虚拟组织收益分配的博弈分析

运用博弈分析的方法,对虚拟组织的收益分配问题进行了深入的研究,指出了绝对收益分配差距对合作伙伴总收益的影响,阐述了虚拟组织动态博弈条件下,收益分配应满足的条件,论证了按投入比例分配收益的不利影响,以及均分投入与收益的不现实,提出了全面认识弱势合作伙伴投入的价值,打破按投入比例分配收益对虚拟组织的意义.     

不完全博弈学习过程的虚拟行动规则

本文把博弈学习虚拟行动规则的学习时间一般化,研究不完全学习过程中参与人策略选择的收敛性及效用一致性问题. 分析结果表明：当学习时间不完全时,在学习一致到达的条件下,虚拟行动规则对严格纳什均衡是吸收的; 在学习时间充分及时与虚拟行动非频繁转换的条件下,各参与人的虚拟行动具有效用一致性.     

基于可拓方法的虚拟项目团队构架

虚拟项目团队是网络经济条件下产生的一种新的团队组织形式,目前,许多知识型项目团队的构架均采用这种方式.利用可拓工程方法完成了虚拟项目团队从任务确定、职责分工、人员甄选,直到项目团队构架的整个过程.方法的运用,为虚拟项目团队的进一步研究提供了一种新的思维方式和研究方法.     

弱相关试验设计

将选择交换向量分量的方法引入蒙特卡诺法,向量搜索速度大大提高,构造出了m×(m-1)维弱相关设计矩阵,只要m≠4k+2,k为正整数,便都包含一个零相关子阵,试验点分布均衡分散,回归系数估计简单且相关性小.给出了一个包含7×3维零相关子阵的7×6维弱相关矩阵的例子.     

初中学生心理测量的统计分析

本文用相关分析说明了〈中学生素质特点分类培养〉项目研究中所用各种心理诊断量表整体组合运用的合理性 ;用因子分析简化了测试项目的指标体系 ,选定了适当的公共主因子 ,并对公因子给予了合理的解释 ;用聚类分析依据因子得分对学生实施心理素质特点分类 ;根据学生的心理素质特点类型提出了相应的宏观培养策略     

不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性

本文在已知不确定参数变化范围的假设下,研究了不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性.首先,基于经典非合作博弈NS均衡概念提出了不确定参数下群体博弈NS均衡的定义;其次,在支付函数连续性与凸性的一定假设下,利用Ky Fan不等式证明了均衡的存在性;最后,给出了不确定参数下群体博弈模型NS均衡集通有稳定性的相关结论,运用Fort引理证明了在Baire分类的意义下,当支付函数发生扰动时,大多数不确定参数下群体博弈的NS均衡点集都是稳定的.     

收费机制下利己-利他混合交通均衡分配的效率损失

运用解析推导方法对收费机制下利己-利他混合交通均衡分配问题的效率损失进行研究.首先,构建了收费机制下利己-利他混合交通均衡分配问题的等价变分不等式模型;然后,通过解析推导方法得到了收费不作为系统总出行时间成本一部分时的效率损失上界;最后,给出了路段出行时间成本函数为多项式函数时的上界表达式.研究结果表明,效率损失上界与路段出行时间成本函数类、利他系数以及出行需求划分系数相关,结论以现有文献有关结论为特例.     

对相关市场条件下贸易竞争的博弈机制及福利效应的研究

在古诺双头模型的框架内分析了市场风险和相关因素对贸易竞争均衡和福利水平的影响.与传统模型不同,假设各国市场具有潜在相关的随机需求,且出口企业具有风险规避的态度,并利用博弈模型研究了市场风险和相关因子对竞争力和成本优势形成的产出效应及定价行为的影响.推论表明国际市场的不确定性和相关性削弱了企业在完全信息条件下参与贸易竞争的动机,而各国的福利水平则取决于企业风险态度、市场风险和相关系数的特定组合.     

