Förster energy transfer from poly(arylene–ethynylene)s to an erbium–porphyrin complex

We study the infrared emission at 1.54 μm of an organolanthanide complex, Er(III)-tetraphenylporphyrin [Er(TPP)acac], both as a result of direct optical excitation and via energy transfer from host π-conjugate polymers of type poly(arylene–ethynylene) [PAE]. In the first case, the emission of the neat complex is characterized in inert transparent materials and a value of the quantum yield at 1.54 μm φ_IR=4×10⁻⁴ is measured. Then, fluorescence resonance transfer is investigated in blends of Er(TPP)acac with PAEs by monitoring the quenching of the polymer fluorescence along with the enhancement of both the visible emission of the ligand and the near-infrared band of Er³⁺. These different procedures allow a detailed analysis of the transfer efficiency within a specific implementation of the Förster model for polymeric donors. The experimental values of the critical radius R₀, ranging from 1.3 to 2.5 nm for the different blends, are in good agreement with theory for a wide interval of the physical and spectroscopic parameters. This suggests that other mechanisms for excitation transfer do not play a significant role in these materials.     

Structural hierarchy of rock masses and the mechanisms of its formation

The formation mechanisms for the structural hierarchy in geological media are discussed. It is shown that the formation of such a hierarchy is caused by certain external and internal circumstances. The first ones consist in the fact that, because of external actions, the Earth’s poles continuously execute the translational and rotational motions responsible for a regular structure of rock fracture and for the appearance of the scale factor √2. The second ones consist in the fact that, under the action of many random factors and because of external actions, during the formation of geological media there appear dissipative structures and, hence, some self-similar fractal structures are formed.     

Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument

Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct re-construction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination, that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that, properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc.