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Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article. 相似文献
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Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate
from recent choices. More recent choices can be more salient than other choices, or more readily available in the agent’s
mind. Alternatively, agents may have formed habits, or use rules of thumb. This paper provides discrete-time adjustment processes
for strategic games in which players display such a bias towards recent choices. In addition, players choose best replies
to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past. We characterize the limit behavior of these processes by showing
that they eventually settle down in minimal prep sets (Voorneveld in Games Econ Behav 48:403–414, 2004).
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