Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives

Supply chain coordination has become critical to firms as increased pressure is placed on them to improve performance. We evaluate the performance of Push, Pull, and Advance-purchase discount (APD) contracts in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where one or both firms have a satisficing objective of maximizing the probability of achieving a target profit. We identify the resulting operational modes of the supply chain and potential conflicts over the preferred contracts under the Push, Pull, and APD contracts. When both firms are satisficing, conflict over the preferred contract arises when the manufacturer has an ambitious profit target or the retailer has a low profit target. We show that the Push contract can result in a large decrease in the expected profit of a risk-neutral manufacturer when the retailer maximizes the probability of achieving her maximum expected profit. We find that a modified buy-back and profit guarantee contracts can provide significant Pareto improvement over Push or APD contracts when the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is satisficing, while revenue-sharing contracts cannot. In contrast, revenue sharing and modified buy-back contracts are Pareto dominant under certain conditions when the manufacturer is satisficing and the retailer is risk-neutral.     

Pareto quantity flexibility contracts for a supply chain under multiple objectives

We analyse a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The terms of trade between the two agents are specified by a quantity flexibility (QF) contract. We first identify the Pareto QF contracts for the supply chain where each agent adopts a satisficing objective, that is, to maximize the probability of achieving his/her predetermined target profit. It is shown that to coordinate such a supply chain, QF contracts have to degenerate into wholesale price (WP) contracts. This provides an additional justification for the popularity of WP contracts besides their simplicities and lower administration costs. Next, we consider the supply chain where each agent adopts multiple objectives, namely the satisficing objective and the objective of expected profit maximization (EPM). It is shown that there always exist QF contracts that coordinate the supply chain under the objective of EPM and are simultaneously Pareto optimal for the satisficing objective.     

Coordination of a two-level supply chain with contracts

4OR - We consider the coordination of planning decisions of a single product in a supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, by using contracts. We assume that the retailer has the...     

Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.     

Transshipment incentive contracts in a multi-level supply chain

Transshipments within a supply chain can be difficult to implement as the costs and benefits are often incurred by different parties. This difficulty becomes even more problematic when the costs and benefits are not completely known by all parties. The primary purpose of this paper is to introduce the role of asymmetric information into the design of supply chain transshipment contracts. Using a representative supply chain from within the soft drink industry as an example, a multi-level contracting framework is developed that aligns incentives to encourage transshipments and improve performance in the absence of all parties having full information. Analysis of the proposed framework suggests that, even if a transshipment is likely to be unprofitable to the transshipping dyad, it may still be best for the entire supply chain. Moreover, overall supply chain inventories with transshipments do not necessarily increase relative to the no-transshipment case.     

The coordinating contracts for a fuzzy supply chain with effort and price dependent demand

This paper investigates the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with fuzzy demand that is dependent on both retail price and sales effort. In contrast with the centralized and decentralized decision models, two coordinating models based on symmetric information and asymmetric information about retailer’s scale parameter are developed by game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples yield the maximal supply chain profits in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized situation and greater than that in the decentralized situation. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract.     

Long-term and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand

Recent applications of game-theoretic analysis to supply chain efficiency have focused on constructs between a buyer (the retailer or manufacturer) and a seller (the supplier) in successive stages of a supply chain. If demand for the final product is stochastic then the supplier has an incentive to keep its capacity relatively low to avoid creating unneeded capacity. The manufacturer, on the other hand, prefers the supplier’s capacity to be high to ensure that the final demand is satisfied. The manufacturer therefore constructs a contract to induce the supplier to increase its production capacity. Most research examines contracting when final demand is realized after the manufacturer places its order to the supplier. However, if final demand is realized before the manufacturer places its order to the supplier, these types of contracts can be ineffective. This paper examines two contracts under the latter timing scenario: long-term contracts in which the business relationship is repeated, and penalty contracts in which the supplier is penalized for too little capacity. Results indicate long-term contracts increase the profit potential of the supply chain. Furthermore, the penalty contracts can ensure that the supplier chooses a capacity level such that the full profit potential is achieved.     

Pareto-optimal insurance contracts with premium budget and minimum charge constraints

In view of the fact that minimum charge and premium budget constraints are natural economic considerations in any risk-transfer between the insurance buyer and seller, this paper revisits the optimal insurance contract design problem in terms of Pareto optimality with imposing these practical constraints. Pareto optimal insurance contracts, with indemnity schedule and premium payment, are solved in the cases when the risk preferences of the buyer and seller are given by Value-at-Risk or Tail Value-at-Risk. The effect of our constraints and the relative bargaining powers of the buyer and seller on the Pareto optimal insurance contracts are highlighted. Numerical experiments are employed to further examine these effects for some given risk preferences.     