虚拟科技创新团队知识转移稳定性研究——基于演化博弈视角

虚拟科技创新团队作为一种优势资源的有效整合机制和从事创新性工作的知识密集型组织,知识的有效转移和持续流动是其成功的关键。本文运用演化博弈论的方法,将转移效应、制度因素、成本损失等影响知识转移的主要因素作为研究问题的关注角度,以知识转移效用函数为切入点,对虚拟科技创新团队知识转移的条件进行分析,系统研究了团队内部知识转移的稳定性、持续性以及演化趋势,并在此基础上提出了改善虚拟科技创新团队知识转移的对策建议。     

股权结构对代理成本影响的实证分析

本文运用典型相关分析的方法对股权结构与代理成本各指标之间的关系进行了实证研究,实证研究表明从股权结构角度考虑,股权集中度与股权权衡度是影响代理成本的主要因素。     

Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage.  We prove that every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payoff. In other words, for every ε>0 there exists a probability distribution p _ε over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1−ε, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p _ε and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than ε in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy. Received: April 2001/Revised: June 4, 2002     

Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games

A correlated equilibrium in a two-person game is “good” if for everyNash equilibrium there is a player who prefers the correlated equilibrium to theNash equilibrium. If a game is “best-response equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game, then it has no good correlated equilibria. But games which are “almost strictly competitive” or “order equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game may have good correlated equilibria.     

A differential game model of a market of substitutable products

Modern industrial organization often classifies groups of differentiated products that are fairly good substitutes to belong to the same market. This paper develops a differential game model of a market of substitutable products. To avoid the problem of time-inconsistency, we solve a feedback Nash equilibrium solution for the game. A set of state-dependent equilibrium strategies is derived. Extensions of the model to a stochastic formulation and to an infinite time horizon specification are also provided.     

Correlated equilibrium and concave games

This paper shows that if a game satisfies the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium provided by Rosen (Econometrica 33:520, 1965), then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, it shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. The condition generalizes the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium provided by Neyman (Int J Game Theory 26:223, 1997) for a potential game with a strictly concave potential function. I thank the editor, an associate editor, and an anonymous referee for detailed comments and suggestions, which have substantially improved this paper. Special thanks are due to the referee for pointing out Lemmas 4 and 5. I acknowledge financial support by The Japan Economic Research Foundation and by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research. All remaining errors are mine.     

On weakly correlated and correlated equilibria in discontinuous games

This paper treats of non-zero-sum discontinuous games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces. It is assumed that the payoff function of each player in the game is bounded, Borel measurable and is upper semicontinuous on his strategy space, for all fixed actions of the remaining players. It is shown that for each ε>0, such games possess weakly correlated ε-epuilibria introduced by Moulin and Vial as extension of correlated equilibria in the sense of Aumann. An upper semicontinuous came having weakly correlated equilibria and no correlated equilibria is discussed in details.     

基于多层博弈的智能电网住宅电力实时需求响应机制

通过建立多层博弈模型刻画智能电网系统中电力公司、家庭电力管理中心和家庭内各个电器设备间的电力实时需求响应过程。在此模型中,每个时段电力公司将电价通知各个家庭,每个家庭的电力管理中心接收到实时电价信息后为家庭内各个电器设备分配虚拟电价,各个设备则确定各自最优用电量并将其反馈给家庭电力管理中心,由其确定该家庭总用电量并发送至电力公司,电力公司再计算得到最优电价。证明了所建多层博弈模型的均衡存在唯一性,并得到均衡解。仿真结果验证了模型的有效性,并给出其实际应用价值。     

Correlated equilibrium and potential games

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.     

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.     

Internal correlation in repeated games

This paper characterizes the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs in two player repeated games where the signal that the players get after each stage is either trivial (does not reveal any information) or standard (the signal is the pair of actions played). It turns out that if the information is not always trivial then the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of the correlated equilibrium payoffs. In particular, any correlated equilibrium payoff of the one shot game is also a Nash equilibrium payoff of the repeated game.For the proof we develop a scheme by which two players can generate any correlation device, using the signaling structure of the game. We present strategies with which the players internally correlate their actions without the need of an exogenous mediator.