Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms

This paper examines strategic investment games between two firms that compete for optimal entry in a project that generates uncertain revenue flows. Under asymmetry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows of the two competing firms, we investigate the value of real investment options and strategic interaction of investment decisions. Compared to earlier models that only allow for asymmetry on sunk cost, our model demonstrates a richer set of strategic interactions of entry decisions. We provide a complete characterization of pre-emptive, dominant and simultaneous equilibriums by analyzing the relative value of leader’s and follower’s optimal investment thresholds. In a duopoly market with negative externalities, a firm may reduce loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre-emptive entry. When one firm has a dominant advantage over its competitor, both the dominant firm and dominated firm enter at their respective leader’s and follower’s optimal thresholds. When the pre-emptive thresholds of both firms happen to coincide, the two firms enter simultaneously. Under positive externalities, firms do not compete to lead.     

Resource-based strategies and problem structuring: using resource maps to manage resource systems

The resource-based view of strategy seeks to explain why some firms consistently outperform rivals in the same industry by acquiring a unique set of strategic assets (or resources). However, differences between dominant managerial mental models in management teams lead to disagreement at the moment of implementing distinct resource-building strategies. This managerial and cognitive view of strategic decision making and competition lends itself to investigation through problem structuring methods. We suggest that resource maps, as a problem structuring method, can be used to interpret managerial mental models for strategic decision making in terms of resource-building processes. Through resource maps, we represent the system of asset stocks believed to be most important for driving business performance. We illustrate the framework by comparing and contrasting maps of the system of resources (asset stocks) that best characterize two leading firms in the UK commercial radio broadcasting industry.     

An empirical study of relationship between IT investment and firm performance: A resource-based perspective

The resource-based view of the enterprises generally attributes superior financial performance to organizational resources and capabilities. Firm-specific IT resources are classified as IT infrastructure, human-IT resources, and IT-enabled intangibles. This paper empirically examines the association between IT investment and firm performance. Results indicate that firms with high levels of IT infrastructure and human-IT resources have a strong positive relationship with IT-enabled intangibles, but not with firm performance. In addition, IT-enabled intangibles are strongly positively correlated with firm performance. The relationships between IT investment and corporate IT capability are also examined. The results suggest that IT investments have begun to show results, indicating that they can make a positive contribution to firm IT infrastructure. However, the various measures of IT investment do not appear to have a positive relationship with human-IT resources, and IT-enabled intangibles. Although IT investment is likely to improve organizational IT infrastructure, but the IT-enabled intangibles is the key factor to effect the business performance, and the human-IT resource is a driving force for the IT-enabled intangibles.     

A Computational Model of Technological Innovation at the Firm Level

The factors which speed and slow technological innovation have been of interest to policy makers since at least the mid 1960's. Since that time, many theoretical models of innovation at the firm level and at the industry level have been proposed. Due to limitations in computational complexity, nearly all of these models have assumed a single, representative firm type. Very few have systematically investigated the implications of markets with a variety of firm types. With increases in computing power and the advent of agent-based modeling, interactions between agent types can now be explored. In this paper, a computational model of innovative firms in competitive markets is presented. Firms devote resources to R&D which can lead to new, improved products allowing firms to steal market share from their competitors. Two types of firms, differentiated by the strategies they use in pursuing new innovations, are allowed to coexist. One type pursues exclusively radical innovations, while the other pursues exclusively incremental innovations. It will be demonstrated that under certain conditions, a synergy exists between firms of different types which allows heterogeneous populations of firms to earn more than homogeneous ones.     

Anticipated responses: The positive side of elicited reactions to competitive action

This study advances the action-oriented perspective on strategy dynamics. Strategy research suggests that a firm’s profit will decrease when facing rival responses, yet anecdotal evidence indicates that countermoves may enhance its performance. What is the interaction effect of simultaneous negative- and positive-side competitive responses on organisational performance? We propose that the answer depends not only on the actor’s characteristics but also the action’s characteristics. Grounded in empirical facts, our formal model of competitive dynamics examines the possibility of anticipated responses that are deliberately elicited by the attacking firm. We show that against attentive rivals, a firm with high attention and low aggressiveness can utilise visible actions to achieve its strategic intention and deployment. Our study offers significant implications for theory and practice.     

