Some thoughts on saddle-point conditions and information structures in zero-sum differential games

For a very simple two-stage, linear-quadratic, zero-sum difference game with dynamic information structure, we show that (i) there exist nonlinear saddle-point strategies which require the same existence conditions as the well-known linear, closed-loop, no-memory solution and (ii) there exist both linear and nonlinear saddle-point strategies which require more stringent conditions than the unique open-loop solution. We then discuss the implication of this result with respect to the existence of saddle points in zero-sum differential games for different information patterns.     

Role of information in the stochastic zero-sum differential game

In this paper, a linear-quadratic Gaussian zero-sum differential game is studied. Maneuverability is defined to measure players' strength. It is shown that a more maneuverable player would prefer a more observable information system. An example is given to show that a more controllable player might not prefer more observable measurements in the stochastic environment.The research reported in this paper was made possible through support extended to the Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University, by the US Office of Naval Research under the Joint Services Electronics Program by Contract No. N00014-75-c-0648 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. GK31511.     

On saddlepoints of two-person zero-sum games with applications to data verification tests

A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of saddlepoint strategies of two-person zero-sum games is given which may be described as follows: The set of pure strategies for one of the two players is a compact metric space. His opponent has a best answer to each randomized strategy. The payoff function satisfies a continuity condition concerning the weak convergence of probability measures. These conditions are neither covered by those of well known existence theorems for saddlepoints nor do they generalize them. They are applied to treat important practical problems that have not been solved before. Received November 1995/Revised version August 1998     

A multistage game with incomplete information requiring an infinite memory

This paper describes a zero-sum, discrete, multistage, time-lag game in which, for one player, there is no integerk such that an optimal strategy, for a new move during play, can always be determined as a function of the pastk state positions; that is, the player requires an infinite memory. The game is a pursuit-evasion game with the payoff to the maximizing player being the time to capture.This paper is the result of work carried out at the University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia, under an Australian Commonwealth Postgraduate Award.The author should like to thank the referee for his valued suggestions.     

A markov chain game with dynamic information

Two players, not knowing each other's position, move in a domain and can flash a searchlight. The game terminates when one player is caught within the area illuminated by the flash of the other. However, if this first player is not in this area, then the other player has disclosed his position to the former one, who may be able to exploit this information. The game is considered on a finite state space and in discrete time.The work of the second author was supported by ZWO, The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research, Contract No. B62-239, by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Grant No. AFOSR-85-0245, and by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. NSF-INT-8504097.Visiting Professor at Delft University of Technology during 1986.     

Infinitely constrained optimization problems

A generalized cutting-plane algorithm designed to solve problems of the form min{f(x) :x X andg(x,y) 0 for ally Y} is described. Convergence is established in the general case (f,g continuous,X andY compact). Constraint dropping is allowed in a special case [f,g(·,y) convex functions,X a convex set]. Applications are made to a variety of max-min problems. Computational considerations are discussed.Dr. Falk's research was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Air Force Systems Command, USAF, under AFOSR Contract No. 73–2504.     

Formulation and analysis of combat problems as zero-sum bicriterion differential games

In this paper, we present a formulation and analysis of a combat game between two players as a zero-sum bicriterion differential game. Each player's twin objectives of terminating the game on his own target set, while simultaneously avoiding his opponent's target set, are quantified in this approach. The solution in open-loop pure strategies is sought from among the Pareto-optimal security strategies of the players. A specific preference ordering on the outcomes is used to classify initial events in the assured win, draw, and mutual kill regions for the players. The method is compared with the event-constrained differential game approach, recently proposed by others. Finally, a simple example of the turret game is solved to illustrate the use of this method.     

A differential game with two pursuers and one evader

This paper is concerned with a coplanar pursuit-evasion problem in which a faster evaderE with constant speedw>1 must pass between two pursuersP ₁,P ₂ having unit speed, the payoff being the distance of closest approach to either one of the pursuers. The control variables are the directions of the velocities ofP ₁,P ₂, andE. The path equations are integrated, and a closed-form solution is obtained in terms of elliptic functions of the first and second kind. A closed-loop solution is given graphically in several diagrams, for different values ofw.     

