Expectation-Stock Dynamics in Multi-Agent Fisheries

In this paper we consider a game-theoretic dynamic model describing the exploitation of a renewable resource. Our model is based on a Cournot oligopoly game where n profit-maximizing players harvest fish and sell their catch on m markets. We assume that the players do not know the law governing the reproduction of the resource. Instead they use an adaptive updating scheme to forecast the future fish stock. We analyze the resulting dynamical system which describes how the fish population and the forecasts (expectations) of the players evolve over time. We provide results on the existence and local stability of steady states. We consider the set of initial conditions which give non-negative trajectories converging to an equilibrium and illustrate how this set can be characterized. We show how such sets may change as some structural parameters of our model are varied and how these changes can be explained. This paper extends existing results in the literature by showing that they also hold in our two-dimensional framework. Moreover, by using analytical and numerical methods, we provide some new results on global dynamics which show that such sets of initial conditions can have complicated topological structures, a situation which may be particularly troublesome for policymakers.     

On a discrete-time model with replicator dynamics in renewable resource exploitation

We consider a discrete-time version of the model proposed by Lamantia and Radi [15 F. Lamantia, and D. Radi, Exploitation of renewable resources with differentiated technologies: an evolutionary analysis, Math. Comput. Simulation 108 (2015), pp. 155–174. doi:10.1016/j.matcom.2013.09.013.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] to describe a fishery where a population regulated by a logistic growth function is exploited by a pool of agents that can choose, at each time period, between two different harvesting strategies according to a profit-driven evolutionary selection rule. The resulting discrete dynamical system, represented by a two-dimensional nonlinear map, is characterized by the presence of invariant lines on which the dynamics are governed by one-dimensional restrictions that represent pure, i.e. adopted by all players, strategies. However, interesting dynamics related to interior attractors, where players playing both strategies coexist, are evidenced by analytical as well as numerical methods that reveal local and global bifurcations.     

On the influence of memory on complex dynamics of evolutionary oligopoly models

Nonlinear Dynamics - In this paper, we propose a unitary formulation for evolutionary oligopoly models with memory. In particular, we consider behavioral rules that are stationary at the Nash...     

Basin boundaries and focal points in a map coming from Bairstow's method

This paper is devoted to the study of the global dynamical properties of a two-dimensional noninvertible map, with a denominator which can vanish, obtained by applying Bairstow's method to a cubic polynomial. It is shown that the complicated structure of the basins of attraction of the fixed points is due to the existence of singularities such as sets of nondefinition, focal points, and prefocal curves, which are specific to maps with a vanishing denominator, and have been recently introduced in the literature. Some global bifurcations that change the qualitative structure of the basin boundaries, are explained in terms of contacts among these singularities. The techniques used in this paper put in evidence some new dynamic behaviors and bifurcations, which are peculiar of maps with denominator; hence they can be applied to the analysis of other classes of maps coming from iterative algorithms (based on Newton's method, or others). (c) 1999 American Institute of Physics.     

Binary choices in small and large groups: A unified model

Two different ways to model the diffusion of alternative choices within a population of individuals in the presence of social externalities are known in the literature. While Galam’s model of rumors spreading considers a majority rule for interactions in several groups, Schelling considers individuals interacting in one large group, with payoff functions that describe how collective choices influence individual preferences. We incorporate these two approaches into a unified general discrete-time dynamic model for studying individual interactions in variously sized groups. We first illustrate how the two original models can be obtained as particular cases of the more general model we propose, then we show how several other situations can be analyzed. The model we propose goes beyond a theoretical exercise as it allows modeling situations which are relevant in economic and social systems. We consider also other aspects such as the propensity to switch choices and the behavioral momentum, and show how they may affect the dynamics of the whole population.     

Bubbling,riddling, blowout and critical curves

This paper provides a survey of some recent results and examples concerning the use of the method of critical curves in the study of chaos synchronization in discrete dynamical systems with an invariant one-dimensional submanifold. Some examples of two-dimensional discrete dynamical systems, which exhibit synchronization of chaoti1c trajectories with the related phenomena of bubbling, on–off intermittency, blowout and riddles basins, are examined by the usual local analysis in terms of transverse Lyapunov exponents, whereas segments of critical curves are used to obtain the boundary of a two-dimensional compact trapping region containing the one-dimensional Milnor chaotic attractor on which synchronized dynamics occur. Thanks to the folding action of critical curves, the existence of such a compact region may strongly influence the effects of bubbling and blowout bifurcations, as it acts like a ‘trapping vessel’ inside which bubbling and blowout phenomena are bounded by the global dynamical forces of the dynamical system.     

An extension of the Antoci-Dei-Galeotti evolutionary model for environment protection through financial instruments

This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci et al. (2009) [1] where a dynamic model is proposed to describe an innovative method for improving environmental quality based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between firms and tourists in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we first perform a global analysis of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms, also performs a direct action for the pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable balance of financial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental remediation.