Sustaining long-term supply chain partnerships using price-only contracts

In this paper, we study how an informal, long-term relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer performs in turbulent market environments characterized by uncertain demand. We show that the long-term partnership based on repeated interaction is sustainable under price-only contracts when the supply chain partners are sufficiently patient. That is, the channel can be coordinated over a long time horizon when the factor whereby the members discount the future value of this trusting relationship is sufficiently high. Second, above the minimum discount factor, a range of wholesale prices exists that can sustain the long-term partnership, and there are different possible profit divisions between the two players. Third, when the market is turbulent, i.e., either the expected demand or the demand variance changes from period to period according to a probabilistic law, it is typically less possible to sustain the long-term partnership in a booming market or in a market with low demand variability. Finally, obtaining more information about future market fluctuation may not help the supply chain to sustain the long-term partnership, due to partners’ strategic considerations. With the availability of the market signal, total supply chain profits increase, but the retailer may even be worse-off.     

均值-CVaR零售商的供应链服务决策及协调契约

研究零售商具有风险偏好行为下,同时考虑价格、质量和服务水平的供应链联合决策问题。运用均值-CVaR准则来刻画零售商风险偏好行为,它包括风险厌恶、风险中性和风险追求,同时具有损失规避的特性。首先得到供应链集中系统、制造商提供服务（模型$\mbox{I}$）和零售商提供服务（模型$\mbox{II}$）下的最优决策和最优利润（期望效用）。其次,证明了成本共担契约在零售商风险厌恶时可以实现供应链协调.第三,对模型$\mbox{I}$和模型$\mbox{II}$协调后的最优利润（期望效用）进行比较,证明两种模型下制造商利润相同,而与模型$\mbox{I}$相比,模型$\mbox{II}$下零售商获得更多的期望效用。最后,数值例子证明了得到的研究结果。     

A single-period inventory placement problem for a supply system with the satisficing objective

Consider the inventory placement problem in an N-stage supply system facing a stochastic demand for a single planning period. Each stage is a stocking point holding some form of inventory (e.g., raw materials, subassemblies, product returns or finished products) that after a suitable transformation can satisfy demand. Stocking decisions are made before demand occurs. Unsatisfied demands are lost. The revenue, salvage value, ordering, transformation, and lost sales costs are proportional. There are fixed costs for utilizing stages for stock storage. The objective is to maximize the probability of achieving a given target profit level.     

Option contracts: a solution for overloading problems in the delivery service supply chain

Owing to the limited service capacity of express delivery providers, most online retailers have to reject many orders during hot selling seasons. In this paper, we consider an express delivery service supply chain consisting of an express delivery provider and an online retailer whereby the selling season includes both regular periods and online sales periods. Utilizing a modified newsvendor model, we derive the express delivery provider’s optimal capacity decision and find that the overloading problem cannot be avoided because delivery service cannot be inventoried. To solve such a problem, we introduce an option contract to coordinate the supply chain. By allowing the online retailer to book the capacity, the express delivery provider can rent capacity from a third party in advance. Results show this approach can mitigate the problem significantly. We also extend our model to a supply chain consisting of a delivery provider and two retailers.     

The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts

Consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a dominant retailer, such as big supermarkets like Walmart. Under a consignment contract with revenue sharing, the two manufacturers sell through the retailer two substitutable products whose demands are dependent on their shelf space and sales prices. The two manufacturers may compete horizontally for shelf space and pricing by three scenarios: Nash game, Stackelberg game, and collusion, and play vertically the retailer-Stackelberg game with the retailer. For each of these horizontal scenarios, we present all participators’ equilibrium strategies and their corresponding profits, based on which the impacts of manufacturers’ cost difference and moving sequence are investigated. Additionally, we discuss whether a horizontal collusion among manufacturers occurs when they choose their scenarios and whether centralization is always beneficial for the entire chain under the considered consignment contract. The study reveals the following results: (i) When the manufacturers compete horizontally, the high-cost manufacturer always sets a high-price and less shelf space strategy, while the low-cost manufacturer always adopts a low-price and more shelf space strategy, which is not affected by their moving sequence. If they collude horizontally, it is just reverse. (ii) When the two manufacturers compete horizontally, all participators’ equilibrium strategies and their corresponding profits are significantly influenced by manufacturers’ moving sequence. (iii) A horizontal collusion between the manufacturers can occur only when their cost difference is relatively small; this finding supplements existing literature. (iv) When the cost difference between manufacturers is relatively big, then centralization may be detrimental to the entire chain, which can explain why several supply chains adopt vertical competition strategies in practice. In addition, we find that these results still hold for the limited shelf space scenario and shelf-space limitation enhances the horizontal and vertical competition intensity by increasing shelf space fee.     

