Neutral Community Theory: How Stochasticity and Dispersal-Limitation Can Explain Species Coexistence

Neutral community theory explains biodiversity, i.e. the coexistence of several species, as the result of a stochastic balance between immigration and extinction on a local level, and between speciation and extinction on a regional level. The most popular model, presented by Hubbell in 2001, has seen many analytical developments in recent years, which can be used in model analysis, model testing and model comparison. We review these developments here, and present alternative derivations and shine previously unnoticed lights on them.     

Bargaining over the division of a shrinking pie: An axiomatic approach

The Bargaining Problem paradigm is extended to time-consuming conflict situations. Such a situation can be represented by a chain of bargaining domains, each representing the conflict at a different point in time. The solution function selects a point in the union of all these domains. We characterize a solution function which satisfies several requirements and explore its properties. One of the results is that an extension of the Adding requirement (Thomson-Myerson 1980) is enough, under some conditions, to yield a solution point, so there is no need to extend the stronger requirements of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Nash 1950) or Monotonicity (Kalai-Smorodinsky 1975).     

Investigating and ordering Quadrilaterals and their analogies in space—problem fields with various aspects

Problem fields with one or two generating problems and possibilities of varying existing problems give a good chance for self-activities of students and can be used for reaching different general aims. In this paper some topics concerning quadrilaterals will be presented. I hope they will animate teachers for more problem orientation in mathematics education. First we will reflect about different types of convex and non-convex quadrilaterals and possibilities of ordering them. Then we focus on middle-quadrilaterals and types of quadrilaterals with special middle-quadrilaterals as well as their logical ordering. Finally we investigate the analogies in space to the parallelogram and its sub-types and order them in the “house of parallelepipeds”.     

The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints

Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts.     

On the uniqueness of minimizing harmonic maps to a closed hemisphere

We study the uniqueness of minimizing harmonic maps to a closed hemisphere. We are able to describe the boundary data for which there are more than one minimizer, and to describe in these cases the corresponding set of minimizers. This is a limiting case for a former result of W.Jäger and H.Kaul.This article was processed by the author using the Springer-Verlag T_EX PJourlg macro package 1991.