Chem 44: 5344–5352, 2006     

A note on theβ-measure for digraph competitions

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to digraph competitions: domination structures that can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles for a group of individuals within the framework of social choice theory. Brink and Gilles (2000) defined theβ-measure of a digraph competition as the Shapley value of the corresponding digraph game. This paper provides a new characterization of theβ-measure.     

Range convexity,continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives reported byn individuals a compromise alternative. A voting scheme is strategy-proof if no individual is better off by lying, i.e., not reporting a best alternative. In this paper the main results concern the case where the set of alternatives is the Euclidean plane and the preferences are Euclidean. It is shown that for strategy-proof voting schemes continuity is equivalent to convexity of the range of the voting scheme. Using a result by Kim and Roush (1984), this leads to characterizations of surjective or unanimous, anonymous, strategy-proof voting schemes.Furthermore, the paper contains an extensive discussion of related results in the area.