Strategic robust supply chain design based on the Pareto-optimal tradeoff between efficiency and risk

The strategic design of a robust supply chain has to determine the configuration of the supply chain so that its performance remains of a consistently high quality for all possible future conditions. The current modeling techniques often only consider either the efficiency or the risk of the supply chain. Instead, we define the strategic robust supply chain design as the set of all Pareto-optimal configurations considering simultaneously the efficiency and the risk, where the risk is measured by the standard deviation of the efficiency. We model the problem as the Mean–Standard Deviation Robust Design Problem (MSD-RDP). Since the standard deviation has a square root expression, which makes standard maximization algorithms based on mixed-integer linear programming non-applicable, we show the equivalency to the Mean–Variance Robust Design Problem (MV-RDP). The MV-RDP yields an infinite number of mixed-integer programming problems with quadratic objective (MIQO) when considering all possible tradeoff weights. In order to identify all Pareto-optimal configurations efficiently, we extend the branch-and-reduce algorithm by applying optimality cuts and upper bounds to eliminate parts of the infeasible region and the non-Pareto-optimal region. We show that all Pareto-optimal configurations can be found within a prescribed optimality tolerance with a finite number of iterations of solving the MIQO. Numerical experience for a metallurgical case is reported.     

Price-only contracts with backup supply

This paper studies a supply chain in which a manufacturer holds backup supply with extra cost to satisfy demand unmet by a retailer. We provide a simple threshold condition for when the manufacturer should hold backup supply. We also study how the backup supply affects the supply chain performance.     

Heuristic approaches to determine base-stock levels in a serial supply chain with a single objective and with multiple objectives

This paper deals with the problem of determination of installation base-stock levels in a serial supply chain. The problem is treated first as a single-objective inventory-cost optimization problem, and subsequently as a multi-objective optimization problem by considering two cost components, namely, holding costs and shortage costs. Variants of genetic algorithms are proposed to determine the best base-stock levels in the single-objective case. All variants, especially random-key gene-wise genetic algorithm (RKGGA), show an excellent performance, in terms of convergence to the best base-stock levels across a variety of supply chain settings, with minimum computational effort. Heuristics to obtain base-stock levels are proposed, and heuristic solutions are introduced in the initial population of the RKGGA to expedite the convergence of the genetic search process. To deal with the multi-objective supply-chain inventory optimization problem, a simple multi-objective genetic algorithm is proposed to obtain a set of non-dominated solutions.     

Linking supply chain processes’ performance to a company’s financial strategic objectives

The main aim of this paper is to develop a performance measurement method which links supply chain (SC) processes’ performance to a company’s financial strategy through demonstrating and utilising the relationship between SC processes’ performance and a company’s financial performance.     

Pruned Pareto-optimal sets for the system redundancy allocation problem based on multiple prioritized objectives

In this paper, a new methodology is presented to solve different versions of multi-objective system redundancy allocation problems with prioritized objectives. Multi-objective problems are often solved by modifying them into equivalent single objective problems using pre-defined weights or utility functions. Then, a multi-objective problem is solved similar to a single objective problem returning a single solution. These methods can be problematic because assigning appropriate numerical values (i.e., weights) to an objective function can be challenging for many practitioners. On the other hand, methods such as genetic algorithms and tabu search often yield numerous non-dominated Pareto optimal solutions, which makes the selection of one single best solution very difficult. In this research, a tabu search meta-heuristic approach is used to initially find the entire Pareto-optimal front, and then, Monte-Carlo simulation provides a decision maker with a pruned and prioritized set of Pareto-optimal solutions based on user-defined objective function preferences. The purpose of this study is to create a bridge between Pareto optimality and single solution approaches.     

Penalties,rewards, and inspection: provisions for quality in supply chain contracts

Rewards for better quality, penalties for poorer quality, and the type of inspection policy are among the most common quality-related provisions of supply chain contracts. In this paper, we examine the effect of rewards, penalities, and inspection policies on the behaviour of an expected cost minimizing supplier. We assume that the supplier selects a batch size and target quality level in order to meet a buyer's deterministic demand. We show that the reward and/or penalty that motivates a supplier to deliver the buyer's target quality depends upon the inspection policy. We also show that, when sampling inspection is used, penalties and rewards are substitutes for one another in motivating the supplier and that there exists a unique reward/penalty combination at which the buyer's expected cost of quality is zero.     

Investigation of rolling horizon flexibility contracts in a supply chain under highly variable stochastic demand

Email: patrick.walsh{at}ul.ie Received on 19 January 2007. Accepted on 3 October 2007. A discrete-event simulation model of a supply chain has beendeveloped to evaluate operational performance of sharing uncertaininformation on upcoming demand between an original equipmentmanufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer under a formalrolling horizon flexibility (RHF) contract in a four-node supplychain. There are two types of RHF contracts evaluated, i.e.RHF contract with constant flexibility and decreasing flexibilitybounds. The demand is externalized (i.e. the OEM receives thedemand), stochastic and generated according to a gamma distribution.This paper reports on the analysis of RHF contracts operatingwith coefficients of variation of demand up to 2.00. Analysisof the interaction of RHF contracts with forecasting and theimpact an RHF contract has on the transmission of the bullwhipeffect are reported here.