Modelling heterogeneity in a manpower system: a review

Manpower planning is an essential methodology for business and industry; it allows managers to make more efficient use of human resources. However, human behaviour is highly variable and it is therefore essential for manpower planning that population heterogeneity is successfully modelled. In this paper we review methods of incorporating population heterogeneity into manpower modelling. The analysis of differentials in a manpower system is emphasized since they are a source of aggregation error in stochastic models. Two strategies have been stressed, the use of observable sources of heterogeneity as they affect wastage, and the latent sources which cannot be identified precisely but are known to affect the key parameters of most models. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Returns to scale pattern and efficient firm size in the public accounting industry: an empirical investigation

This paper employs Data Envelopment Analysis to investigate returns to scale patterns and efficient firm size in the public accounting industry in the USA post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Using contemporary survey data from Accounting Today's top-100 accounting firms for the years 2003 and 2004, our results indicate that the very largest accounting (first tier) firms display constant returns to scale, whereas approximately half of the smaller (second tier) firms exhibit increasing returns to scale. These findings suggest that while very large firms are optimally scaled, there still are economic efficiencies to be gained through expanding the size of nearly half of the second-tier accounting firms. Results for the remaining second-tier firms show either constant or decreasing returns to scale, indicating that they are either already optimally sized or that they should consider contraction. The results for the second-tier firms remain qualitatively unchanged when the first-tier firms are excluded from the estimation.     

Investment and financing decisions in the presence of time-to-build

We study a firm’s optimal decisions on investment, default, and financing when the amount of time and the running costs for project completion are uncertain. In the presence of time-to-build, a firm makes conservative investment and financing decisions; investment is delayed, and the optimal leverage ratio is inverted U-shaped with respect to the size of the lag. Although equity holders can choose to default before the project has been completed, the default probability in the presence of time-to-build is lower than that in the absence of a lag in most cases because of the conservative investment and financing decisions. Given the lower default probability, equity holders may benefit more from debt financing in the presence of time-to-build than they would in the absence of a lag. When firms can shorten their expected time-to-build by bearing more costs, unlevered firms strive to reduce the lag more than optimally levered firms do. However, highly levered firms utilize more resources to reduce the lag than all-equity firms do because equity holders are more concerned about the possibility of default before the project’s completion.     

医药产学研联盟创新决策、创新危机与利润分配

以我国医药行业产学研合作创新为现实背景,构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型,分析企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响,探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响,研究制药企业创新战略的选择决策及创新对企业可能的危险。通过模型分析,得到如下结论:产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利,但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格;议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响;虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿,但盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果。本研究对促进医药行业的产学研合作,提高产学研合作的有效性具有现实意义。     

考虑消费者从众特性的动态定价研究

面对掌握大量信息的消费者,厂商需考虑多方因素制定价格策略。研究运用经典的博弈模型,讨论不同消费者特性情况下厂商的定价机制。模型按从众特性和等待特性将消费者分为六类,并引入一个价格偏差变量,分析各类型消费者比例变化对厂商定价和利润的影响。结果显示,一般情况下降价幅度、消费者期望购买总数量和期望销售利润都随着反从众消费者比例的增大而增加。最后扩展分析了效益贴现率,反从众消费者比例和短视型消费者比例三因素对厂商总利润的影响,研究认为效益贴现率和从众消费者比例较高时,厂商利润会随着短视型消费者比例的降低而有所提高。因此,为使收益最大化,厂商在制定定价策略时需同时考虑贴现因素和消费者行为特性。     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.     

Dynamic Advertising Under Vertical Product Differentiation

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly, and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with the output levels.     

Strategic multi-store opening under financial constraint

This paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm. Specifically, given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open, they sequentially determine the number of store openings, including their locations, to maximize their profits. As a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework, we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved. When firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market, the leader chooses “segmentation strategy,” in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower’s entry. In contrast, when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market, the leader chooses “minimum differentiation strategy,” where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival’s. Under this strategy, the leader necessarily captures just half of the market. Furthermore, we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms, both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium.     