Non zero-sum stochastic games in admission,service and routing control in queueing systems

The purpose of this paper is to investigate situations of non-cooperative dynamic control of queueing systems by two agents, having different objectives. The main part of the paper is devoted to analyzing a problem of an admission and a service (vacation) control. The admission controller has to decide whether to allow arrivals to occur. Once the queue empties, the server goes on vacation, and controls the vacations duration (according to the state and past history of the queue). The immediate costs for each controller are increasing in the number of customers, but no convexity assumptions are made. The controllers are shown to have a stationary equilibrium policy pair, for which each controller uses a stationary threshold type policy with randomization in at most one state. We then investigate a problem of a non-zero sum stochastic game between a router into several queues, and a second controller that allocates some extra service capacity to one of the queues. We establish the equilibrium of a policy pair for which the router uses the intuitive Join the shortest queue policy.     

On the existence of the stabilizing solution of generalized Riccati equations arising in zero-sum stochastic difference games: the time-varying case

In this paper, a large class of time-varying Riccati equations arising in stochastic dynamic games is considered. The problem of the existence and uniqueness of some globally defined solution, namely the bounded and stabilizing solution, is investigated. As an application of the obtained existence results, we address in a second step the problem of infinite-horizon zero-sum two players linear quadratic (LQ) dynamic game for a stochastic discrete-time dynamical system subject to both random switching of its coefficients and multiplicative noise. We show that in the solution of such an optimal control problem, a crucial role is played by the unique bounded and stabilizing solution of the considered class of generalized Riccati equations.     

Algorithms for uniform optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information

We deal with zero-sum two-player stochastic games with perfect information. We propose two algorithms to find the uniform optimal strategies and one method to compute the optimality range of discount factors. We prove the convergence in finite time for one algorithm. The uniform optimal strategies are also optimal for the long run average criterion and, in transient games, for the undiscounted criterion as well.     

The Value of Preference Information in Agency Relationships

Standard models of agency theory often assume that the principal has complete information about the preferences of the agent. This paper starts from the assumption of incomplete information on the agent&2018;s preferences and models a situation where the principal can obtain additional preference information before concluding a contract with the agent. We introduce the concept of a Value of Preference Information (VPI), which describes the benefits to the principal from obtaining such information. This information can be obtained either before or after the principal knows the precise structure of the decision problems which will be delegated to the agent. Analytic and simulation techniques are used to study factors influencing the VPI in these two situations.     

Saddle-point equilibrium sequence in one class of singular infinite horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential games with state delays

ABSTRACT

We consider an infinite horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with state delays in the dynamics. The cost functional of this game does not contain a control cost of the minimizing player (the minimizer), meaning that the considered game is singular. For this game, definitions of the saddle-point equilibrium and the game value are proposed. These saddle-point equilibrium and game value are obtained by a regularization of the singular game. Namely, we associate this game with a new differential game for the same equation of dynamics. The cost functional in the new game is the sum of the original cost functional and an infinite horizon integral of the square of the minimizer's control with a small positive weight coefficient. This new game is regular, and it is a cheap control game. An asymptotic analysis of this cheap control game is carried out. Using this asymptotic analysis, the existence of the saddle-point equilibrium and the value of the original game is established, and their expressions are derived. Illustrative example is presented.     

On a square haystack game

A haystack game is a hider-seeker zero-sum game of locating a needle in a haystack. Baston and Bostock have obtained partial solutions to this game for the case of a square haystack. This paper supplements their results, thus confirming their belief that a complete solution is difficult.The author would like to thank a referee for his helpful comments, in particular for suggesting Lemma 2.1 which has led to a more concise and transparent treatment of Section 2.     

Nonautonomous regulator problem in Hilbert spaces

In this paper, we study the quadratic optimal control problem on the half linett _o, for nonautonomous control processes in Hilbert spaces. We prove that the quadratic optimal control problem has a solution if, and only if, an associated Riccati equation has a positive solution fortt _o. The optimal control is given in feedback form. If a detectability assumption holds, then we prove that the optimal control is a stabilizing feedback control when the associated Riccati equation has a positive solution which is bounded fortt _o.This work was performed under the auspices of the National Research Council of Italy (CNR).     

Pricing problems with a continuum of customers as stochastic Stackelberg games

The pricing problem where a company sells a certain kind of product to a continuum of customers is considered. It is formulated as a stochastic Stackelberg game with nonnested information structure. The inducible region concept, recently developed for deterministic Stackelberg games, is extended to treat the stochastic pricing problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a pricing scheme to be optimal are derived, and the pricing problem is solved by first delineating its inducible region, and then solving a constrained optimal control problem.The research work reported here as supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECS-81-05984, Grant ECS-82-10673, and by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under AFOSR Grant 80-0098.     

On the order of elements in long minimal zero-sum sequences

Let G be a finite abelian group and S = a minimal zero-sum sequence in G of maximal length |S| = l. We study the order of the elements