A Markov Model of Referral-Based Hiring and Workplace Segregation

I construct a Markov model of referral hiring to look at two issues: inequality between groups and workplace segregation. The model differs from most models of referral hiring in that it explicitly considers a firm structure where employment opportunities arise. The model suggests that referral hiring does not directly produce inequality between groups at the population level, even though firms have a bias toward hiring workers from the same group they already employ. The result highlights a difference between outcomes of referral hiring at the population and individual levels in that individual firm biases balance out when aggregated. However, referral hiring does produce segregation of groups across firms in a given industry, and the degree of segregation monotonically increases in the amount of referral hiring.     

Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry revised

We revisit the Cournot duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric costs of Delbono et al. (2016). In particular, the authors claim that a Prisoner Dilemma always arises. However, we show that, by setting properly the admissible parameter set, if the firms are sufficiently different, the efficient firm is better off when both firms delegate production. Therefore, in contrast with the traditional view, we claim that a Prisoner Dilemma is not an inevitable outcome in a strategic delegation game.     

Firms' R&D decisions under incomplete information

The paper considers a patent race in which firms do not know their relative positions. In this setting, firms that start in the same position proceed at the highest possible speed; and if one firm has an initial advantage it preempts the rival, but at the cost of dissipating a significant part of its monopoly rent. So the paper shows that incomplete information in a patent race leads to rent dissipation. The latter is higher, the higher the value of the prize and the lower the cost of R&D. Thus, for innovations that provide relatively high profits the time to discovery is shortened, but the social losses are likely to be high, due to duplication of effort.     

Allocating the gains from resource pooling with the Shapley Value

To make their cost structure more efficient, firms often pool their critical resources: small divisions of a large firm may negotiate a joint contract to benefit from volume discounts; or firms may outsource their call centres to an independent provider who is able to increase utilization by reducing variability since demand is now pooled. Since pooling demand reduces total joint costs, an immediate question is how the realized savings should be shared. We model the problem as a cooperative game and use the resulting allocation schemes to distribute the savings. One popular scheme is the Shapley Value, which always exists and, we show, represents each player's incremental value to the pool. When the pooled savings depend on the sum of each player's demand, we label the game coalition symmetric and propose, for those games, an algorithm that makes pseudo-polynomial the computation of the Shapley Value.     

Spatial competition and collaboration networks

We model the formation of collaboration networks among firms that are located in a circular city as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firms form collaboration links, and in the second stage, they engage in price competition. If two firms form a link, their production costs in the second stage are reduced. The second stage is a generalization of Salop??s (Bell J Econ 10(1):141?C156, 1979) circular city model. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices of the model. We show that a firm prefers forming a link with a more distant firm if the cost-reducing effects are the same. We discuss the stability and social efficiency of the collaboration networks. When link costs are small, there is no conflict between efficiency and stability of networks. When link costs are significant, there is a conflict between efficiency and stability of networks. We also examine the average distances between linked firms.     

Optimal Dynamic Investment Policy for Different Tax Depreciation Rates and Economic Depreciation Rates

This paper analyzes the investment policy consequences of incorporating a tax depreciation rate different from the economic depreciation rate. Most often, firms choose their tax depreciation rate in a strategic way. Therefore, it would be a coincidence, should the optimization process lead to a tax depreciation rate that equals the economic depreciation rate. The implications of a difference between tax depreciation rate and economic depreciation rate are investigated in an optimal control model for the determination of the firm investment policy over time.     

Portfolio selection under DEA-based relative financial strength indicators: case of US industries

Fundamental analysis is an approach for evaluating a firm for its investment-worthiness whereby the firm's financial statements are subject to detailed investigation to predict future stock price performance. In this paper, we propose an approach to combine financial statement data using Data Envelopment Analysis to determine a relative financial strength (RFS) indicator. Such an indicator captures a firm's fundamental strength or competitiveness in comparison to all other firms in the industry/market segment. By analysing the correlation of the RFS indicator with the historical stock price returns within the industry, a well-informed assessment can be made about considering the firm in an equity portfolio. We test the proposed indicator with firms from the technology sector, using various US industries and report correlation analyses. Our preliminary computations using RFS indicator-based stock selection within mean–variance portfolio optimization demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach.